

DERRIDA'S DECONSTRUCTION AS A METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

**Thesis submitted to the University of Calicut
for the award of the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Philosophy**

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2008

DECLARATION

I, Devadasan. P (Parol) hereby declare that this thesis entitled **‘DERRIDA’S DECONSTRUCTION AS A METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE’**, is an original work carried out in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calicut under the supervision of Professor Dr. A Kanthamani. I also declare that the work has not been submitted so far for the degree of Ph. D. or any other Degree from this or any other university.

Department of Philosophy,
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this thesis '**DERRIDA'S DECONSTRUCTION AS A METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF LANGUGAE**' is a bonafide record of research done by Sri. Devadasan. P (Parol) under my guidance and that no part of it has previously been submitted to any other university or academic body or published.

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Dr. A. Kanthamani
Supervising Teacher

Acknowledgement

The number of persons who have encouraged me during the course of this work are many. I reckon a few of them to whom my personal debts knew-no bounds. Firstly, my guide and supervising teacher, Professor Dr. A. Kanthamani, whose expert guidance and incessant encouragement always put me in confidence and determination. I prostrate before him and praying for his health and long life. Secondly, I remember my mother who left me two years back. It was my intention to submit the thesis if anything happen to her. Fate is faster than time? Thirdly, I thank ICPR for sending me the xeroxed copies of some valuable books.

Among the few other persons, I cannot ignore the names of Professor Dr. S. Nirmala and Smt. Sreekumari, Selection Grade Lecturer from the Russian department and Dr. Geethakumari K.K, Reader, Sanskrit department for extending their support and encouragement by providing all sorts of materials available to them.

Among the close officials, colleagues and friends, I list a few. The names, Sri. Harilal. K, former Press Superintend, Sri. P.G Thomas, University Engineer, Sri. T.J Martin, Sri. Praveen, Sri. John Antony, Sri. C.D Francis, Sri. Aravindakshan, Smt. Safeeya. N, Smt. Shirly.K.M, Smt. Shyni. K.G are some of the individuals who worked in me to overcome the cobwebs of lethargy and hesitation.

Above all, I cannot left unnoticed the name of Smt. Suja V.V, Typist, for her sincerity, dedication in typing.

Her quality of typing most often got recognition even from my guide. Lastly me own niece Miss. Neeraja, who was always at my willingness to provide materials from her college library as well as from internet. I thank all of them sincerely.

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PREFACE

Derrida has lived his life and his paradigm of deconstruction is still dying, that is, it continues. It reaches the limit, the edge (death), but it becomes 'post' (post-deconstruction). Lying of the intersection is his life which he cannot deconstruct and his *oeuvre*. His *oeuvre* remains as a massive, voluminous corpus, especially during the last decade of his life. Even if the early, middle Derrida is often understood to be away from philosophy, the late Derrida disproves this hypothesis. The question whether Derrida's 'analysis' (sometimes called as 'conceptual analysis' comes closer to 'analytic trends' which marked the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy, remains to be answered as yet. The answers vary and at times contradictory. It is the purpose of this thesis to look at this question afresh and to build a perspective on Derrida as an analytical philosopher on the basis of very extensive selection of his works. In executing this work, I have some opportunity to propose a corrective both to the received understanding of Derrida in the West and of course the 'Indo-Centric' reading of Derrida. Derridean analysis arrived to locate binary opposition in the grammatical side of writing and reading whereas analytic philosophers took the deep structure of language seriously. Thus both are not far from each other. An attempt is here made to draw from the large number of works to marshal evidences for proving the analytical philosophy behind deconstruction.

One interesting way, the above question can be answered is by calling attention to Quine's deconstructionist mode (indeterminacy) or Davidson's deconstructionist path on language ('there is no language'), meaning, belief, truth, etc. But the question whether there is anything that can be called paradigm of deconstruction within the analytical schools of philosophy is still open. The answer is found in Wittgenstein's own deconstruction of his own early work. This is analogous to Derrida's own reading of Husserl, that provides an important paradigm. So Derrida is an analyst like Frege or Russell or perhaps Wittgenstein, or Quine or Davidson, and this is what that appears to be evident in the famous debate between Austin-Searle and Derrida. Characteristically they talk past one another; still there is a reckoning and it is visible in the very manner of analysis both shared. This becomes more pronounced in 'late' Derrida where Derrida shared a platform with Habermas or even Lyotard. Lyotard called attention to the 'pagan urge to violate the rules', in *Le Juste*. The binary opposition between normative/parasitical deviant use of language echoes this. The relation is one that can be triangular. The relation between post-modernism, Derrideanism, and critical theory can be provably continuous with one another occupying the vortices. The distinction between them is a distinction without a difference. There is a central focus they all share in common, namely language, communication, meaning, inter-subjectivity etc.,

The thesis is presented as a distinct and complete perspective, may be first perspective after deconstruction has its quota of appeal to numerous philosophers. All of us, philosophers, as Gayatri Spivak says, are ‘touched by deconstruction’. This phrase reverberates in analysis. This is what is executed here in the thesis in terms of the choice of half a dozen THESES, interspersed with *three* major motifs presented in the backdrop of the entire analytical philosophy from Frege upto Kripke (Kripke is not mentioned by name, but he casts a shadow on the debate between Austin and Derrida (Chapter 1). The three chapters that follow are meant to evaluate the nuances of the arguments from both sides of the interface so as to assess the kind of interface it has.

Motif 1 is presented as the Quinean paradigm of deconstruction (Wheeler), followed by Motif 2, which presents the paradigm of deconstruction in Wittgenstein and Derrida (chapter 2 and 3). The penultimate chapter is critical assessment of the central claims of Norris, one of the most sympathetic literary giants to classify Derrida as an analyst as much in the sense of any other philosopher, excluding perhaps the other vortices in the triangle. I have tried to treat his reading only to add strength for my own central contention.

The project is not complete without the analysis of the ‘late’ Derrida which opens a potentially vast canvas, but it is worked out within the limitations of space. It is here his analysis of more recent philosophers like

Marx, Capitalism, Secularism, Cosmopolitanism, Heidegger and others along with his response to the image of the World Trade Centre when it crumbled only terrorist attack comes in to view. We have made it a point to study the distinction between Euro-Centric and Indo-Centric by commenting on some Indo-Centric readings of Derrida. With this, it is hoped that the perspective has ensured widest appeal cutting across cultures. The thesis also includes a fair summary and evaluation when the conclusions are highlighted along with the scope for the future.

Chapter I

'I am touched by Deconstruction'

- Gayatri Chakravorty Sripvak

**THE LINGUISTIC TURN
IN PHILOSOPHY**

Chapter II

'Deconstruction is Iterability'

- Derrida

**LOGOCENTRISM AND
DECONSTRUCTIVE
OVERTURES IN
WITTGENSTEIN**

Chapter III

**'Deconstruction has been dying for
sometime'**

- Derrida

**TWO POST-ANALYTICAL
EXTENSIONS OF
DECONSTRUCTION**

Chapter IV

'Deconstruction is violence'

- Derrida

**THE LOGIC OF
DECONSTRUCTION**

Chapter V

'America is deconstruction'

- Derrida

**'LATE' DERRIDA:
THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE
PUBLIC SPHERE**

CHAPTER I

THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY

1.1 The Linguistic Turn and the Deconstructive Turn: The *Entente Cordiale*

The objective of the thesis is to widen the scope of the Derridean rigours of deconstruction to cover the logic of the entire analytic traditions found within the analytic traditions (Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein), as well as in the post-analytic traditions (Quine, Davidson and Dummett). Before such an enquiry, it becomes necessary to unpack some of the leading definitions of deconstruction at the outset, so as to take it in the ‘maximalist’ sense than the ‘minimalist’ construal of analysis as envisaged by Christopher Norris.[#]

In his attempt to deconstruct logocentrism – the ‘phonocentric’ suspicion of writing as a parasite upon the authenticity of speech – Derrida translated and adapted the German words ‘*destruktion*’ or ‘*Abbau*’

[#] The author of fifteen books. Dr. A Kanthamani construes the entire corpus as analytical, post-analytical, hermeneutic and the cognitive turns. Norris seriously believe that the last three phases are symptomatic of ‘dead-end predicament’.(6) along with non-rigorous literary portrayals of deconstruction. For Norris, any ‘alliance’ between post-analytic and ‘depth-ontological’ (‘Heideggerian depth-hermeneutics’ is an ‘improbable’ one (21). Again, the *rapprochement* between the post-analytic and depth-analytical projects (40) emphasis in the original) have nothing whatsoever in common (39). *Contra* Norris, my aim is to vindicate a thesis according to which the combinatorial game (deconstruction, post-modernism and critical theory) has a higher pay-off in the climate of naturalism.

(unbuilding) for his own convenience. How the word first occurred to him in the '*Littre*', and the meaning it conveys, Derrida writes in the following way in a letter to his Japanese friend Professor Izutzu.¹

The grammatical linguistic or rhetorical senses [porte/es] were found bound up with a 'Mechanical' sense [Porte/es 'Machnique']. Derrida explains some of the entries from the '*Littre*', according to which deconstruction is:

'Disarranging the construction words in a sentence'.*

'To disassemble the parts of a whole. To deconstruct verse, rendering it by the suppression of meter, similar to prose'.⁺²

'A language reaching its own state of perfection is deconstructed [se'st *deconstruive*] and altered from within itself according to the single law of change, natural to human mind'.³

According to Derrida, 'deconstruction is not simply the decomposition of an architectural structure; it is also a question about the foundation, about the relation between foundation and what is founded; it is also a question about the closure of the structure about the whole structure of philosophy'.⁴

'Any attempt to define 'deconstruction' must soon run up against the many and varied obstacles that Derrida has shrewdly placed in its path'.⁵ However

* Of deconstruction, Derrida further explains, a common way of saying construction, Lemare, *De la maniere d'apprendre les langues*, chap. 17, in *Cours de Langue Latine*.

+ In the system of prenotional sentences, one also starts with translation and one of its advantages is never needing to deconstruction, Lemare, *Ibid*.

interpreters of Derrida have attempted to define deconstruction and some of them are given here.

Christopher Norris defines deconstruction as “the vigilant seeking out of those ‘*aporias*’ blindspots or moments of self- contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly *means to say* and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean.”⁶ And so, it is the “dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can then be *reinscribed* within a different order of textual signification.”

Geoffrey Bennington is ready to give up it as “not as a theory or a project”. It does not prescribe a practice more or less faithful to it nor project an image of a desirable state to be brought about. All of Derrida’s texts are already applications, so there is no separate ‘Derrida’ in the form of theory who might then be applied to something else. we cannot simply be content to claim that Derrida (sometimes) applies his own theory or unites theory and practice, or performs theoretical practice.⁷

Barbara Johnson admits that the word “deconstruction” is closely related not to the word “destruction” but to the word “analysis”, which etymologically means “to undo” – a virtual synonym for “to deconstruct”
.....⁸

According to John D. Caputo the very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things, texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs and practices of whatever size and sort you need – do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy..... A ‘meaning’ of a ‘mission’ is a way to contain and compact things, like a nutshell, gathering them into a unity whereas deconstruction bends all its efforts to stretch beyond these boundaries..... Whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell – a secure axiom or a pithy maxim – the very idea is to crack it open and disturb this tranquility..... cracking nutshells is what deconstruction is.⁹

Deconstruction tries “to undo” the structural significations by means of analysis of language and reinscribe them in a different order of textual signification. How do deconstruction undo the structural significations? What type of analysis is involved in it?

Before making an assessment of the interface between deconstruction and the analysis, we shall give a quick review of both analytical and post-analytical traditions so as to keep them at the backdrop. Norris is an exemplar because he borrows rigour from analytic philosophy and foists deconstruction, thereby making it inseparably bound and non-distinct. To him, deconstruction is not textual ‘free play’ but symbolizes the very notions of rigorous thinking

or conceptual critique. He is of the opinion that the central issues of deconstruction can be set forth and defended in such a way as to engage the serious interest of philosophers in the 'other', Anglo-American or analytical tradition.¹⁰ Norris wants to expound a novel thesis which is stated as

Thesis I: Deconstruction is a sub-branch of philosophy (analytical philosophy, to be more precise). To demonstrate the above thesis, Norris conflates the post-analytical with post-modernism (sub-thesis). Both are not in his good books. It is an open question whether his *thesis* and *sub-thesis* can be sustained. We shall review his position **Motif 3** after covering the post-analytical motif (**Motif 1 & 2**) as dealt separately with two leading thinkers. We shall review his position as **motif 3** after covering the past-analytical **Motif (1 & 2)** as they are dealt separately in chapters 2 and 3. **Motif 3** (Derridean 'Rigour of Analysis') is subserved by the following considerations:

- 1) There is a logic of deconstruction;
- 2) This logic has a certain argumentative rigour;
- 3) This is demonstrated by 'close reading' of the texts from 'Plato-Nato' (Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Husserl; Nato we shall see in 'late' Derrida).
- 4) This subscribes to the Kantian enlightenment ideals (e.g rationality in science);

- 5) This requires the thematic closure from *two* key notions such as the ‘condition of possibility’ (Norris) and the ‘condition of impossibility’ (Rudolph Gasche).
- 6) This makes full use of resources of (minimal) realism/naturalism (*contra* anti-realism/scepticism).

We can as well as counterpose the early part with the later which is purported to be a short review of Norris to maintain the status-quo of the combinatorial game. But it is not necessary as the lines of distinction between modernism and post-modernism (unfinished project of modernity) as well as the distinction between analytical and post-analytical tradition are only thinly drawn. We shall take up issues with Glock for the broadside criticism on the post-analytical ‘naturalism’. Norris’s ‘resources’ of realism is an option to be reckoned with, but its efficacy is far from influential even in the recent developments of cognitive science. Norris opts for a more narrower construal given as

Thesis 2: Deconstruction is a sub-branch of ethics (Socio-political and ethico-juridical claims) as it is true of ‘late’ Derrida.

Now **Thesis 2** is fully potent enough to counter the derogatory reading of

Thesis 3: Deconstruction is a sub-branch of literary theory. (*a la* Rorty)

There is more *politics* of deconstruction than of *analysis*, that will resemble post-modernist thinking let loose by Francis Fukuyama ('end of history') or Habermas, in his 'unfinished project of modernity'. So Norris is after all blows hot and cold against the reading of post-analytical seriousness. That bids us to move to **Thesis 4**.

Motif 1 (Quine's 'Deconstructivist Logic') is subserved by Samuel Wheeler's reading which seeks out parallelism or analogism between Quine, Davidson and Derrida and of course, Paul de Man as well. They nonetheless reach similar positions on the basis of analogous considerations indicates that from their different traditions in the exact sense that a common problem has emerged that transcends the particularities of those traditions. The parallelism also implies a sort of 'competitiveness' as evidenced in the way *Philosophical Investigations* of Wittgenstein replies to *Logical Investigations* of Husserl. Competitiveness apart, this motif moves the logic of post-analytical philosophy towards the logic of deconstruction that is very similar to the **motif 2** which is placed next in the line.

Motif 2 ('Structural Affinity Thesis') is subserved by Henry Staten's direct comparison between Wittgenstein and Derrida tries to bring "Derrida's" project into relation with Wittgenstein and strongly suggests the Anglo-American context of 'ordinary language' as an operational concept.

It states that, “Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* bears close affinities to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*” and that “Derrida’s penetrating consideration and ultimate rejection of the basic principles of Husserl’s philosophy of language is the historical analogue of Wittgenstein’s later consideration and rejection of his own earlier work, the *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*. With a microscopic fidelity Staten observes the different areas where Wittgenstein and Derrida’s philosophies come across and states that ‘there is a filiation between the texts, and the new threads must be twisted onto the old ones with the tightness appropriate to philosophical textuality’.

Staten chooses Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’, as a “perspicuous area” of “deconstructive reading of Wittgenstein’s work” taking this as the historical analogue of Wittgenstein’s later considerations and rejection of his own earlier work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Hence Staten says that the more one reads the *Logical Investigations* next to the *Philosophical Investigations*, the more striking the relation between the two becomes, taking the cue from *Blue Book* which, on his reading consistently deconstructive, which acts as a bridge between the early and later Wittgenstein.

It is in this context ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy suggests certain deconstructive motifs. Although this Rortian expression first occurs in 1967, there are difference of opinions on the question of when did the linguistic turn occur in the history of philosophy. While P.M.S Hacker traces the origin of

this turn with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, a writer like Antony Kenny, following Dummett, is of the opinion that if analytic philosophy was born when 'the linguistic turn', was taken, its birthday must be dated to the publication of *The Foundations of Arithmetic* in 1884 – when Frege decided that the way to investigate the nature of number was to analyse sentences in which numerals occurred.¹¹ Taking the term 'analysis' *au pied de la lettre*, twentieth century analytic philosophy is distinguished in its origins by its non-psychological orientation. One (Russellian) root of this new school might be denominated 'logico-analytic philosophy', in as much as its central tenet was the new logic, introduced by Frege, Russell and Whitehead, provided an instrument for the *logical* analysis of objective phenomena.¹² However, **Motif 3** sponsors a 'divide-and-rule' strategy by aligning Derrida with the analytical tradition of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein and at the expense of the post-analytical tradition of Quine, Davidson and Dummett. Such a strategy enables him to overlook what is very likely to 'survive' the 'crisis' of analytic philosophy. (see the remarks of Hintikka and Putnam on page 40)

Norris proposes the following counter-theses to support his perspective:

[A] against Quine

- (a) The two dogmas of empiricism:

- (b) The case of the field-linguist theory which holds that there is an indeterminacy of radical translation; that is the anthropologist is not sure whether

gavagai = rabbit

is the *exact* translation.

- (c) Ontological relativity which holds that there is no way of individuating objects or belief-contents except in relation to the entire ‘web’ or ‘fabric’;
- (d) The meaning-holism which lacks any appeal to intermediary entities (propositions/statements/sentences).

From (a) – (d), it follows that the *Human* predicament is *not* the *Humean* predicament; realism wins hands down.

[B] against Davidson

- (a) His dualism of scheme and content;
- (b) His dualism of prior and passing theory;
- (c) His principle of charity at maximizing truth-content;
- (d) His throwaway pronouncement: ‘there is no such thing as language’;
- (e) His account of malapropism in interpretations;

[C] against Dummett

- (a) His founding of analytic philosophy on the ‘foundation’ of a theory of meaning; systematizing analytic philosophy into a coherent set of beliefs.
- (b) His using of Fregean doctrine of sense for an upbeat anti-realism;
- (c) His using of Wittgenstein’s doctrine of ‘meaning-as-use’ to counterpose the *later* Wittgenstein to the *early* Wittgenstein;
- (d) His way of sustaining the anti-realistic tenure by holding that there could not be any truth beyond what is verifiable (verification-transcendent truth).

Does Norris using the above **[A]**, **[B]** and **[C]**, succeed to counterpose anti-realism with a tenable realism (minimal realism), notwithstanding the inner fissures? The question is answered negatively in the course of the thesis. Together with their positives might, they extend Thesis (1).

Føllesdal has a definite answer with his ‘genetic affiliation thesis’ (**Thesis 5**). To him, the label ‘analytic philosophy’ is inappropriate even for survey purposes, that the whole division of contemporary philosophy into ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ is fundamentally flawed.¹³ The thesis states that there is a genetic affiliation between the continental and analytic philosophy (A.W Moore calls this as a ‘clumsy’ distinction). Føllesdal looks at the

standard classification model of dividing philosophy between the analytic and the continental with the following diagramme.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY		CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY						
logical	Ordinary Language	phenomenology	existentialism	hermeneutics	structuralism	deconstructionism	Neo Thomism	Neo Marxism

Føllesdal's 'genetic affiliation thesis' used the terms argument and 'justification' in a broader sense. The term 'argument' does not mean just deductive argument, but something more than that. The types of argument we find in philosophy and other areas, according to Føllesdal are usually variants of *non-monotonic* (not logical enough as per canons) arguments, that is, the type of arguments in which adding new premises may cast doubt on a conclusion that would follow without these premises.

Regarding the term 'justification', Føllesdal says that philosophy also has to alternate between general connection and details. The details provided by the theory of general connection must be proper and it must find a place in a more general theory. It is through this kind of 'reflective equilibrium' that we arrive at justification of our philosophical insights, of the general insights as well as of the detailed specific ones, says Føllesdal.

According to Føllesdal, it is the particular way of approaching philosophical problems that make analytic philosophy distinct and this method cannot even be identified with a specific method of analyzing philosophical concepts. Føllesdal finds no unity between the three strands of thinking namely (1) doctrines (2) problems and (3) ways of approaching them. The way of treating the main currents of philosophy as philosophical schools, according to Føllesdal is unsatisfactory. On Føllesdal's view, the 'genetic affiliation thesis' (**Thesis 5**) implies a sub-thesis which can be called the 'continuum thesis', where Føllesdal traces the genealogy of analytic philosophy.

The 'genetic affiliation thesis', begins with argumentators opinion on the origin of analytic philosophy. It has often been considered that the logical branch of analytic philosophy begins with Frege and Russell and the ordinary language branch with G.E. Moore. Likewise in connection with the publication of Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* and Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*, the year 1903 is taken as the year of birth of analytic philosophy. But 20 years earlier than this, Frege was engaged in analytic philosophy in that sense, the date of birth of analytic philosophy is shifted back to 1879, the year in which *Begriffsschrift* was published. But history tells us that even before Frege, Bolzano anticipated many of the ideas of Frege, Carnap, Tarski, Quine and others. The 'continuum thesis', therefore, supports that Bolzano

as the 'Great grandfather of analytic philosophy' and Frege the great grandfather.

Føllesdal raises similar argument in the case of Von Wright's finding incompatibility between hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. The former Von Wright claims, emphasizes the differences between Social Science and Humanities and the latter speaks of the differences between naturalism and Historical/Cultural Sciences. Føllesdal refutes Von Wright's former claim stating that not all analytic philosophers speak of unity of Science. Further, we cannot say that Social Sciences and Humanities conduct experiments of the kind common to natural sciences. Føllesdal takes Wolfgang Stegmüller's article 'The So-called Circle of Understanding', as a best example for his argument since it deals with analytic approach to hermeneutics and calls it analytic hermeneutics. The latter claim of Von Wright is refuted by Føllesdal taking Dasenbrock's work *'Literary Theory After Davidson'*, as a model for his argument. Davidson's efforts have aroused the interest of literary critics and now a days literary theorists are looking for philosophical foundations of literary criticism. Føllesdal's arguments therefore comes to the conclusion that the traditional classification of contemporary philosophy as one trend among others, is misleading since the analytical/non-analytic distinction runs across other divisions. One can be an analytic philosopher *and also* a phenomenologist, existentialist, hermeneuticist, thomist etc. Whether one is an analytic philosopher depends on what importance one ascribes to argument

and justification. Føllesdal expressed the classification in the following revised way.

	Pheno- meno- logy	Exist- entia- lism	herme- neutics	structu- ralism	deconstr- uctivism	Neo- Tho- mism	Neo- Mar- xism	ethics	natur- alism	Etc.
MORE ANAL- YTIC ↑ ↓ LESS ANAL- YTIC	Husserl	Heidegger								

The takehome lesson is that deconstruction cannot be singled out for privileging the ‘argument’ at the expense of the continental philosophy. That is, the line of apparent distinction between analytical and post-analytical tradition cannot provide any strong case against the latter.

1.2 Argument, Arguer, Explication: Tools for Derrida’s ‘Conceptual Philosophy’

One major evidence for calling ‘analysis’ as ‘argument’ comes from the important 1999 *Ratio* conference on Derrida, which was published under the title ‘*Arguing with Derrida*’ (2001). The major focus of the volume is to side-step the hear-say reception of Derrida’s work and to concentrate on the ‘argumentative strategies’ at two levels. One at the level of revisit of Derrida-Austin debate and the other includes Derrida’s own responses to the ‘Reading

Affairs’*. Defining an argument “a sequence of propositions”, Geoffrey Bennington notes that “it is largely mistaken to suppose that Derrida’s theses (such as for example, ‘There is nothing outside the text’, ‘Perception does not exist’, ‘Everything that is, is in deconstruction’, ‘In the beginning was the telephone’, and so on), are not properly backed up by argument”. It means only that deconstruction is not allergic to arguments but uses them *up to a point*.

The only good argument – for Derrida’s being a philosopher, being taken to be taken for a philosopher, at any rate, or being accepted *as* a philosopher by those who are confident they really are philosophers would be the presence *of* arguments – in his texts.¹⁴

He suggests ‘transcription’ as a method, presentation of the relation of Derrida’s thought to analytical philosophy, not as a relation of critique, conflict or warfare but non-oppositional and non-conflictual way.

In this context, it would be worthwhile to look at how argument about the concept of sign goes upto a certain point in ‘Structure Sign and Play’ or *Of Grammatology*. It says that ‘sign’ is a metaphysical concept; this metaphysical concept of ‘sign’ is the concept of its own teleological reduction or disappearance in the presence of the thing signified; so we can do something to metaphysics by maintaining (now: *en maintenant* –

deconstruction happens each time now)- by maintaining the sign short of that reduction or disappearance).

The argument goes in a similar way at the end of 'The White Mythology' regarding the remarks about metaphor. There it occurs, 'the concept of metaphor is metaphysical in that it is the concept of metaphor's 'death' or effacement, its ending in the presence of proper meaning; but by maintaining metaphor short of that *telos* (i.e. its death as prescribed by philosophy) may be we provoke the death of philosophy in a quasi-metaphorical textuality that never quite comes back down to proper meaning at all (whence 'dissemination', which philosophy will never get on top of).

Quoting Derrida's best known texts, 'Differance' and 'Signature', Event, Context', A.W Moore goes further to present a brief argument to justify his calling it as conceptual philosophy (a term suggested by Simon Glendinning).

Thesis 4: Conceptual philosophy is the *staple* of analytic philosophy. Conceptual philosophy with a clear purport to argue. That is, if conceptual philosophy is a staple of analytic philosophy, *and* deconstruction is a species of analysis (in the wider sense), then conceptual philosophy is a *special case* of analytical philosophy. He wants us to note the following features for his argument.

1. It is a label – a better one than many others – ('analytic' (argument)).

2. 'The practice of conceptual philosophy' is *not* to be identified with the practice of science but it can be more narrowly defined in terms of two features.
 - a. It is natural to disassociate it from the pursuit of knowledge or truth, but *concepts*.
 - b. It makes claim about reality to demonstrate how these concepts are put to work.
3. Following the above distinction, conceptual philosophy has a commitment to the truth (so, it is analogous to science). That is, in Derrida's words, analytical philosophy has a *commitment* to truth. Here Derrida says, 'I too have such a commitment to the truth of only to question the possibility of the truth, to the history of the truth, the differences in the concept of truth, and not taking for granted the definition of truth as tied to declarative sentences.'¹⁵
4. It has some point of contact between conceptual (analytical) philosophy and the works of Derrida.
5. This is illustrated by Frege's analysis of the concept of horse as lying in the following question.

'Is the 'concept of horse' a concept'?

Here Moore makes use of Kerry's analysis according to which the concept of horse is both an object as well as a concept, thus leading to a 'paradox' and Frege denies Kerry's argument. Frege's denial led to some sort of confusion. This is an obvious 'tangle': how to justify whether it is a name (object) or a predicate (concept)?

So Moore concludes that conceptual philosophy fails even in its own terms. Moore wants to explore the points of contact in the light of the above citing ineffable as an example (Ineffable = that which cannot be expressed (it is expressed as 'ineffable')). This case against conceptual philosophy has certain clear echoes in Derrida's remarkable essay 'Differance'. Likewise, 'diffe'rance' = 'differance is not'. So one can derive many such links Derrida with Frege and Wittgenstein. The neologism 'diffe'rance', which is the central characteristic of meaning in Derrida, is an echo of Frege. Just as analytical philosophy can tolerate paradoxes, deconstruction can tolerate falsehood and nonsense. It is not the same idea, but there is a common predicament (even in Quine and paradoxes abound) in analytic philosophy.

The French word equivalent of arguing is 'arguer'. But there is another word 'explication' which carries some of the same connotations as argument. 'S' *expliquer avec quelqu'un* means 'to have it out with them' (combative). But '*Explication de texte*' is also French which stands for 'close' (sensitive) reading incidentally, it may be noted that for Carnap's

Explication (*explicandum-explicans* relation) bears on philosophical queries in science. Heidegger's '*Auseinandersetzung*' is an expression which stands for both to argue and to explain, as well as 'a kind of arguing'. What is to be noted is that the word 'explication' contains the *combative* sense of having an argument. In one sense, it gives the meaning of what we outlined as one side of the debate and in the other sense, it explains what somebody else saying – the other side of the debate. Both meaning are implicit in each other. This is important in the discussion of deconstruction.

At this point let us turn our attention to Derrida's text 'Signature, Event, Context' in which Moore explains the Austin – Derrida debate. Derrida raised the complaint against saying that Austin is over-sanitized, in his rough and ready distinction between normal/abnormal or parasitic/deviant expression. This second category suggests that by extension and analogy, we can clearly separate the contexts in which it is possible to use any given word with its (standard) meaning from those in which it is not. Quite contrary to this, Derrida adopted a much more fluid method to explain the relationship between how words are used and how they mean what they do. For Derrida, meaning is its infinite potential for iterability in new contexts to new effects, for new purposes, in playing new games. Derrida says that

'every sign can be *cited*, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender

infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion..... This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or an anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even have a so-called 'normal' functioning.'¹⁶

According to this, may be

1. 'a' is the correct usage (primary)
2. 'a' is the deviant usage (secondary: The Indian Dhvani is an echo of this).

In the above, 1 and 2 (even with quotation) may roughly correspond to 'use-mention' distinction of Carnap. The secondary (incidentally, if may be noted that for Carnap, explication is defined as follows: *explicandum* = df. *explicans*) may be non-serious in Austin's sense; it may not have 'uptake'. Still one can claim that conceptual philosophy can eschew deviant expression. Moore's overall conclusion is that, 'there is a curious and unexpected convergence of Derrida's style of philosophy with what he has been calling conceptual philosophy.'¹⁷

Derrida's response is positive. He is doing 'conceptual philosophy' in Moore's sense. But Derrida terms it as 'massive' or 'huge' issue what is conveyed by the quote:

‘Although I am professionally a philosopher, everything I do is *something else* than philosophy. No doubt it is *about* philosophy, but it is not simply ‘philosophical’ ‘through and through’.¹⁸

Derrida concludes by saying,

‘I am an analytical philosopher – a conceptual philosopher’,
‘my ‘style’ has something essential to do with a *motivation* that one also finds in analytic philosophy, in conceptual philosophy’.¹⁹

In this context, I take Simon Glendinning’s ‘Inheriting ‘Philosophy’: The case of Austin and Derrida Revisited.’ In what follows, I shall try to capture the Austin-Derrida debate conceding that the general distinction between analytical and continental philosophy is both ‘vague’ (since it lacks accepts standards of clarity and rigour’) and overdetermined (since the supposition of division is not an impartial one).

Glendinning proceeds to point out the nature of the debate saying that it describes Derrida’s controversial reading of J.L Austin’s theory of performative utterances as symptomatic of the above schism between continental and analytical philosophy. Why ‘deconstruction’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ congenial for a discussion is that Bennington finds that its basic themes suggest that the idea of a distinction between analytical and

continental philosophy 'clouds' rather than clarifies what is at stake in the 'ways of going on. Hence it does not go to any minimal extent to clarify the two different ways of going on while being-an-heir to 'philosophy'.²⁰ His discussion on the 'tidy-looking dichotomy' falls into three parts such as (1) there are parallels between Derrida's and Austin's criticism of a style of thinking which they are willing to call simply 'philosophy'. (2) Austin's is open to critics in the way he criticizes philosophy. Austin's deployment of the word *Gleichschaltung* (means 'community', 'brings some money to line', 'inform to a certain standard by force'- originally used by Hitler as a watchword for 'integration'; Austin used it in the sense of abandonment of philosophy's deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies, for e.g, between 'constative' and 'performative' utterances). (3) It gives an approach to contemporary philosophy.

The first point to be noted in this context is that, for Austin as for Derrida, 'the tidy-looking dichotomy' is a 'distorting idealization of our language that *is* 'philosophy'. We abandon it but to relocate the distinction in inherit/dis-inherit at its most *active* form.

Searle in his 'Reply to Derrida', used the word 'Reiterating' (the Differences) (Searle 1977) to which Derrida remarked: 'the only sentence to which I subscribe' (meaning that I to reiterate the differences). Derrida rejected the hypotheses of confrontation 'not only' because he considers his

own work to be importantly similar to Austin's.²¹ Glendinning states that Searle finds the necessity of a confrontation under the impression that Derrida misunderstood and misstated Austin's position, but such a confrontation never takes place since Derrida and Austin are close to each other. Derrida states that

Among the many reasons that make me unqualified to represent a 'prominent philosophical tradition', there is this one: I consider myself to in many respects quite close to Austin, both interested in and indebted to his problematic. This is said in *Sec*, very clearly (Derrida, 1988, p.38).²²

Thus Derrida's engagement with Austin mainly focuses on the attempt to undermine a conception of 'the meaning and utterances'. When Austin considers meaning ideally to be definite and exact, for Derrida, this is a prejudice or injustice among others in philosophy. Derrida states that no philosophy has renounced the Aristotelian ideal of 'univocity of essence or the *telos* of language'. *This ideal is philosophy*. It thus becomes the target of Derrida's attack. It is aimed at what is intrinsic to 'philosophy' as such. Although Derrida's mode of being an heir to 'philosophy' this attempt '*about philosophy it is not simply "philosophical" through and through*'.²³

The two central developments of philosophical conceptions are (1) the restriction of utterance to 'meaning' to the *truth-evaluable* content and (2) the

invariant nature of meaning in different contexts. It is against the second of these assumptions Derrida, defends what is best seen as a radical form of contextualism which is open to non-deviant readings. Derrida states that ‘intentional meaning’ allows ‘no dissemination escaping the horizon of the unity of meaning’ (Derrida 1998. p.14). It is a logical incoherence to suppose that there could be marks or signs (inner or outer) which might have this properly. Further we cannot make sense of some “event” without taking into account the other ‘events’ included in it. Here Derrida is not simply advancing a claim about the (factual) repeatability or multiple applicability of words and signs in different contexts but a claim about the ‘eventhood’ of such events’.²⁴ The functioning of a word, in this context is associated with its ‘iterability’, a quasi-technical term used by Derrida to capture this ‘logic that ties repetition to alterity’. It makes the conclusion that epistemic intuition are unacceptably dogmatic. Further ‘performative communication becomes once more the communication of an intentional meaning in which there ‘no dissemination escaping the horizon of the unity of meaning’.²⁵ However according to Norris, despite the ritual show of hostilities (sadly typified by responses to the Derrida-Searle ‘debate’) there is much to be gained from an ecumenical approach that seeks out genuine points of content while avoiding any kind of reductive or premature synthesis.’²⁶ Then the debate is not without any substance to which Norris agrees (especially in his remarks of the later edition of the book ‘Theory and Practice’).

1.3 The Rigours of Analysis

The twentieth century has witnessed a ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy where philosophy itself has come to be defined as:

Philosophy = df. as analysis of the underlying (deep) structures of language (subject-predicate *form* of propositions) with reference to their ontological import (subject stands for a *named object*, predicate stands for a *property*) and the evaluation of *truth* or *falsity* of the class of propositions (truth-telling discourse).

The revolution started with Frege. Giving reverence to Kant, Frege, tried to provide a rigorous logical foundation – an ‘old Euclidean standards of rigour’ for the proofs of arithmetic.[#] The *purpose* of Frege was to replace the ‘psychological’ with the logical, the subjective with the objective and the rejection of meaning of a word in isolation to the context of a proposition.

The *first* major work of Frege, in ‘*Concept Script*’ was the ‘turning point’ in which he devised a system of logic that marks the beginning of this discipline in its modern form. It includes the notions of ‘assertible content’, ‘negation’, ‘conditional proposition’, ‘the universal quantifier’ and ‘identity’. Frege also pointed out the analogy between the mathematical notion of a function and the logical notion of a *concept*. Thus his *function-theoretic logic*

[#] Famous works of Frege are “*Concept Script*” (Begriffsschrift), *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik), *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik), and papers such as ‘*Concept and Object*’, ‘*Function and Concept*’ and ‘*Sense and Reference*’

was supposed to perform as an explanation of *number-theoretic account* of logicism. It also explains how this analogy could help clarify what in the older logic was called the *predicate* of a proposition. Further, Frege pointed out the importance of the use of the notion of quantifiers and the variables they bind, in order to thereby express the concept of *generality*.

Frege applied the programme developed in the *concept script* to the most fundamental of mathematical theories, especially to the theory of numbers in his *Foundations of Arithmetik*. In this work, Frege, thus poised between two discursive possibilities, one internal to the mathematics and the other to analysis proving the basic laws of arithmetic from purely logical principles. In order to overcome some of the shortcomings in *The Foundations*, Frege, published a series of articles in which his distinction between ‘sense and reference’ occurs.

In his *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, the programme sketched in *The Foundations*, was carried out with proofs set out as derivations within a formal system (axiomatics). This system also embodies theory of classes for which a contradiction was discovered by Russell. This is known as Russell’s Paradox. This is the sample of rigour in analysis.

Frege has carried out his investigations into the nature of meaning. Further, Frege treated concepts as special types of objective entities and concept words, as special linguistic expressions that refer to these concepts. It

is with these concept words that a logician has to work out just as he do with other types of linguistic expressions. Frege therefore, can be called a realist who believed in the objective existence of concepts, relations and objects. The objects in the world, in the Fregean view, are entities designated by special types of linguistic expressions.

Frege's notion of philosophical analysis:

Definition : assertibility = logic *plus* content (semantics) given in terms of the theory of sense.

The above definition requires an equivocation like the following:

true = known to be true.

Frege also finds an indissoluble link between thought and meaning and introduced the distinctions between 'sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*)'. Unlike Saussure, he claims that the relationship of reference to the referent is not arbitrary, but there is a notion of sense in which the sign belong. This does not mean that reference and sense of a sign form the idea, instead, he points out that reference and sense have to be distinguished from the idea. Frege stated this by declaring $p=q$ is logically true, if p and q have the same sense, but empirically true, if they have only the same reference. Further for Frege, all expressions in a well constructed language have sense. Ideally each expression would have a single, uniform sense, shared and understood by all

competent users of language. It is on the basis of the sense of the expression that one can specify the conditions for the truth or falsity of the sentence as a whole.²⁷ In short, according to Frege, the sense is that part of the meaning of an expression which is relevant to the determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression occur. To know the sense of a proper name is to know the criterion for identifying any given object as the meaning of that name; to know the sense of a predicate is to know the criterion for deciding whether it is true of an arbitrary object. 'The distinction between sense and reference thus brought the following changes in the analysis of the term 'meaning' itself. Accordingly, meaning is (1) the personal, subjective (and therefore variable) associations, images, or ideas an expression calls up in some mind; (2) the sense of the expression and (3) the referent of the expression. Out of these three options, Frege rejects the relevance of subjective associations, at the same time gives importance to (2) and (3) since they are relevant for logic and a scientific use of language'.²⁸

According to this Fregean semantics, some senses must be presented in themselves, directly apprehended in their own nature. Although senses look like signs in determining objects, they are different from ordinary signs in the sense that there is no possibility of misinterpreting them. A sense, thus becomes a sign that forces us to take it in exactly one way. It can be said that Fregean theory of meaning therefore, needs a kind of direct and unmediated presence of sense. This Fregean semantics in many ways resembles Husserl

especially when Husserl deals with the nature of propositional contents, our access to them, and their acts of language production. According to Wheeler both Frege and Husserl are antireductions. Both take the defense of mathematical and logical consequence against psychologism to be of central concern.²⁹ The ‘presence’ model common to Frege and Husserl, and shared by many theories later are largely antimetaphysical. In that sense, Frege and Husserl bespeak of a sort of interface with continental philosophy.

Russell’s notion of philosophical analysis involves logic-ontology interface given as:

logic \Leftrightarrow ontology.

His metaphysical school of logical atomism is defined as follows:

Logical atomism = metaphysics based upon the logical analysis
of language.

Russell’s two major contributions to philosophical analysis are (a) Theory of Definite Descriptions and (b) Theory of Types. The Theory of Types is formulated as a solution to the ‘Russell’s Paradox’ found in Frege’s philosophy of mathematics. His theory of definite descriptions is acclaimed as the paradigm of philosophical analysis (Ramsey, Ayer).

Russell's philosophy of logical atomism makes explicit the principle on which the metaphysical interpretation of logical constructionism depends. Russell's analysis aims to show:

Logical forms of *proposition* 'correspond to' worldly form of *facts*

The ideal language is essential to reflect the real structure of the world. Russell formulated a basic "Principle of Acquaintance" as the important requirement of an ideal language. As its name indicates, this principle enjoins that the "atomic" sentences get their meaning through direct correlations with experience. They therefore, become the names of particular sense-data and terms of properties of sense-data and relations between sense data. Logical atomism can therefore be explained as the thesis that all knowledge can be stated in terms of atomic sentences and their truth – functional components.

Russell distinguished proper names from definite descriptions. The existence of a proper name, according to Russell, is connected with the object it represents but there are definite descriptions that have no denotation and hence have no meaning. Such descriptions, according to Russell, do not function as names. On analysis, they will disappear as putatively denoting phrases that need re-writing. 'To put it briefly and more or less neutrally, logical atomism is a method analyzing *definite descriptions*, also called *singular descriptions*', i.e. phrases in English typically beginning with the word "the".³⁰ In opposition to definite description, there is indefinite

description which does not designate a particular object and carries the words such as “a” or “any”. This is the standard analysis on which one brings out the underlying logical (deep) structure of subject-predicate propositions.

Calling definite descriptions as incomplete symbols, Russell argued that ‘it is a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation but is only defined in certain contexts. The idea of incomplete symbol made a revolutionary change in Russell’s thought. In the light of this, the primary task of philosophy therefore becomes to keep away from the misleading surface structure of language to the underlying deep structure or from the grammatical form to the logical form’. The shift of attention towards language – towards actual words spoken or written – was to be of the greatest importance both for Russell’s own thought and for that of philosophers who came after him.³¹

Wittgenstein made *two* revolutions in philosophy. One is his famous work on the *Tractatus* and the second is the *Philosophical Investigations*. Critics identifying the difference constituting an opposition between early ‘realism’ and later ‘anti-realism’ gives meaning a truth-functional form. Accordingly,

Realism: Meaning = definition: truth-conditions (True or false is determined by the way they are distributed over propositions)

This gave a truth-conditional theory of meaning.

In contrast, in anti-realism:

Meaning = definition: *verification* or *justification* condition.

This gave a justification condition theory of meaning (meaning depends on cognitive procedure). Wittgenstein's earlier notion of philosophical analysis is given by truth-tabular conception of logical truths ('every proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions'). Sometimes the early theory of meaning is called the '*Chess*' Theory of Meaning (every move in language is governed by rules), whereas the later theory is called '*Mosaic*' theory where contexts are included in meaning. In spite of the above contrast or more poignantly put, the rivalry, there is a deep continuity between early and later philosophy which is what we need to exploit in this dissertation.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* owes much to Frege and Russell. It is a comprehensive work of extreme originality in which Wittgenstein explains the limits of language and limits of thought. The chief motif behind this work is to explain the nature of logical necessity that Russell had left unexplained in *Principia Mathematica*. The marginal status of theories in his early philosophy did not deflect this theory from its main goal, which was to show that logically necessary propositions are a kind of by-product of the ordinary use of propositions to state facts.³² In the preface to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein said, 'the book deals with the problems of philosophy, and I

believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that of the logic of our language is misunderstood.³³

In order to clear this misunderstanding, Wittgenstein therefore, proposes the strategy of critique of language and thus explains the limits of what can be said. What cannot be said lies outside the frontiers of thinkable and they are non-sensical and cannot enquire by means of logic. On the enquiry of it Wittgenstein introduces two concepts such as “picture” and “truth-function.” According to the picture theory, a proposition is a picture of reality in which the elements of proposition and of the world are structurally related to one another. This picture may be either true or false.

The picture theory also gives an account of the nature of thought. According to it ‘a thought is a sentence with a sense’ (*Tractatus* 4). Here the relevance of language in the formation of sentences becomes explicit. The totality of true thoughts thus give the true picture of the world.

Propositions describe the states of affairs and are composed of expressions. Apart from the logical expressions, all expressions are either analysable or unanalysable simple names. Simple names stands for the objects in reality which in turn are their meanings. It is these simple names that link language to reality, pinning the network of language to the world. The elementary proposition is a concatenation of names in accordance with the logical syntax, which does not name anything, but says that things are thus

and so. It represents the existence of a possible states of affairs that is isomorphic to it, given the method of projection. Further, the logical syntax of any possible language *mirrors* the metaphysical structure of the world.

The logical analysis of the structure of language distinguishes *two* different possibilities of truth-conditions, as two extreme cases. “ In one of these cases, the proposition is true of for all the truth possibilities of the elementary propositions. We may that the truth-conditions are tautological. In the second case, the proposition is false for all the truth possibilities: the truth-conditions are contradictory. In the first case we call the proposition is tautology; in the second a contradiction” (*Tractatus*, 4. 46).

Thus the tautology and contradictions are the two limits of language. Only propositions show what they say. Tautologies and contradictions ‘show’ that they say nothing. Therefore neither tautology nor contradiction is a true proposition. They lack meaning, as they are not pictures. However, tautologies and contradictions are not nonsensical. They are part of the symbolism as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic. Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘senseless’ as lying within the chosen symbolism (truth-functional logic) and outside of it, later gave rise to ‘meaningfulness’ and ‘meaninglessness’ in Carnap. This overlaps Derrida in a sense. We seek the post-analytical engagements in the following section.

1.4. The Post-analytical Engagements

There is controversy over whether there is continuity between the early work of Wittgenstein (the *Tractatus* phase) to that of his later work, (the *Philosophical Investigations*) or whether there is radical break. According to MacDonough, there is a sustained theme that runs throughout Wittgenstein's writings – namely *Philosophical Investigations*, 352, 356, *On Certainty*: 199, 200 and Part IV of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. This theme is mainly concerned with the question of whether there is some 'queer argument' (P1 352) or relationship which connects the tautologies to a set of ontological or linguistic views. However, the context of allusions to this argument in the later writings get altered from that of the *Tractatus*. The difference is that in the later writings, Wittgenstein's attitude to the argument seems to have become critical. Wittgenstein's rigour is rather legendary; but the dismantling of his 'extreme version' of logical atomism brick by brick by later work is strongly suggestive of deconstructive motif.

This extraordinarily simple and yet audacious, even revolutionary move, Staten says, parallel to that of Derrida when he replaces the phenomenology "voice" (silent, internal) with the concept of "writing". This becomes the focus of attention later in the thesis.

'*The Philosophical Investigations*' begins as an enquiry into "meaning". This enquiry leads to the intertwined concepts of

“understanding”, “thinking”, “grasping a rule”, “being guided”, “giving orders”, “teaching and learning”, and so on. It not only rejects the subtle medium of mind but also does not demarcate between words as a more nearly spiritual medium and gestures, pictures and inarticulate sounds as sub linguistic. Instead, the scene of language is unfolded as a rebus with an indefinite potential for an indefinite kind of signifying sequences.³⁴ As Wittgenstein said ‘it could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of thinking.’

If this ‘old way of thinking’ was an intellectual exercise in the logical versus rhetorical dichotomy, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, there is an end to this practice, or it is, to quote Wittgenstein’s verbal mystification, ‘a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.’

Wittgenstein paid little attention to the history of philosophy. The only reference text he wanted for the *Philosophical Investigations*, his own great deconstructive work was his own earlier work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It makes sense to say that ‘by bringing Wittgenstein into relation with Derrida, we can overcome the historical amnesia Wittgenstein can cause, without betraying the fundamental radicality, of his method.’³⁵

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, the logic of linguistic expressions constructed in altogether different terms. The analysis of language is made neither by means of depth-grammar that points to the truth-functions of

elementary propositions nor are propositions in their ‘basic’ constituents made up of names. Language is ordinary language. Language is languages that is, it consists of and can be conceived as exhibiting many different types of or combinations of language-games. It is to be explained and understood *as it is found*. The meaning of a word is its use. It speaks about the role ‘meaning’ plays in our language.³⁶ It is neither logical nor rhetorical. The concept of ideal language and thorough-going determinism disappears at this level. In other words, the logic of truth-conditions in the *Tractatus* was changed to the logic of “use-conditions”, and the primary role of philosophy becomes a “critique of language”, an activity of clarification rather than as a discipline that asserts various substantive propositions or factual claims about the world. In Wittgenstein, the notion of language-game serves a number of functions. Sometimes, it is used as a simplified model of a language, a tool to be used in the analysis of complex many-sided ordinary language.

Wittgenstein’s later view on the nature of language, thus involves the dissolution of a number of philosophical concepts like dogmatism, determinism, essentialism, representationism, universalism, a priorism etc. According to Christopher Norris, the whole point of Wittgenstein’s appeal to language games and cultural forms of life is to coax philosophers down from such forms of self-induced skeptical puzzlement.³⁷

Let us start with Quinean notion of philosophical analysis, by comparing this with his predecessors in a rough and ready way.

1. For Frege, the conceptual notion gets the sanction of science, logic provides the perfect canon.
2. For Russell, it is the logic ontology interface.
3. For Wittgenstein, it is the isomorphism (one-to-one relation) between logic and ontology.
4. For Quine, logic itself is ontology. It is the ontic idiom *par excellence*.

Quine's major pre-suppositions in philosophy can be classified under two general headings, such as those having to do with philosophy of language (logic) and those having to do with ontology. What he has to say on naturalism (no dividing line between science and philosophy) as marked affinities with the general orientation of empiricist and pragmatist philosophers. Two of his papers 'On What There Is,' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism,' gained him importance in the list of analytical thinkers.

Quine's paper 'On What There Is?' explores a sound ontological base for his naturalistic account. It is here that Quine sets down his criterion for ontological commitment by means of which he has attempted to overcome the hostility to metaphysics. It does not mean that Quine encouraged metaphysics, instead he would revitalize and rehabilitate metaphysics as ontology. This has been done by reconstructing the formation of the

questions with which ontology deals with in accordance with the guiding principles of modern logic with precision and clarity. In addition to this, Quine also makes use of the general power of predicate calculus in which lies the use of the method of quantification. It is enough for Quine for purposes of classifying one's ontological commitments to make use of first-order quantification where the quantified variables range over one or more types of individual objects. In short, Quine's statement "to be is to be the value of a variable", sums up the essence of the criterion of ontological commitment.

Quinean pattern of argument in the 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', undermines the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. Traditionally a statement is analytic, if it can be reducible to a form governed by the logical law of identity. Likewise, a statement is synthetic if it cannot be reducible to a statement that is basically of the form of an identity. The main drawback in all these kinds of approach, according to Quine, is the lack of holistic approach. He believes that in determining the truth, and our knowledge of the truth, we should consider not on individual sentence taken singly and apart from its inter-relations with other statements in total network of beliefs. Taskian disquotational theory and Davidson's Principle of Charity are direct descendants of this holism or 'narrative turn' as described by Richard Rorty. According to Christopher Norris, Quine examines the essentialism found in the logical empiricist distinction between analytic and synthetic statements (or 'truths of reason' or 'truths of act') and then goes on to argue in holistic

fashion that 'our statements about the external world face the tribunal sense – experience not individually but only as a corporate body.'³⁸

Much more than Quine's indeterminacy of radical translation, Davidson's doctrine of radical interpretation has an edge in that it is as much an acknowledged model for literary criticism as deconstruction is in the 'wild' version. Starting from his contribution towards the semantics (meaning-theory) for natural language, whatever realistic consideration that underlie it by virtue of its affiliation to Tarski's semantic conception of truth, it reaches a paradoxical conclusively approximating interpretation with the way we use language. Davidson concludes with a paradoxical remarks that 'there is no such a thing as language'. Davidson's starting point is to bring a cohesion between two radically different languages, but ends up with some sort of indeterminacy.

Davidsonian theory of meaning thus states that meaning must to language – like. Meaning is fundamentally linguistic, and not something behind or expressed in language. In place of the term 'means that', Davidson therefore elects the biconditional – 'if and only if' – as the connective needed in a theory of meaning. Davidson's theory of meaning accordingly associated with the inter-related phenomena of belief, desire, intention and other mental states which themselves form an autonomy of family of concepts. In that sense, meaning is a conceptual content with wide and varied application. In

addition to the conceptual content, meaning also has other “senses” which will cause into being only on interpretation. “Being subject to interpretation” means that nothing intrinsic to the term determines that it must refer to a given object, instead every mark is subject to interpretation without essence. To have a meaning according to Davidson is that, to have a place in a language-game. But such a meaning will not work in the case of metaphor. Since metaphors do not have a special kind of meaning. It makes us to see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight.³⁹ This treatment of metaphor is a direct attack on the reductionist view of metaphor used by the Platonists and Positivists according to which metaphors are either paraphrasable or useless for the purpose of representing reality and is usually literally false but uttered with the aim of bringing something to the attention of the hearers.

Davidson also held the view that “giving the meaning of a sentence” was equivalent to stating its truth-conditions. But Davidson considered the notion of truth absolutely indispensable and primitive in the sense that truth cannot be reduced to reference or to other notions. According to this theory, all data for determining meaning and for determining truth-value consist in what is said and when it is said. Davidson’s indeterminacy therefore becomes a milder kind and in fact more radical and pure than Quine’s, since he denies any sub-basement of content that can be separated from the linguistic framework. Davidson’s abandonment of the division between scheme and

content also denies the notion that experience is something organized by theory or that there are alternative schemes that does not make sense.

Similarly, Dummett who tries to systematize analytic philosophy was forced to move a rather radically different counter-paradigm called anti-realism which threatened to swallow all forms of realism. It is not therefore without justification that Norris apprehends danger to his way of legitimizing Derridean logic placing it in the camp of anti-realism. Norris's efforts go in vain by any simple move which efforts is purported to neutralized the radical opposition between realism and anti-realism. Norris is not a safe bet against the odd option. The crisis Derrida has generated will not subserve Norris's reading of Derrida.

The post-analytic engagement is not shown to be redundant in the light of thesis 5. Thus Wheeler finds that Derridean notion of dissemination is also paralleled with Quinean indeterminacy of translation. Quine used the metaphor, "the myth of the museum", to point out the common misconception of language with regard to sign and referent. By the term indeterminacy, Quine points out the indeterminacy of translation in going from one language to another. According to Wheeler, 'a vivid way to express the view common to Quine and Derrida is to say that all thought can be at most brain-writing or spirit writing, both of which modes of inscription yield texts with at least the hermeneutic problems of other texts. There is no meaning or meaning bearer

behind language that is not itself a language like phenomenon.’⁴⁰ Similarly, Norris also finds such a parallelism in Quine and Derrida stating that the empiricist programme of Quine could scarcely be more remote from Derrida’s ceaseless undermining of any assured link between sign and referent. Nevertheless, it is clear that Quine like Derrida, perceives covert metaphysics at work in traditional ways of conceiving philosophy; also that he shares the deconstructionist will to demystify language by removing the appeal to, some ultimate ground of concept or meaning.’⁴¹

Pursuing the same line of inquiry, Wheeler also finds so many parallelisms in Davidson and Derrida. Both have arrived at analogous positions after rejecting the dogmas of empiricism and phenomenology and also on the denial of “magic language”. They also agree on fundamental issues in the philosophy of language as they are committed to some degree of indeterminacy of interpretation for the same reasons. According to Wheeler, the Derridean phenomenon of dissemination is akin to the Davidsonian variety of indeterminacy rather than to the kind of global, total sets of alternatives that Quine envisions in word and object’.⁴² However there is difference between Davidsonian and Derridean indeterminacy. Derrida states that truth, if anything must be a match between an utterance and a given, but it does not speak of such a matching can be made sense of. Davidson not only denies any such matching between an utterance and given but he also does not consider whether any such matching is required for truth. Davidson considers

truth functions as an analytical interpretative concept rather than as a metaphysical concept. Wheeler states that ‘the core problem driving the analysis of both Derrida and Davidson is that allegedly non-Aristotelean and non-essentialist accounts of the world (e.g., Kantian and “linguistic” ones) still seem to rest on essentialism about conceptual or linguistic items..... The radical break that both Davidson and Derrida make is to work out the consequences of denying essentialism and objective necessities across the board.⁴³

To Sum Up

1. The analytical model subsumes analysis.
2. The post-analytical is brought into the deconstructionist camp.
3. There is not much underlying difference between analytical and post-analytical.
4. There is not much rivalry between realism and anti-realism.
5. There is no ‘divide’ between analytical and continental philosophy.
6. There may not be much discontinuity between modernity and post-modernity in view of modernists ‘unfinished project’. Thus the perspective on Derrida is a very legitimate one to be unfolded in the coming chapters.

1.5 Taking it Forward:

In this context, we recall the *four* theses and *three* motifs before entering into thesis 5.

T1. Deconstruction is a sub-branch of philosophy of analysis.

T2. Deconstruction is a sub-branch of ethics.

T3. Deconstruction is a sub-branch of literary theory ('wild').

T4. Conceptual philosophy is the *staple* of analytic philosophy.

The justification for (1) is derived from the tools of analysis in conceptual philosophy as envisaged in (4). (3) is not very much favoured and (2) waits for consideration towards the end of the thesis ('late'), were we shall also add thesis (5) and (6).

The three Motifs are reiterated once again.

Motif 1 Wheeler pushes analysis to the deconstructive side but competitive.

Motif 2 Derrida is quite analogous for deconstruction of Wittgenstein (in his own work).

Motif 3 the way Norris divides analytic/post-analytic/continental altogether is not correct in the light of 'genetic affiliation' thesis and its consequent 'continuum thesis'. It is no longer possible to defend Norris even on grounds

of realism. Thus we tried to situate Derrida within a full-blooded analytical perspective.

We shall now open continuity to the previous thesis.

Thesis 5: Deconstruction enters into ‘feud’ with speech-act variety of analytical philosophy (Austin and Searle).

Critics points out that the debate between Austin and Searle on the one had and Derrida on the other is illusory, because it represents the real talking past to each other.

What survives the ‘crisis of analytical philosophy is the legacy of Kripke’s reading of later Wittgenstein which has its focus on rule-following considerations. This is a focus that adds as a ‘bridge’ both to critical theory and post-modernism. Such a bridge is not provable within the compass of the thesis. But its tenability is beyond doubt. And thus we pass on to say: If this is taken for granted then we have a counsel for next thesis (6).

We have to admit to “a conviction that the present situation in [analytic] philosophy is one that calls for a revitalization, a renewal, of the subject” (Putnam, 1992, ix cf. Putnam, 1998). Similarly Jaakko Hintikka has declared that..... ‘we have to have a new start in, practically in all branches of philosophical studies including logic, foundations of mathematics, language theory, epistemology and philosophical

methodology.⁴⁴ This call for a realignment as seen in Kripke's rule-following which by and large brings an interface with Derrida, as Austins'. As if to endorse this Staten argues that the concept of rule does not explain anything in the *Investigations*: it is what has to be explained. The word *rule* is itself subject to the same conditions for meaningfulness that other words are, and it too has a vague and shifting family of meanings'.⁴⁵ Analysing the survival of analytic philosophy, Jaakko Hintikka said, '..... survival of analytic philosophy depends on philosophers acknowledgement and utilization of [the opportunities for *constructive* philosophy to be found in Wittgenstein later thought]⁴⁶. Thus it is proved beyond doubt that Norris's marginalizing post-analytic motifs is a disaster. This goes directly against Derrida's own suspicion about the hard-and-fast distinction between ordinary-extraordinary (formal) language. Derrida says

I am suspicious of the *opposition* between ordinary/extraordinary language. What I am trying to do is to find – and I think this is close to the Wittgenstein that you presented – the production of the extraordinary *within* the ordinary and the way the ordinary is, as you put it 'vulnerable' to or not 'immune' to what we understood as extraordinary.'⁴⁷

Thesis 6: The genetic affiliation between the analytical and continental philosophies is warranted by analytic and post-analytic considerations. It

remains now to substantiate the above claims (Thesis 1 – Thesis 6) in the pages to follow before capping it with a consideration of ‘late’ Derrida, the philosopher of the public sphere, who comes to proximity with critical theory of Habermas in sharing a platform against the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre.

Notes

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8. Barbara Johnson, in the introduction to Derrida's work 'Dessimation', *continuum*. 2005. p. xv (Dsmn. Hereafter).
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12. *Ibid.* p. 248.

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14. Simon Glendenning, *Arguing with Derrida*, Blackwell 2001, p.37 (A.D hereafter).
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16. *Ibid.* p. 66.
17. *Ibid.* p. 74.
18. *Ibid.* p. 83.
19. *Ibid.* p. 83.
20. *Ibid.* p. 11.
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25. *Ibid.* p. 23.
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33. L.H Holler, *Philosophy and the Critique of Language : Wittgenstein and Mauthener*, Blackwell 1998, p. 65.
34. Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida*, Blackwell, 1985, p. 90 (W & D hereafter).
35. *Ibid.* p. 3.
36. DAP p. 207.
37. Christopher Norris, *Truth About Postmodernism*, Blackwell. 1993, p.219. [TAP hereafter].
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39. Donald Davidson, *Enquiries into Truth and Interpretation* O.U.P. 1984. p. 261.
40. DAP. p. 44.
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42. DAP. p. 29.

43. DAP. p. 23-24.
44. Aaron Preston, Conformism in Analytic Philosophy, *The Monist*, April 2005, Vol. 88, No. 2. p. 311.
45. W & D. p. 102.
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47. A D. p.112.

CHAPTER II

LOGOCENTRISM AND DECONSTRUCTIVE OVERTURES IN WITTGENSTEIN

2.1 Deconstruction: Rigorous and Wild (Non-Rigorous)

Norris's classification of deconstruction falls into two categories. Claiming it as hard and fast distinctions, he calls these into 'rigorous' (philosophical) and non-rigorous or wild (literary) forms of deconstructive activity. Staten's discussion of Derrida is set on these two maneuvers.

Firstly Staten begins his enquiry with the general impression that deconstruction is a sudden and rather simple operation in which a philosophical argument is dispatched when it is found to be merely figurative or rhetorical or is found to privilege speech over writing. But a closer study will make it clear that Derrida does not merely point out fundamental metaphor but he analyzes in great detail arguments and conceptual structures. One thing that comes out clear from reading his texts is that the "logos" in "logocentric" cannot be understood in relation to speech. *Logos* must first be understood in relation to *eidos* "form" a concept that occupies a far more important place in metaphysical thematics than does speech. The very notion that speech occupies a more important place in metaphysics, itself is based on the concept of form. The privilege of speech in philosophy mainly occurs

since it names what is, and what it truly is, in its intelligibility and the principle of intelligibility is form.

Secondly, Staten also attempts to read Derrida's project into relation with Wittgenstein so as to suggest that an Anglo-American context within which deconstruction makes philosophical sense. Such a parallelism offers an alternative method of seeing him as some sort of structuralist and also explain the reasons for how and why we should read his texts on Husserl and Aristotle as well as those on Rousseau and Saussure.

It is better to read this in the context of Newton Garver. Thus Garver advanced a 'Structural Affinity' thesis: 'Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* bears close affinities to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*'. Garver's thesis provides the starting point to the question about the 'structural affinity' between the two texts. It appears in *two* forms such as (a) the weak form and (b) the strong form.

- (a) In the *weak* form, it calls for a penetrating consideration and ultimate rejection of the basic principles of Husserl's philosophy of language. In other words, Husserl's philosophy of language is the *historical analogue* of Wittgenstein's later consideration and rejection of his own earlier work, *Tractatus*.
- (b) In the *strong* form, it gives an advice to be read *Logical Investigations* next to *Philosophical Investigations* to discover a close relation. The

very name of Wittgenstein's investigations acquires a special significance here.

The *thematic* considerations are given as:

What is relevant to (a) is the commentary *Of Grammatology* (Chapter I especially p. 44-65).

What is relevant to (b) is the deconstructive reading of Wittgenstein later work. The *textual filiation* is brought out as follows:

- (1) In *Grammatology*, Derrida concludes that originary trace as the general structure of the sign as well as the general structure of experience as lived time. The presence of a minimal unit of temporal experience and trace retaining the other as other in the same acts as working conditions of meaning and differance. The differance here is not a constituted one but it acts before all determination of the content and of the pure movement which produces differance. *The (pure) trace is differance*. Similarly Wittgenstein notion of rule-following is aimed at showing that the form of a rule is essentially multiple and that it is always possible to deviate from the established application of a rule while continuing to adhere to its form. This boundary between form and meaning was rejected in Wittgenstein's later work. There, words have meaning only in the context of "language-game" and "forms of life". If the target of attack of Wittgenstein was the parent

language of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the whole text of western philosophy from Plato, Aristotle to Husserl and Heidegger (logocentrism) was the target of Derrida.

When Wittgenstein is trapped inside the text, Derrida speaks of the impossibility of the text. For Wittgenstein what is called the Ariadne's threads of dispose is identified with the 'labyrinth of language' (Bowsma's phrase) or the 'metaphor of twisting fibre'.

(2) Wittgenstein says that the concept of essence can be treated *grammatically*, that is, a general term whole principle of operation sum up or schematize the principles of operation of a whole set of other, less metaphysical physical sounding terms. In the case of Derrida, the characteristic move of metaphysics exists on the hierarchical structure of binary opposition where "essence" and "accident" comes under the most general rubrics.

The deconstructive critique of language can also be phrased as a *denial that there is language*. Here language is used in the sense of ideality we call "meaning". Derrida's commentary on Husserl distinguishes *three* levels of ideality of meaning such as (1) the ideality of the word (2) the ideality as the unity of the word's sense or signification and (3) the ideality which is free from dependence on contingent realities. Derrida treats the relation between ideality and embodiment horizontally. Here the 'iterability' of the sign is an

essential characteristic. The sign-type which is constituted in his conceptual essence by its 'iterability' is distinct from the spatio-temporal things and to some extent differ from each other. A sign would not be a sign keep it lacks 'iterability'. The structure of iteration "implies both identity and difference". Iterability or the capacity for multiplicity constitutes the identity or the essence of the sign as sign and Derrida says that "splits the identity of the sign *a priori*". It is in this continually different contextualised meaning as the focus of investigation we can see the convergence between Derrida and Wittgenstein. 'Staten relates the detailed discussions of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Husserl to the history of philosophy especially to Aristotle'.

'Deconstruction is not a system of concepts but a *textual labour*, a way of traversing the body of the text. Derrida's work on Husserl leaves "a track in the text" of Husserl, and the track cannot be traced out without reference to the text in which it is marked.'¹ This opinion of Staten fully agrees with when we take into consideration of Derrida's own response to Thomas Baldwin's essay on 'Death and Meaning'. There Derrida says,

I am very interested in and indebted to Husserl's analysis of idealization. One could say that I 'borrow' from him while leaving him at a certain point and what I borrow from him is the analysis of what he calls 'idealization'.²

An enquiry into what extent Derrida borrowed from Husserlian mode of thinking, Staten explains that ‘deconstruction in its phase as critique of phenomenology proceeds by the rules of phenomenological discourse up to the moment of rupture’.³ This rupture Derrida calls an “event”. To him “the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked determinations of the center. The center receives different forms or names. Its matrix is the determination of being as *presence* in all sense of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to the center have always designated an invariable presence – *eidōs, arche, telos, energia, ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject) *alētheia*, transcendality, consciousness, God, Man, and so forth.”⁴

According to Staten, the chief objectives of Husserl from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Crisis* were two-fold. *Firstly*, Husserl tries to establish that the objects of our knowledge are “transcendent” to the mental acts by which we know them. They are not “real” component of our psychological flow but ideal identities that could be repeated as identically the same by different subjects. *Secondly*, in the process of accumulation of knowledge Husserl gives importance to the “generative” or “constitutive” activity of thought required for the original institution of truth or fixing of insights in language, where they will be available for others. According to Staten, it is unlikely that anyone who does not know what it means to desire to be awake

to the meaning of his symbolic manipulations in the way Husserl teaches can grasp deconstruction in its strongest form.⁵

Phenomenology is a critique of “sensualist” and “psychologicist”, view according to which objects enters into our consciousness in the form of bundles of sensations and from there function as images or representatives of the object. This scheme maintains a split between an inner object which is really perceived as an outer object which is the source of the bundle of sensations which can be inferred rather than perceived. In opposition to this view, in order to get a true and accurate description of perceptual consciousness, Husserl introduced an interpretative or constructive *activity* of consciousness. This view maintained a distinction between the “real”, temporal content of a particular consciousness and the ideal or “irreal”. Husserlian notion of ideality and reality can best be understood if we take into account his distinction between the natural and the phenomenological standpoint. The natural standpoint states that when I see a tree before me, it is not the inner representations of the tree I perceive, but the object tree itself. The phenomenological reflection upon this natural consciousness states that everything is perceived just as it is, but new elements of the scene come into view are “thematized” as “objects”. In the natural standpoint, individual’s attention is absorbed in the object intended by his perception. The time one tries to describe this experience of perceiving, it has different characteristics than the description of the tree. Here the tree is susceptible of an infinite

number of perceptual viewings. The tree as – appearing or *noema* unlike the “mental Image” of representationalism, is not an object, nor a reality of its own. *Noema* is not directed towards objects but towards the modes in which consciousness is aware of objects. It becomes an object for phenomenological reflection. This reflection suspends or brackets the question of reality. The phenomenological bracketing or the “reduction” of the material world considers the mental act (*noesis*) as an absolute being irrespective of any correspondence to empirical reality, and the *noema*, as the correlate of this act. In this attempt, Husserl maintains an admirable balance between subjectivity and objectivity, between real objects and ideal objects and between conceptual judgement and preconceptual experience. Objects are for Husserl experienced through the ideal senses which are *repeatable as the same* in the repeated experience of any number of different subjects. ‘Hence the phenomenological movement towards the *telos* of cognitive fulfillment takes the form of a return to origins. To take the world as it appears to unreflective experience, already shaped by previous experience and by language and tradition, is to take it as a habitual world, as a world we can understand and manipulate only, as it were from the outside. Phenomenological insight demands that we peel off the layers of interpretative form in which the world comes clothed for us, in order to return to the most primitive moments in which things spring into being for consciousness. This is the only way we can arrive at a truly evident and

presuppositionless description'.⁶ Phenomenology speaks of different stages of reduction.

Taking 'evidence' as the central problematic of phenomenological method, one may recount the major steps of the phenomenological method at least in two distinct ways. *Firstly*, the pre-reductive method of the *Logical Investigations* which expounds a theory of evidence which is applicable to the apodictic certainty of mathematical, logical and geometrical propositions. *Secondly*, there is the reductive and post-reductive method found in *Ideas* and in the later writings which focuses on evidence as a pre-requisite to all the investigations of the sciences.

The different stages of phenomenology can be expressed in the following way.

1. Natural standpoint (unmodified pre-thematic/ante-predicate)
2. Epoche (Bracketing)
3. Phenomenological Reduction (Stage –1)
4. Eidectic Reduction (Stage –2)
5. Transcendental Reduction (Stage – 3)
6. Adequate Evidence (Adequatio)
7. Apodictic Evidence (Apodictivity)
8. Intuition of Essence (Wesenschau)

Of these eight stages, steps 3, 4 and 5 are interpreted as different ways of phenomenological reduction rather than different stages. Accordingly, the views about the way they depend on evidence may get altered. The relation between 6 and 7 marks the early theory of evidence, and takes on different forms. Generally, three important stages are recognized in the whole process – the phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental.

The *first stage* is called phenomenological reduction which consists of suspending all beliefs that are characteristic of the “natural-attitude”. It involves the suspension of the beliefs given by the senses as well as science. It also excludes what is transcendent. It does not deny the existence of the objects of experience but rejects the beliefs characterizing the ‘natural attitude’.

The *second stage* is called eidetic reduction in which Husserl distinguishes between real objects and ideal objects. A real object is that which is both temporal and spatial and an ideal object is both non-spatial and a temporal. The purpose of eidetic reduction is to reduce the real objects into ideal objects or what may be called essences. Here the existence of the essences in the particulars are bracketed by the phenomenological reduction. With eidetic reduction the realm of essences is uncovered. At this stage both the act of the consciousness and the object of consciousness enter into the realm of essences ‘eidos’ the level of universal type.

The *third stage* is called transcendental reduction in which the ‘pure consciousness’ or ‘transcendental consciousness’ is uncovered. The ego – subject which is theoretically accessible by the eidetic reduction now becomes transformed into the ‘pure – ego’ or ‘*the concrete ego*’. It is a necessary principle and it also constitutes being in general and the transcendent world. After the transcendental reduction, what remains as ‘phenomenological residuum’ is ‘pure consciousness in its own absolute Being’.

The important step that is apparent in his essay on ‘The Origin of Geometry’ where the origin is always understood as the ‘ideal objectivity of scientific concepts’. It can be said that ‘the phenomenological viewpoint alters nothing in the natural standpoint which it brackets, and so a place must be made within the phenomenological system of description for everything that we already, as natural subjects know.’⁷ In this attempt, Husserl maintains an admirable balance between subjectivity and objectivity (the “two sides” toward which phenomenology is oriented) between real objects and ideal objects, and between conceptual judgment and pre-conceptual expressions.⁸

Many followers of Husserl rejected and criticized the transcendental phenomenological reduction. However Iso Kern’s evaluation of it, according to its “ontological” form, exemplifies Husserl’s true and lasting intention. ‘The reduction, says Kern, is designed to “break through the limitations of

natural objective cognition” which sees objects as “static, fixed, foreign things” in order to open the depth character of the world as a dynamic achievement of consciousness. Thus the reduction is finally “nothing but a change of attitude”. Kern cites Husserl’s words: “to exclude the world means not to want to pass judgement on it straightway.”⁹

Dagfinn Føllesdal finds that “the concept of “sense” as the preconceptual language-anticipating meaning of the intuited object is a generalizations of the notion of meaning:”¹⁰ On a wider enquiry, it can be found that this generalization is far from an assimilation of objects to language. Quite opposite to this, by peeling off the layers of meaning from the sensuous substratum of language, Husserl forged the connection between meaning and the object. Here the milieu of object of evidence expresses in subjectivity and objectivity has no role of the physical phenomenon of language. However, according to Husserl, in the case of intersubjectivity, language becomes a necessary medium.

2.2. Wittgenstein and Husserl: A Textual Parallelism

As stated earlier, phenomenology in its furthest reach seeks to define the most fundamental or original structure of transcendental consciousness in which a world can be constituted as given to consciousness. The different stages of phenomenological reduction acts as an essential moment for the

emergence of deconstruction. Deconstruction thus has to work through the text of phenomenology. As stated by Staten,

‘The phenomenological reduction is a moment essential to the emergence of deconstruction because without it we would confuse the object itself with some determined concept of the object itself, say as defined by the positive sciences or in some realism or empiricism. The reduction opens the possibility of a radical reflection on the *sense* of the object as originally given to experience, and it is on the level of this radical reflection that deconstruction contests the phenomenological determination of this sense.’¹¹

The tension contained in the Husserlian treatment of language between “the living body” of language which is transparent to intention and the dead and opaque body serves Derrida in his readings of Husserl as a mainspring for the deconstructive turn. The very necessity of “original reactivation” of ideal meaning and the conflict between this necessity and the worldiness of linguistic sign expressed in the Husserlian “The Origin of Geometry”, thus becomes the focus of Derridean attraction in his ‘first major work’, *Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, the central questions of *The Origin of Geometry* is posed initial question as follows.

‘how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary interpersonal origin, where it is a structure within a conscious space of the first inventor’s soul, to its ideal objectivity.’¹²

What is called ideal objectivity can be better understood in terms of the *three* levels of idealities formulated by Derrida. The *first* level is called ‘semiotic ideality’ in which a particular word retains its ideality throughout. The *second* level is called ‘semantic ideality’ which is nothing but the ideality of linguistic meaning. Here the identity is understood to presence what is called the translational meaning of two terms/sentences. The *third* level is called ‘scientific ideality’ which stands for the ideality of geometrical objects. Here the ideality is the object itself. As Derrida remarks at this level, ‘all adherence to any real contingency is removed’.¹³

This is the highest stage of ideality according to Derrida. There is an inevitable comparison between the *solipsistic* model and the way Husserl transcends it to reach an *intersubjective* level, where ideality and historicity come together. Whereas the previous mode excluded the communicative function of language, the latter invokes it in terms of the constituency of language (of the geometrical, ideality/ideal objectivity).

Now *let us discuss* how Derrida proceeds to deconstruct Husserl’s ‘*the Origin of Geometry*’. Husserl discusses the experience that might have

undergone by the original inventor of geometry at the moment of the primal creative act that enables him to “grasp” the geometrical truth “with the consciousness of its original being itself there [*selbst-da*]”. This “original reproduction” is made possible only by means of writing and it is writing that gives linguistic expression a persisting existence. Derrida finds this moment in Husserl’s text very important in the sense that writing is necessary to free ideality from the contingency of any particular empirical subject. The completion of meaning, according to Husserl, occurs in the presence of an object intended before a consciousness that intends it in accordance with the intellectual form. The “act of pure meaning” takes place when the object that was merely thought of “in symbol” is presented in intuition. With this distinction between the meaning-intention which functions signitively and the sense-perception or “intuition” that fulfills it, Husserl maintains the freedom of thought even in the absence of the object when think about it and the teleological determinations of the essence of thought when it finds only signitive in relation to an object. These two sides of Husserl’s project Derrida calls “intuitionist” and the “formalist” and praise Husserl for the breakthrough in the formalist moment of his analysis.

Husserl attempts to develop a “*pure logical grammar*” by means of the distinction between meaning and object meant and it explains the universal structures of language that would define *a priori* the conditions of possibility for linguistic meaningfulness. The pure forms generate meaning in the

interval before fulfillment in sense-perception. This view of Husserl is criticized by Derrida stating that the meaning intend “symbolically” is not always true and cannot be fulfilled as in a sentence like “the circle is square”. In *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida comments, ‘we know the act of meaning that confers *Bedeutung* (*Bedeutungsintention*), is always the aim of a relation with an object. But it is enough that this intention animates the body of a signifier for speech to take place. The fulfillment of the aim by an intuition is not indispensable. It belongs to the original structure of expression to be able to dispense with the full presence of the object aimed at by intuition’.¹⁴

According to Derrida, Husserl also effaces his own formalist moment of description of “the emancipation of speech as non-knowing” as structurally independent of fulfilling intuition. In *Speech and Phenomena*, he notes the ‘subtle shift’:

In other words, the genuine and true meaning is the will to say the truth. This subtle shifts incorporates the *eidōs* into the *telos*, and language into knowledge. A Speech could well be in conformity with its essence as speech when it was false; it nonetheless attains its entelechy when it is true. One can well *speak* in saying “the circle is square”; one speaks *well*, however, in saying that it is not. There is already sense in the first proposition, but we would be wrong to conclude from this that

sense *does not wait upon* truth. It does not await truth as expecting it; it only precedes truth as its anticipation.

In truth, the *telos* which announces the fulfillment, promised for “later”, has already and beforehand opened up sense as a relation with the object.¹⁵

Derrida also questions the teleological determination of the essence of meaning. Here, the essence of meaning is the ability to function in the absence of the object meant simply by “animating the body of a signifier”. Or else, if the object meant is present, we do not see the unique and distinctive character of “meaning” as rigorously distinguishable from “object intuition”. In such a way, Derrida is trying to wrest the concept of meaning away from the moment of intuition in order to attach it *essentially* to the moment of signification.

Deconstruction is not a refutation of Husserl’s view of meaning and signification. Instead it follows the conceptual path traced by Husserl shifting emphasis for the major steps Husserl had taken. The purpose of Derrida, in this attempt, is to show the “ethico-theoretical” decisions which determine the precise shape that this articulation and this linkage take. An enquiry on this line based on the formalist moment of analysis of meaning of Husserl in the *Investigations*, will enable us to draw different conclusions about the nature of signification than Husserl does. Because, according to Staten, ‘Husserl

predetermine his path according to the *telos* of fulfillment of signitive intention by something - itself, a subordinate valuation is prescribed for the moment of signification, and therefore a subordinate place in the linkage of moments of Husserl's discourse'.¹⁶

In Husserl, the ethico-theoretical decision determines the value of the sign. An attempt to suspend the decision will question the place and value of the sign. In place of this, Derrida treats language apart from fulfillment of knowledge, searching its originality and its peculiarity as a quasi-material medium. Derrida also compares the part followed by Husserl to that of James Joyce when Husserl's path leads to the fixing of terminology in a univocity that would be transparent to the logical unities of ideal meaning. Joyce's, Derrida writes, would "repeat and take responsibility for equivocation itself. He also utilized a language that could equalize the greatest possible synchrony with the greatest potential for buried, accumulated, and interwoven intentions within each linguistic atom. Such a linguistic atom consists of each valuable, each word, each simple proposition, in all worldly cultures and their most ingenious forms (mythology, religion, sciences, art, literature, politics, philosophy and so forth)".¹⁷ Derrida does not follow Joyce's path but takes the problem of "univocity" as underlying Joyce's equivocity. It is that univocal language in which philosophy works that Joyce explored to the spread of meaning. 'That is what makes Derrida so difficult to read *well*', says Staten, 'neither simply as poetry nor simply as philosophy (which in any case

are undoubtedly weak ways of reading poetry and philosophy)..... It may be said of Derrida's work, as Wittgenstein wrote of his own, that "one cannot even compare the genre (Art)" it belongs to "with that of earlier works."¹⁸

In opposition to the Husserlian model of presence, Derrida devises the model of the sign as structure of *differance*, as an in-principle "not this" and "not now" and thus come to a realms of indefiniteness in the absence of a wakeful grasp of a conscious reactivation. "*The thing itself is a sign*", says Derrida in the *Grammatology*. This Derridean saying is a radical opening of the inside to what is not homogenous with that inside understood as wakeful consciousness. It can be explained in the following way. "Let us consider the experience of what we call 'things themselves' as structured more like the experience of signs than like the experience of an idealized "full presence".¹⁹ Here the philosophical limit-idea of the thing and unreflected materiality of objects have to be taken separately. Derrida analyzes the sign as an impure ideality, a membrane between world and the subject that exist entangled in the web of worldliness while inhabiting the zone of ideality.

Husserl considers idealities in general as identities that present the standing possibility of repetition by a rational subject in general. It states that the sign, too, is an ideality. But according to Derrida, this ideality does not make sense of a real thing. The various sensuous configurations that can reckon as the same sign might have no "objective" identity with each other as

long as they retain the same relative function within a system of differences that constitutes the whole sign-system to which they belong. Thus if “l” and “r” are different phonemes in one language, they are the same in another language. It thus becomes clear that the sign is not quite ideal in the purity of ideality nor a quite material object. But in the Husserlian way of thinking, the sign confounds the categories of ideality and materiality. Instead, Derrida takes sign as something like the limit point of idealization, a practice followed from Plato to Husserl. In the words of Staten, it is stated as follows:

‘Having identified the distinctive structure of the sign as repetition of what is not fully present, Derrida comes back to reinterpret the fundamental structure of presence proper in its terms. That is, he reconceives all of experience on the model of signitive experience. “Repeatability”, as the condition for the existence of all idealities, whether they are the “senses” of real or ideal objects, turns out to, infect the entire domain of presence’²⁰

To complete the above picture, we must add how Derrida looks at the way Husserl viewed objectivation in terms of time-consciousness. It says that without a clarification of the identity of temporal position, no clarification of the identity of an object can be given. Further, consciousness depends upon the “primal impression” that an object makes on consciousness in an absolute

“now”. This primal impression has its full being, it at once moved back into a just past and a new ‘now’ takes its place as “in the living source point of the now these..... Wells up ever fresh primal being.”²¹

Derrida questions the nature of retention of Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness. The question is, if the present now is constituted by its relation to a past – now, does it mean that retention belongs to perception in the primordial sense Husserl wants to affirm? According to Husserl, consciousness is necessarily *consciousness* in each of its phases. It is this Husserlian notion of fullness of consciousness that Derrida challenges when he contests Husserl’s judgement on the nature of retention. It says that if the primary remembrance lacks the primordial fullness of objective a consciousness, it would contaminate the “originary” of the origin by means of intrusion of a content not itself belonging to originary presence.

Inverting the order of precedence by means of an in-principle multiplicity of repeatable identity, Derrida reinterprets the structure of transcendental consciousness and of ideality in general on the same model. To him, *repeatability* splits the ideality of the sign *a priori*.

Here if we are to follow the logic of deconstruction, we must revise not only our concepts but our concepts of concepts and our concept of language. In short, the logic of this *revision* is the logic of *deconstruction*.

To quote Staten:

‘For Derrida as for Wittgenstein, deconstruction is not a pure thought but allows itself to work in and be worked by the medium of language, and allows for the productivity of that medium. It is in order to open a space of philosophical legitimacy for that medium that Derrida refuses to let it be reduced and devises the concept of the divided essence.’²²

Derrida’s critique of Husserl is not only different from the views of orthodox “linguistic analysis” as represented by Ernst Tugendhat. In place of the phenomenological focus on the relation of intentional acts to intentional objects of Husserl, Tugendhat claims that “inter-subjective communication in language” must function as our “universal system of reference”. In linguistic analysis, the primary unit of awareness is understanding the meaning of a sentence. This understanding is itself clarified not in terms of an interpretative or constitutive subjectivity, but in terms of inter-subjective linguistic rules. The deconstructionist perspective of Tugendhat’s approach says that it is just another way of repressing the linguistic sign replacing its sublation into a rule.

Derrida’s critique of Husserl is also different from Donn Welton’s attempt to answer Tugendhat. According to Welton, Husserl eventually realized that” thinking is, at the very outset, linguistic and that language is

necessarily inter-subjective.” Staten finds nothing new in Welton’s view of language. According to Welton, the linguistic sense that interacts with the perceived object in the formation of new perspectives is an ideal sense “pared out” in the shape of “critical language” from the “heart of normal talk”. Hence the language which Welton finds essential for Husserl is not a language in question for Derrida. ‘In fact Welton confirms what Derrida has emphasized about Husserl’s view of language, that it defines the essence of language on the basis of a logico-objective core attained, by a reduction of the “mere sign” or sign *as such*.’²³

It can be said that the reduction of the sensible sign in favour of ideality exclude the world. In opposition to this, according to J.N Mohanty, for Husserl “even solitary monologue is about the world.”²⁴ Here Mohanty misapprehends Derrida’s claim that Husserl cut off language from its “relation to the world by his reduction of the sensuous sign.” Husserl does not exclude the world (or inter subjectivity) but the world (and inter subjectivity) insofar as it has not been “worked over by *Geist*” (*Speech and Phenomena P. 35*), insofar as it would not be the correlate of a possible *noesis*, and in this phenomenology is typical of philosophy in general. Materiality is not excluded from the phenomenological reduction but excludes the element of impurity, of indefiniteness, of non-essence in that materiality, so that the sense of the object-as-such, the intelligible object, may emerge.

2.3. Wittgenstein Deconstructs the ‘Twisting Fibres’

Wittgenstein’s famous remark about letting the fly out of the fly bottle can be taken as a token of Wittgenstein’s quest to loosen up the crystallized patterns of philosophical thought in order to force real thought. The movement of deconstruction in Wittgenstein therefore points out the movement of his language which renews the restless perplexity, arises from the inadequate forms of language. It is this deconstructive impulse in Wittgenstein that Staten intends to discuss. Wittgenstein’s method thus would be one which necessarily opens new paths. And it is this movement towards new paths which has been characterized by Derrida as “dissiminations” (one of the textualist strategies of Derrida). In this attempt, Staten explains:

Wittgenstein is not primarily making arguments or teaching new concepts, though much of what he writes certainly looks like those things, rather, he is instructing us in a skill, a method, a strategy. Hence there will always be a double-sense to each move he makes.²⁵

As stated earlier, from *Blue Book* onwards Wittgenstein was *deconstructive*. The best example of this can be found in Wittgenstein’s own words in *Blue Book*:

“As we are not interested in where the processes of thinking, calculating, takes place, we can for our purpose imagine the calculations being done entirely on paper. We are not concerned with the difference, internal, external”(P.13)²⁶

This Wittgensteinian pronouncement, Staten reads as extra-ordinary simple and yet audacious, even revolutionary move. A parallelism of this move, can be found in Derrida which he replaces the phenomenological “voice” (silent, internal) with the concept of “writing”. In a sense, the whole of the *Investigations* follows upon this investigating move, but the first 242 remarks are especially marked by it.

Staten’s enquiry is therefore, set forth against the first 242 remarks of the *Philosophical Investigations*, in which questions about the basic structure of naming, understanding a meaning, grasping a rule etc., are dealt with. Here deconstructive move in Wittgenstein develops against the primal scene of philosophy in the *Tractatus*, where naming appears as an “occult process”. “Naming appears as a *queer connexion* of a word with an object. In this context, Staten reads the following themes or motifs working in Wittgenstein’s repudiation of the primal scene of philosophy.

- (1) *The Satirical Aspect*: Here the “Scenic” character of Wittgenstein’s presentation of a philosopher is described. The philosopher as an actor *acting out an absurd or comical scene* in his most intense

moments of philosophical travail. Since Wittgenstein wants to investigate meaning as signification, as spatio-temporal, he believed on the principle of evoking the *scene* of language as the locus of meaning.

(2) *The Scenic Aspect*: At this level, the philosophic conceptions of mind and meaning is described as “occult” or “peculiar”. This is the point which Wittgenstein describes as “beyond” of language which philosophy postulates, the ideal realm where things like “meanings” are possible.

(3) *The Figurative Aspect*: It is related to his Satirical aspect. Here figures are used to picture mental activities. Since it was Wittgenstein’s task to find words to express the characteristic experiences associated with certain philosophical notions and here his language works like lyric poetry.

Wittgenstein’s concept of “baptism” of an object can be taken as a direct descendant of Husserlian picture of primordial intuition expressed in a very different way of philosophical sophistication. Similar to that of Husserl, a compelling scene of truth is involved here. This compelling force is expressed in the word “This” (PI. 38) since it has an absolutely unique role in the language. It is with this word that language transcends its separation from

things and makes contact with them. The word “*this*” acts as a hinge on which “mental picture” and the idea of “understanding” as a mental event.

Wittgenstein used the term “mental picture” (*Bild im Geiste*) to represent the unity of the meaning of a name. This mental picture does not give a precise characterization of the mental sample and in that sense, it is subject to the same ambiguity that occurs in the case of *physical objects*. So we would replace the mental sample with an actual physical sample. If we have used the word similar to that of others do, we have learnt the meaning of the word. The mental picture alone gives the meaning of a word but its use or application gives the meaning. Thus inserted in a sequence of, the sample will act as a sample of one thing in a particular context and of another in another context. And the application occurs *Im Laufe der Zeit* (in the course of time) (PI. 141). According to Samuel.C. Wheeler, one of the best features of Staten’s book is the attempt to give serious content to dark phrases current in much secondary material on deconstruction about “Western Metaphysics”.²⁷ Although Wheeler argues that some of Staten’s broad claims about the history and character of philosophy are partly *wrong*, he states that the book is free from the oversimplifications and stupidities about philosophy that deface many expositions of deconstruction and embarrass the philosophers who take deconstruction seriously.

Wittgenstein's linguistic method is both *textual* and *critical*, and more precisely, it is a method of *destabilization*, as it is clear from following remark:

Wittgenstein's method is critical. It is a way of attacking another style of language, the traditional style of philosophy.²⁸

The style of traditional philosophy is characterized by the pursuit of "essences" of the world. Staten counterpose Wittgenstein's early account of *essentialism* as found in the *Tractatus* with his later style of *non-essentialism*, which he characterizes as *accidence* of language. This style shows how many different routes it would be possible to take from any given point in the discourse. From this, Staten concludes that Wittgenstein's method is not any kind or it is no sort of method. It has not "sort" that it belongs to.

The *Investigations* considers many different kinds of method, and none of this method of the *Investigations*, but all of them are aspects of this method. Not because it is a higher method, the ultimate *Aufhebung* of method, but because they make up the series of language-games, a language consisting of and taught by examples.²⁹

As Staten wants to interpret it, it is a method in which there is a certain confrontation between language and philosophy. Thus in the later Wittgenstein, we can see that the *critique of philosophy* is given in the form of

critique of language. And so Staten concludes by saying that now we can how “ordinary language” can be used in the critique of philosophy. This proves that *critique of language* is a unifying thesis within Wittgenstein. Deconstruction has no precise beginning or ending, but only an endless intertwining of the threads of the deconstructive text with those of the classical text and of “ordinary language”.

Deconstruction is a simultaneous unraveling and reweaving of ‘Ariadne’s threads of discourse’ (Bouwsma’s phrase, In his essay on the *Blue Book*) in the labyrinth of language.³⁰

As Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*, is directed at what is already in plain sight, that is, the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, there is a double movement in his presentation of “ordinary language”. They are called “as Penelope and as a Circe” signifying respectively the home to which language has to be returned and as the reduction of the play of surfaces. Wittgenstein’s introduction of the German word ‘*Verwendung*’ (use) according to Staten, signifies a *per-verting* or turning of language from its normal use. Wittgenstein remarks that philosophical problems arise when language goes on a holiday. So he rejects the ‘holiday’ of language as used by philosophy along with his emphasis on use. Thus Wittgenstein shows that philosophers use of ‘holiday’ conveys that language gets perverted to the extent that one can say that it is the atrophy (*atropos*) of language. This is

what gets explained in Wittgenstein's use of "seeing as" aspect (the duck-rabbit syndrome).

In Part II of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says, 'there are here hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible concepts.' We are oblivious of these possible concepts and which can be drawn to us if we remove a word or picture from its normal surroundings and put it into new ones. Accordingly, an arbitrary cipher will reveal various "aspects". It will look a childish script, a letter in a foreign alphabet or a calligraphic flourish, according to the fiction one sounds it with. In this connection, an example of the aspect of a triangle is explained. This triangle can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing, as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other things (compare the 'necker cube' as an example).³¹ The pictures that enslave the gaze lie in language, and language seems to repeat them to us inexorably. Therefore, 'philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'.

Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblances" has to be viewed in these terms. The term "resemblance", itself was deconstructed by Wittgenstein by various related terms. Terms like "similarity" and "family

resemblance” are introduced in such a way as images which help us to think relation, sequence, ordering in a new way, allowing for more variation between terms, more “play” in their linkage. The concept of “family resemblance”, is therefore very similar to Wittgenstein’s illustrations along with the image of the toolbox, the locomotive with different switches, the chess game, and so on. The later Wittgenstein himself drops the image of family resemblance to the image of the *thread*. Here philosophy has been viewed as *twisting fibres*. The figure of twisting fibres conveys that

‘by *twisting fibres* together we get a thread; by weaving threads together we get a text; by unravelling the text into its threads and the threads into fibres we get deconstruction, which is at the same time itself a fabric, woven according to the variable pattern of the unweaving of the deconstructed fabric.’³²

A very pattern of this argument can be found in Derrida’s own reply to Kristeva’s when the latter was asked “what is *gram* as a new structure of non-presence”? Derrida’s answer comes as follows:

The interweaving results in each element *Phoneme* or *grapheme* – being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain system. This interweaving, this textile; is the text produced only in the transformation of another text.³³

The displacement of the threads of philosophy from their old configuration is not due to the fact that they are false. Philosophy is neither senseless in the sense that sense is something settled that is missing from it. Wittgenstein says:

‘It is not as it were its essence that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation’ (PI. 400).

Thus philosophy is not entirely withdrawn because “senseless” sentences are interwoven with the recommended combinations of words, though no boundary is drawn between them.

‘But if I draw a boundary, “that is not yet to say what I am drawing of it for”: It could be part of a game and the players be supposed, to say, to jump over the boundary’ (PI. 499).

In the words of Wheeler ‘one of the *tasks of deconstruction*, as practiced by Wittgenstein, is to eliminate exactly this kind of demand for “*pure cases*” as the condition for the usability of dichotomy. Wittgenstein could try to allow science and practical knowledge to differ from more intentionally involved fields.³⁴

Wittgenstein’s style in the *Investigations* is deeply *involved in the kind of liberation* of language as *material* substance from the domination of

meaning. One cannot understand the deconstructive activity in the fictionalization, of invention of alternatives of syntax involved in the *Investigations* without sufficient knowledge of the variety of material resources of language and the excess of these resources over what can be predominant by the meaning intention of the users of language. In this attempt, Wittgenstein defamiliarizes language and heightens the sense of signs as ciphers which, however, rather than calling for *decipherment* call for *syntaxis*, sequencing or arrangement. Language passes into doodles and pictures in one direction and into something like music in another.

Similar to that of Derrida, Freudian influence in Wittgenstein can also be traced out. Commentators like Rush Rhees find that from 1919 on, and in the mid-forties, Wittgenstein read Freud and spoke of himself as a “disciple of Freud”. However, like that of Derrida, Wittgenstein also believed that Freud ultimately remains caught within a traditional philosophical schema. This is because Freud wants to recuperate all the materials of the dream for the category of “meaning”. Contrary to this, Wittgenstein wants to leave open the possibility of meaning – indicating phenomena which only *indicate* (i.e. suggest) meaning without actually meaning anything, so that all that we can do is follow out the character of their indicativeness as far as it goes.

Wittgenstein’s own famous statement that ‘philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language, also needs

discussion in this context. Here the key word is “means”, a translation of the German *Mittel* which can be interpreted in three ways, Such as “remedy”, “medium” and “wealth” or “resources”. Accordingly, the role of philosophy can be interpreted in *three* ways.

1. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence “through the remedy of language”. Staten says that this would be the account of Wittgenstein’s method.
2. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence “through the medium of language”.
3. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence “through the resources of wealth of language”.

This wealth or profusion of appearances of language cannot simply be effaced in the service of the meaning intention. It is the source that bewitches the intellect. It is also the source of the possibility of new analogies and new possibilities of syntax. Hence Staten says that:

‘The remedy for the illusions that arise from the excessive wealth of language is the transit through the material medium of language, an endless transit, exile in the endless accident of language. The promise of a return to the homeland of language is never fulfilled.’³⁵

The demonstrative pronoun *this* in the primal scene of Wittgenstein's philosophy gives the sense of a man pointing to a particular object but in the later period, it is replaced with meaning pointing to a word or expression-as in the phrase "this sentence". The linguistic texture of the German text gives us more options on certain connections than does in English. In English when we use the phrase "pointing gesture", "ostensive definition" and "demonstrative pronoun", In German, the only word *hinweisen* is used to point or "to show". Such etymological and semantic resonances or puns can also be found in Derrida's deconstructive key terms. An example of this can be traced out in Derrida's deconstructive device 'difference'. Derrida writes:

'In making out *difference*, everything is a matter of strategy and risk (*strategique et aventureux*). It is a question of strategy because no transcendental truth present outside the sphere of writing can theologically commend the totality of this field. It is hazardous because this strategy is not simply one in the sense that we say strategy orients the tactics according to a final aim, a *telos* or the theme of a domination, a mastery or ultimate reappropriation of movement and field. In the end it is a strategy without finality. We might call it blind tactics.'³⁶

These remarks, apply to Wittgenstein's writings as to Derrida's – in fact; However Staten reads that Wittgenstein's work has never been so well characterized as it is by these remarks.

2.4 Evaluating Staten's Main Lines of Argumentation

Wheeler recognizes Staten as a writer with great clarity and illumination and the very title of the book '*Wittgenstein and Derrida*' stands for the thesis that Wittgenstein's practice is a kind of deconstruction. The very purpose of Staten therefore is to vindicate that deconstruction is not, as Richard Rorty has suggested "parasitic" on the text of philosophy, neither does it "dismantled" the boundary between literary and philosophical discourse. Staten's main lines of arguments therefore, follows a two-way method of enquiry. Firstly, he upholds the analysis of arguments and conceptual structures. Secondly, bringing Derrida's project into relation with Wittgenstein and thus suggests the American contexts within which deconstruction takes philosophical sense. The main lines of arguments that Staten raises in connection with the arguments of Wittgenstein and Derrida therefore falls under the following headings-problems of philosophy, ordinary language, style of these two thinkers, the historical situation etc.

Staten set forth his enquiry taking "ordinary language" as an operational concept for sharpening and criticizing the language. It is this operational concept of ordinary language that Habermas fails to recognize and

considers the 'ordinary' language "shot through with metaphors, non-usages, chance collocations, and other such 'accidental' features that cannot be reduced to any normative account". According to Rorty 'when the analysis of language is the main focus, purity is maintained in another form or it appears in disguise. To stop using the concept of necessity would be to cease to try to keep philosophy pure, but that attempt, I think, has cost too much waste motion already'.³⁷ However Staten makes a good start. This talent of Staten is properly recognized by Norris when he commences on the style of Derrida. To him 'Staten makes the point well when he describes how Wittgenstein like Derrida develop a style that is 'radically errant, one which effectively unlinks all the accidents concealed by "normal" uses of words in order to show how many different routes it would be possible to take from any given point in the discourse'.³⁸ In this, Staten is compatible with "therapeutic" school that considers Wittgenstein's treatment of language as a method to get us unstuck from a too literal or uncritical or fixated attachment to the formulas of traditional philosophy. Instead of taking old texts as mistakes, this method enables us to read philosophy in a more supple and interesting ways than formerly.

By bringing Wittgenstein into an alliance with Derrida, Staten also tries to trace out the styles of these two thinkers. Staten finds that although the styles of these two thinkers are very different, they are so original and powerful. Hence by placing Wittgenstein along with Derrida, Staten intends

‘to create a space of movement between their two styles where the fixation against which they warn us, but which they can cause, can be averted, and deconstruction can avoid becoming that “beautiful garment” of which Wittgenstein speaks, “that is transformed (Coagulates, as it were) into worms and serpents of its wearer looks smugly [selbstgefällig] at himself in the mirror.’³⁹ In the words of Wheeler “one of the best features of Staten’s book is the attempt to give serious content to dark phrases current in much secondary material on deconstruction about “Western metaphysics.” Staten relates the detailed discussion of Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Husserl to the history of philosophy especially to Aristotle.⁴⁰

According to Staten, Derrida does not see any connection between words and the meaning they indicate, instead he took words as words in the form of sounds, shapes, associate echoes that allow themselves to be fitted together. Most often, this Derridean preference is described by the jargon “the play of signifiers.”⁴¹ In this attempt “Derrida makes the argument as logical as possible, but he attempts certain stretching of language that must appear out of bounds so long as we remain within the closed circle of philosophical concepts that finds no place for the play of signifiers.”⁴² It is this style of Derrida, according the Newton Garvers reading, that evoke “frequent discomfort,” in the readers. At the same time, he adds that the ‘students of Wittgenstein are already familiar with the problem of living to read through someone’s language in order to see the point lying behind it.’⁴³

Wittgenstein's deconstruction begins by showing that various theories that instantiate the formal, foundationist, totalizing dream stems from the desire for a totalizing theory. Endorsing Garver's thesis, Wheeler remarks that Wittgenstein tries to deconstruct not a single text at a time but the whole field of philosophy. He paid little attention to the history of philosophy. The only reference text he wanted for the *Philosophical Investigations* was the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, his own earlier masterpiece. Thus, "Wittgenstein by a variety of techniques that Staten makes clear manage to critique and dismantle philosophical theories without proposing another theory".⁴⁴

Wittgenstein viewed the problems of philosophy in terms of his own elliptical recession of the tradition. But Derrida takes the problems of philosophy based on the particular philosophical texts. Derrida was always aware of the impossibility of a simple exit from the web of language. In that case, the language of Derrida is closely related to the language of classical metaphysics, especially that of transcendental phenomenology and by doing that he is keeping away from the line that catches Wittgenstein. Staten concludes,

'Derrida is in every way as alert as Wittgenstein, his language as tense and original.'⁴⁵

According to Staten, since the critical operation called deconstruction is so uncertain, Derrida's own texts are more difficult to comprehend than the texts he comments on. Further, these texts no formed in relation to the history of philosophy. It makes the necessity of reading an enlightening parallelism with the Husserlian critique in the *Investigations*. Husserl considered phenomenology to be something like the fulfillment or culmination of the history of philosophy, which in turn makes him to view "the one philosophy which as idea underlies all the philosophies that can be imagined." It is exactly here that Derrida uses a euphemism to refer to phenomenology, calling it as "juridical priority", in philosophical discourse. In other words, in order to separate out the ideal from the factual, it is necessary to go through the reduction of empirical being to phenomenological sense. In doing so, Derrida uses the pun on Husserl's own conception of phenomenology as "authentic metaphysics", in "the sense with which metaphysics as "first philosophy", was instituted originally." Since phenomenology is a term taken birth from the ancient Greeks in the form of *telos*, reading Husserl indirectly takes us back to the Greek and to the "opposition between form and matter", which inaugurates metaphysics. It makes Staten to say that

Derrida's remark on Aristotle especially in "the supplement of copula" and "*Ousia* and *Gramme*", are among the most important passages for understanding how Derrida's work is oriented to the history of philosophy and what Derrida calls "the

general code of metaphysics” which bears “the decisive mark of Aristotelianism”.⁴⁶

Staten also finds such decisive mark in the features of philosophical thought that Wittgenstein worked against, especially in the philosophical theories of language. The pattern of argument that Wittgenstein makes in the early period of his work therefore, can be called Aristotelian in certain respects, especially in relation to the crucial notion of *Form*. Such a reading can also be applied in the *Philosophical Investigations* when it is summed up as involving the relation of words to things. What is remembered at this point is that the key term is *form*, the *eidōs*, and we think through the basic structure of concepts in relation to words, thoughts and things through the mediation of ideality as form laid down by Aristotle. In that sense, “the famous “picture theory” of the *Tractatus* is really a theory of *Form*, since a picture, in order to be a picture of reality, must have the same “logical form” as that reality. A proposition can then be a “picture” of reality because it too can share this logical form. Such a touch of Aristotelianism can also be found in the *Investigations*, when Wittgenstein summed up his former view in the following way.

“These concepts: proposition, language, thought, word, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each” (PI 96).

The equivalence of these expressions in Aristotle are reflected in the words *logos* (verbal expression, especially the “formula of essence”), *noesis* (thought) and *Ousia* (traditionally but obscurely translated as “substance”).

A close look at the intra-philosophical question of ‘being’ discussed in Plato and Aristotle makes it clear that it is a matter of relation between the *intelligible* form and the *sensible* thing. But what is important from the deconstructive point of view is that even in a “realist,” like Aristotle, the sensible thing itself is unthinkable except in relation to intelligible form. Hence the working principle for Aristotle and for philosophy does not exist between thought and thing or between word and thing, instead it situates within each of these, *between form and formlessness or indefiniteness*.

It was Wittgenstein’s intention to provide a non-transcendental view of rules of language since we misunderstand the way rules functions as a kind of predetermination of a process (‘rules as rails’). This has been stated in the *Philosophical Investigations* in the following way:

All steps are really already taken means. I no longer have any choice. The *rule*, one stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space (PI 219).⁴⁷

Here *form* as *rule*, is already taken shape in the frozen trace of imagined movement of mind (‘surveyability’). It is also a historically determined

concept based on the view of form as the intelligible presence of an object in general.

An exactly similar way of thinking can also be traced out in deconstructive critique. The deconstructive critique works on the most general structure of thought that makes it possible to think predetermination as *form*. In that sense, both Derrida and Wittgenstein takes philosophy working on the principle of formal predetermination ('surveyability') under the assumption that thought runs prior to the manifold of intuitions and also outlines the determinacy of the object. However, in his later work, Wittgenstein rejected the inviolable boundary between *form* to *meaning*. Here words have meaning only in the *context* of "language –game" and "forms of life" and they are not structured in any form of self-identical form. In the words of Staten,

‘Wittgenstein’s rejection of *rules as transcendental forms* imposing transcendental necessity is a break with the classical metaphysics of entity, a metaphysics which Kant retained through the form of an object = x.’⁴⁸

Many of the concepts that Wittgenstein is concerned with can also be found in Derrida’s enquiry on Kant – Husserl transcendental tradition. Staten schematizes Derrida’s concept of constitution in the following way:

‘x is constituted by non-x. x here means essence or self-identity as conceived by philosophy and non-x is that which functions as the “outside”, or limit, to the positive assertion of this self-identity, that which keeps ideality from complete closure, yet in *limiting* it remains the *positive* condition of the possibility of the positive assertion of essence.’⁴⁹

Staten says that the “special” application of this schema takes various forms which is explicit when Derrida points out that the necessary condition for the definition of ‘memory’ is that it must be subject to forgetfulness: “a limitless memory” would be “not memory but infinite self-presence” (Diss. P. 109). The one form of constitution by non-x that we can find in several of deconstructive arguments is the notion of *original presence* and *repetition*.

Stated in Derrida’s reading of Husserl, according to which “original presence is constituted by repetition”, it is a kind of frequent returning from the non-original to the original and can be expressed in the pairs primal impression/reproduction, now/not-now and sign-identity/sign-repetition. In that sense, Derrida’s emphasis on language is not a “privileging” of language. Instead it deals with the “reference” within the *Now* to a past- *Now*. Deconstruction therefore, becomes a challenge to the privilege of language that is enjoyed by classical philosophy and it even denies *that there is language* in the sense that there is no boundary between what we call

language and what we think of as *non-language*. Here the term language does not mean words, the sounds we utter or marks we make with pen, instead it stands for the *ideality* of what we call “meaning”. The meaningfulness of a word beyond its spatio-temporal thing or event is derived from this ideality.

Derrida’s works on Husserl’s ‘*Origin of Geometry*’, distinguishes *three* types of ideality of meaning.

1. The *first* ideality is the self-identity of a word as “type” against its individual manifestations is the *lowest* form of ideality.
2. The *second* ideality is the unity of the word’s sense or signification. A word’s association with its sense cannot be understood if we do not know what the word stands for. But at the time we come to know of the sense we can intend its sense. At this level, the identity of the sense is not related to any signs or symbols in a given language. Neither it has a spatio-temporal existence.
3. The *third* is the *highest* level of ideality which is free from dependence on contingent realities. The ideality of logic and mathematics exist in such a way timelessly. It is the form of ideality which would appear to be that which most fully manifested the essence of what we call language.

Thus Staten concludes that it is misleading to say that Wittgenstein, for example, “wants to establish the *primacy* of language in thought,” so long as we have not carefully distinguished the word whose essence is ideality, *Verbum* or *Logos*, from the word as what Wittgenstein calls “Spatio-temporal Phenomenon” and Derrida calls the “remainder”.⁵⁰

Wittgenstein’s analysis of meaning in terms of the use of words in ‘language games’, has helped to undermine Cartesian notions of first person epistemic priority (this is the practical effect of Wittgenstein’s argument against “private language” for example). In this light, Wittgenstein’s work may seem helpful to post-modernism.⁵¹

2.5 Conclusion

As said earlier, this chapter is meant to expound the ‘structural affinity thesis’ between the two texts. The two texts are:

- (1) Husserl’s Logical Investigations; and
- (2) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus.

The *affinity* is seen in the way both deconstruct the ‘parent’ text.

In the case of Derrida, it is the text of Husserl. In the case of Wittgenstein, it is his own earlier text.

This thesis is substantiated by showing the affinity in the following areas of Husserl.

(1) Iterability of signs (2) Ideality of signs (3) Time consciousness (4) Materiality of the text (5) dissemination. The following areas in Wittgenstein occur as follows:

(1) Critique of language (2) Limit of language (3) Nature of philosophical problems. This is called deconstructive overtures *pace* Staten.

Notes

1. W & D p. 31.
2. W & D p. xvii.
3. W & D p. 31.
4. A D p. 103-104.
5. W & D p. 61.
6. Jacques Derrida in structure sign and play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences in Writing and Difference. Routledge 2001. P. 353.
7. W & D p.32.
8. W & D p. 40.
9. Derrida, Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (trans) P. Licoway Jr. (Stong Brook, Nicholas Hags Ltd.) p. 120.
10. W & D. p. 39.
11. W & D. p. 39.
12. W & D. p. 41.
13. Dagfinn Follesdel, Husserl's Notion of Noema, Journal of Philosophy 66. No. 20. (October 1969): 681 quoted by Henry Staten opcit – p. 242.
14. W & D. p. 59.
15. Edmand Husserl, The Origin of Geometry (A short work belonging to his last period) in the Crisis. Trans. David Carr. p. 358ff.
16. Derrida, Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (trans) P. Licoway Jr. (Stong Brook, Nicholas Hags Ltd.) p. 121.

17. W & D. p. 46.
18. W & D. p. 47.
19. W & D. p. 48.
20. W & D. p. 48.
21. W & D. p. 48.
22. W & D. p. 58.
23. W & D. p. 50.
24. W & D. p. 50.
25. W & D. p. 53.
26. W & D. p. 54.
27. W & D. p. 354.
28. A D p. 105 –106.
29. W & D. p. 27.
30. DAP p. 187.
31. W & D. p. xv.
32. W & D. p. xv.
33. DAP p. 182.
34. W & D. p. 3.
35. W & D. p. 5.
36. W & D. p. 5.
37. W & D. p. 5.
38. W & D. p. 38.

39. W & D. p. 22.
40. W & D. p. 66.
41. W & D. p. 86.
42. DAP p. 181.
43. W & D. p. 74.
44. W & D. p. 104.
45. W & D. p. 106.
46. W & D. p. 82.
47. W & D. p. 82.
48. Psn. p. 24.
49. DAP p. 189.
50. W & D. p. 91.
51. W & D. p. 135.

CHAPTER III

TWO POST-ANALYTICAL EXTENSIONS OF DECONSTRUCTION

3.1 The Analytical Motif: The Magic Language and the Magic Arrows

Wheeler's criteria for defining analytic philosophy as "Clear Writing" brings out a sort of parallelism in analytical philosophy and continental philosophy. Such a parallelism according to Wheeler, can be traced out in Husserl's logical works as well as in Heidegger. Frege and Husserl dealt with some of the same issues. Likewise, both Derrida and Davidson despite their different status reached at analogous positions in their rejection of dogmas of empiricism. In contrast with this, we can find Staten's direct comparison between Wittgenstein and Derrida. According to Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida are competitors. Agreeing with Staten, Wheeler finds that deconstruction is a part of philosophy well-entrenched in the analytic tradition. He argues that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is akin to deconstruction.

In this chapter, therefore an attempt is made to trace out the Derridean parallels that we can find in the works of Quine (especially the variant of indeterminacy of translation) and Davidson (especially the variant of indeterminacy of interpretation). Wheeler's reading in this regard has come

forth with arguments stating that Quine's deconstruction of the division between analytic and synthetic is parallel to Derrida's rejection of "present" meanings. Wheeler also finds substantial agreement between Derrida and Davidson on fundamental issues in philosophy of language. These two thinkers' basic conceptions of language and its relation to thought are much the same. That is, certain basic ideas and insights that move their respective arguments remain the same. The fundamental point of agreement between Derrida and Davidson as well as other thinkers in the analytic tradition such as Quine and Wittgenstein, Wheeler says, is their denial of "magic language".¹ The purpose of Wheeler in this attempt is to place Derrida and deconstruction against those who tend to view them as enemies of rational thought, rather than treating them as interesting sources of new ideas.

What is magic language then? This is the language of *nous*. In Wittgenstein's terms, it is a self-interpreting language. It is the language in which we know what we mean, think our thoughts and form intentions. The sentence in the magic language cannot be interpreted since magic language is what interpretation is interpretation into. The terms of the magic language consists nothing but the meanings expressed by natural languages and hence the problem of discovering what the terms of the magic language mean does not arise.

Derrida's *Of Grammatology* exemplifies the prevalence of some form of magic language in the history of philosophy from Plato to Husserl. Species of such magic language form can be found in Platonic forms, Aristotle's deliverances of *nous* or *Logos*, within which form is possible, the ideas of the empiricist philosophers and in the sense-data of the Vienna Circle. Positivism holds that we have a magic language theory whenever a kind of item is alleged to be present by its very nature "present" to the mind. Derrida characterizes such positions as "presence" theories, or metaphysics of presence, which is similar to what Wilfred Sellars terms as "the myth of the given".²

Let us first discuss the Platonist picture of language and truth which necessitates one of *two* possible foundations. *Firstly*, it speaks of a 'magic language' and *secondly* about a natural segmentation of the world so naturally well-founded that any possible language would have come to terms whose extensions matched that segmentation. The denial of the possibility of a magic language is equivalent to saying that no representing tokens have natural semantic nature. We cannot say that there is 'magic language of the mind', whose terms by their very nature fix an extension. It can be said that a magic language is one whose terms stand for the Fregean Senses. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* also presents the connection between the terms and thing with magical arrows. *Tractatus* did not speak of mental terms that attach extensions; instead it says that the mind can "intend" extensions for its

thought terms. It is also believed that not mere casual relations, but there are too many other relations among thoughts and objects, and the theory thus should explain this intentional relationship. It has been considered that a magic language or *arrow* would allow a clear notion of literal truth independent of culture and convention. With a magic language of interior meanings, truths could be formulated privately in thought, whether or not, an external language existed.³ It is from the denial of the separability of fact and value and the denial of the analytic–synthetic distinction, broadly speaking that “politics” gets its relevance to extensions of terms. These denials are taken place from the absence of a magic language and from the consequent absence of an epistemological given.

What would be the result if there is no magic language? Answer to such a situation demands that there is nothing more purely meaningful than words and no representation can carry the purely factual component of a word and keep it separate from the “value” part of a word. In that sense, representations that were purely factual and representations that were purely valuational are inseparable. But as all radical interpretations are action representations based on beliefs and desire, it is wrong to consider that there is “purely factual” meaning since all intentional tokening express belief and desire.

The absence of an epistemological given make all representations word-like and non-magic or to quote Davidson', 'without a magic language whose terms carry meanings by their very nature, the determination of what sentences mean and what is true, that is, what the facts are, rests on a single kind of data: What people say and when say it'.⁴ It makes the sense that without a magic language, learning a language cannot be separated from learning about the world and thus the analytic cannot be separated in a principled way from the synthetic. It also makes the sense that the "contingencies" of what we say and might have said are not distinguishable from the contingencies about what the world is or could have been. Hence changing language and changing facts are continuous with changing of facts in the former and with revaluation in the latter.

The *second* division of Platonic picture of language upholds that truth is the natural fixation. Platonist truth maintains a distinction between genuine truth and conventional construction which takes place from the hypothesis that if there are no 'magic terms' that determines what they mean, there is a privileged "partition" between the world to which "labeling behaviour" can be matched and to the natural kinds. The basic notion of such a partition lie either in a naturally given set of properties or in a naturally determined array of "real essences". For example, in the word 'dog', there is no connection between the word 'dog' and the real 'dog', but charity of translation dictates that the term fit the only candidate kind. In the naturally selected partitions,

the term “partition” can be made sense of only a limited number of extensions, and the result is that the natural method provides immense reference in truth and falsity.

Derrida finds that the idea that the meaning of a word or utterance should ideally be exact or definite in this way is a philosophical prejudice and philosophical injustice that we find at the beginning of philosophy. This distinctively ‘philosophical’ conception of the essence of language is Derrida’s basic target. It is similar to that of Austin’s condemnation of habits of *Gleichschaltung*. This target is styled not as this or that species of philosophy but as intrinsic to ‘philosophy’ as such. The French word *S’entendre-parler*, explains the intuitive logic of this natural attitude of speech. ‘Entendre’, means both ‘to hear’ and ‘to understand’, with the strong implication that hearing is in some way a privileged or uniquely authentic form of understanding. The phrase *S’entendre-parler* can thus be translated as ‘hearing oneself speak and immediately grasping the sense of one’s own utterance’.

Derrida discusses the consequences of rejecting such *self-interpreting mental contents*. Such a project is a more complex one than that of the analytic philosophers as the entire philosophical concept he intends to deconstruct is deeply embedded in the structure of language. It makes the normal philosophical critique to “reinscribe”, the very distinctions one is

attempting to eliminate. The target of Derrida in this venture, therefore, was to avoid this reinscription by circumventing “straight” critique which is a very difficult task for analytic philosophers to follow. The denial of such a given by Derrida and Davidson not only cease the questions about realism and idealism, but it also stops the match between language and reality. The denial of the possibility of such a magic language of thought is the main plank of Derrida’s critique of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*.

Similar remarks can also be found in Davidson in his discussion of Austin’s theories of illocutions, Frege’s use of the assertion sign and the general distinction between force and content. Davidson rejects the practice of applying force into words or the tendency of considering a linguistic form with the intention of a particular way. In other words, ‘We can state that Derrida’s argument is started from this observation and the principle of that iterability is a mark of any sign.’⁵

The textuality of all significant marks, whether in neurons or in paper therefore becomes the chief focus of attention of both Derrida and Davidson. They had the view on how an expression which is to be interpreted is epistemologically indeterminate. As stated by Wheeler,

For Derrida and Davidson the context of speech act does not suffice to choose one interpretation over another. That is, epistemologically – and for Derrida, metaphysically as well,

neither the intrinsic character nor the context in which they take place can determine which of several interpretations is correct.⁶

It can be said that metaphor and the history of metaphor abound in indeterminacy both synchronic and diachronic and the very nature of “magic language”, determines its reference. Here Wheeler finds three responses to such indeterminacy. These are (1) Appeal to Ontological relativity. (2) Appeal to casual theory of reference and (3) Appeal to truth as irreducible. Let us discuss each of these separately.

(1) Appeal to Ontological relativity:

Based on the acceptance of a given which is relative to the different schemes in it, one can say that the indeterminacy is not merely epistemological and that there is no fact of the matter. Therefore, which of the alternatives is ‘actually’ correct is not a question. Science makes its progress in such a way without taking into account of the ontological schemes. Such schemes are required to state truths just as metrics are required to state sizes. Just as metrics will yield different number for the same sizes without missing anything so different ontological schemes render different ontological schemes for the same contents missing without anything.

This seems to be what Quine aims at *Word or Object* and ‘*Ontological Relativity.*’ The difficulty with this position is the notion of the “given” as

stated by Davidson in his *'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'*. This in effect supposes a basic conceptual scheme underlying all the others.

(2) Appeal to the casual theory of reference:

It states that one can appeal to the casual theory of reference which removes indeterminacy. In a situation like this, since there is no given except using the language according to the context, we have no options. Here the difference between an “ontological” given and a magic-language type given disappears”. According to Wheeler, Davidson’s arguments, showed that reference was indeterminate only if reference was a function of sense (meaning) and if sense was in turn a function of the position of a sentence and so of a term, in a Quinean web of the belief. And given that reference was a function of sense, he argues, realism could not be true. One could be a realist only by abandoning the Quinean/Davidsonian account of meaning.⁷

(3) Appeal to truth as irreducible:

The above statement overlooks the real view of Davidson according to which meaning is *truth-conditions*. Although Quinean web of belief gives evidence for truth-conditions, except truth-conditions, there is nothing to meaning. Since truth-conditions are expressed in language if one denies presence or a given, there are two options before him. (a) Here indeterminacy means that the notions of truth and truth-conditions do not always apply. And that our understanding of life and language must abandon the idea that such

notions are generally applicable. (b) Even though one cannot explain what truth-value is, one can say that an utterance has truth-conditions and truth-value. Among the two, the former points out Derrida's position and the latter Davidson's.

3.2. Quinean Logical Deconstruction and (Logical) Differences

Wheeler identifies the Derridean deconstruction as the counter part in the relatively Quine's "logical type" of deconstruction. A gleaning of this type of deconstruction in Quine and early Derrida will give us enough scope to show that both share the deconstructive mode of analysis of language. A rough comparison between Quine and Derrida suggest the following themes.

	Quine		Derrida
a)	Scepticism about meaning	a)	Death of meaning
b)	Observation-theory distinction (holism)	b)	Polysemy
c)	Dogma 1:analytic-synthetic distinction	c)	Dissemination
d)	Dogma 2:verificationism/reductionism	d)	Meaning is beyond authorial control.
e)	Indeterminacy of radical translation	e)	Meaning is elusive.
f)	Ontological relativity	f)	Meaning is not to be fixed.

Each one on the left hand side can be explained from a Quinean point of view (a) Quine calls meaning as the ‘myth of museum’; (b) Holism entails that proposition form a system (network); (c) No distinction between two classes of statements; (d) Verification is refuted by holism; (e) Translation between two radically different languages is impossible; (f) Ontologies are related to one another.

A similar argument pattern of deconstruction works in Derrida’s critique on the theories of Husserl. Wheeler says: ‘Derridean strategy of deconstruction found in the theories of Husserl is described as one of his most philosophically cogent for its architecture.’⁸ The central notion of Husserlian thought is that theorizing should start with what can be present to us in an unmediated way. But this notion of pure presence of what is, Derrida finds, is incoherent. Derridean critique of Husserl has *two* phases.

Firstly, it attacks the Husserlian notion of the categorical distinction between expressive and indicative signs. It says that expressive signs are meaningful as they express and in speech give voice to meaningful self-present acts of conscious lived experience. The indicative signs, on the other hand are only meaningless marks unless they are ultimately referred back to expressive meaning. Derrida disputes the categorical distinction by arguing that the enlargement of expression with indication is there from the outset, and that pure expression remains mere idealization. Derrida introduced the

term 'iterability', according to which the being of a sign as a sign is constructed by a universal, a repeatable element that carries the meaning and would carry the same meaning.

Secondly, Husserl's theory of temporality explains the living present moment as a combination of the memories of past and anticipations of the future. Hence the present is itself not present in a way that makes its complete nature available to us. Part of what is required for any present to be present is absent, displaced from itself. In other words, neither the expressive sign nor even the ideal non-linguistic meaningful experience maintains a pure self-identity of meaning. *Finally*, "what is supplementary is in reality *differance*, the differing which at one end and at the same time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay." In that sense, deconstruction contests the closure of such philosophies – the claim to be all and end all or the last word in epistemology, ontology, methodology or rationality – by interrogating the terms and distinctions by which such closure is sought. 'Derrida thus similar to that of Quine, attack the hidden realism built into the kind of present meaning – content that will make the necessary the *a priori*. Whatever has the full presence required either by phenomenology or by logical positivism has to have some objectively real objects, and so some objective necessities. Furthermore, they both see no way to separate the meaning from the sign. Meaning is pure, extracted, semantic content is an incoherent notion.'⁹ Despite the critique,

Derrida's response to Husserl was very specific, as revealed in Thomas Baldwin, who asks:

"What, then, is idealization according to Husserl?" and answers:

"for a mark to *be* a mark, to be perceived and understood and interpreted as a mark, it has to be repeatable, it has to be *iterable*, as 'the same' mark".¹⁰

Wheeler further states that the Derridean perspective of taking speech as a species of writing parallel to the Quinean notion that behind writing or speech can lie nothing but more writing-like or speech-like phenomena. The major preoccupations of Quine which usually come under two general headings such as (1) meaning as the myth (2) ontology of what there is, which appears in his famous papers 'On What There Is' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' bears a comparison.

Quine's paper 'On What There Is', deals with ontology and tries to determine the basic types of things there are. His preferences for a sound ontological theory is known as his '*Criterion of Ontological Commitment*'. In this attempt, Quine makes use of some of the notational devices and distinctions of the predicate calculus (existential quantifier for existence). His famous statement "To be is to be the value of a variable" sums up the essence of the criterion of ontological commitment. Quantification is the ontic idiom.

Quine was sure that the criterion of ontological commitment does not settle the question of what there is, or isn't, but it makes clear how the differences can be formulated. Quine described this method as 'semantic ascent', the ascent is from what one says to what the theory says; from what 'p' is to what it says as 'p is true') in the sense that it first transposes differences of a substantive sort into linguistic differences – in their own right.

Quinean pattern of argument in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', undermining the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction shows greater proximity to the original pattern of deconstruction that we discussed earlier. Gilbert Harman has termed this Quinean assault as 'The Death of Meaning'. Not only analytic/synthetic distinction, but the verificationist theory of the meaningfulness of any single 'synthetic' statement invites a comparison. In this context, Wheeler reflects on the origin in the following way:

'This distinction consists in the following complex of views. There are necessary truths. All necessity is to be explained as due to meaning of terms (e.g., the substitution of synonymous terms turns all necessary truths into logical truths). Thus nothing has essential features except in relation to a set of definitions, that is an arbitrary choice of language. All

questions about what is necessary are questions about what the rules of a language are or how language is to be chosen.¹¹

In that sense, Wheeler states that the basic model behind this account of necessary truth can be explained in the way that truth, generally speaking, is a matter of a coalition of *two* factors, the contribution of the world and the meaning of words. Traditionally, a statement is analytic if it can be shown to be ultimately reducible to a form governed by the logical law of identity, 'A is A'. A statement is synthetic if it cannot be reducible to a statement that is basically of the form of an identity statement (A=A).

According to this tradition, statement like 'All married men are married' and 'No married men are married' are considered analytic, since it reduces to an identity. Here the classification of analytic is made through the appeal to the notion of a synonymy. All analytic statements are therefore, identity statements whereas non-analytic statements cannot be explained in such a way to sanction their truth.

This is similar to that of Derridean critique of Husserl seen in the previous chapter. Quine finds fault with this traditional method for identifying analytic statements. In appealing to the notion of synonymy, it makes use of an unclear concept that needs further analysis as the original concept of 'analyticity'. However, Quine has not succeeded in finding out a rigorous method for discriminating the analytic from the synthetic ones. He

also examines the positivists criterion for making the distinction between the two.

The verification theory of meaning states that ‘synthetic statement is open to disconfirmation by what is found in observation. An analytic statement could never be disconfirmed. Here what is important, is the matter of *truth* and not *meaning*. The truth of an analytic statement does not depend on the vagaries or uncertainties of experience. Instead its truth can be established even without recourse to experience, because experience can never upset it.

After examining the dogmas of empiricism and its limitations, and explaining his reasons for rejecting it, Quine in a holistic fashion says that in considering the questions of truth, one has to modify his belief by not confining his attention to individual statements taken singly, but one must pay attention to the entire systems of thought. ‘It is only when we take into account such holistic networks of statements the interconnected web of laws, logical principles, observational reports and so on – that we are in a position to determine the grounds of our acceptance, rejection, or modification of any single belief.’¹² Quine’s emphasis on the importance of always seeing the role of an entire web or network of beliefs thus refuted the traditional analytic – synthetic distinction as well as the dogma of verificationist held by logical positivists. According to Richard Rorty, the holism and anti-essentialism

common to Wittgenstein, Quine and Sellars breaks down the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics by telling us that the only way to pick out an object is as that which most of a certain set of sentences are true of.¹³

Derrida's views on the theories of Husserl and Quine's argument about analytic/synthetic dualism, therefore rests on the general philosophical difficulty about getting 'pure cases'. The incompleteness of analysis into meaning and fact becomes the central target of Derridean deconstruction. As a result of the incoherence of the concept of pure, present unmediated meaning, a number of dualities and notions based on that concept was shattered. According to Wheeler, intention is one such concept which contains semantic content but it is pure and unambiguous. To have semantic means, is to have truth-conditions. The absence of intentions as meaning determines cuts loose the alleged anchors of the rhetorical force of a text. It also questions the neurological sequence of events which takes semantic content ironically or seriously. In place of this, a deeper brain-text is needed for interpretation. Deconstruction thus shatters many of the important dualities such as (1) Fact and value, cognitive and emotive content (2) The rhetorical and the truth-conditional (3) The metaphorical and the literal (4) Textual essence and accident.

(1) Fact and value, cognitive and emotive content:

This is the method of compartmentalizing meaning as denotation or connotation or to separate facts from values. The existence of a non-linguistic meaning brings a kind of thought not susceptible to interpretation and that meaning could have purely factual and evaluation parts. An example of this can be found in logical positivists verification theory of meaning. This situation is reversed if we have no non-language like meanings but only something mixed with more language, so that something language-like, is ineliminable from whatever is taken to be the meaning of some language. If “content” is analysed in a Quinean or Davidsonian fashion as interanimations of sentences, the existence of these languages are very difficult to trace out.

(2) The rhetorical and the truth-conditional:

It says that no distinction can be drawn between the content of a sentence and the form of a sentence. This occurs when we consider that nothing lies behind sentences that is isolable from language-like phenomena. The “real” consequences of a sentence are defined in terms of truth-conditions. But if it is defined in terms of further sentences, those further sentences themselves held to be purified of the non-factual. Thus smearing of the distinction between logic and rhetoric for real language follows from the indivisibility of purely informational, truth-conditional meaning from the total important of a sentence.¹⁴

(3) The metaphorical and the literal:

The break down between metaphorical and the literal is taken place from the non-existence of a level of representation that is not language-like. Argument of this sort already found its place in Davidson. According to Davidson, to give meaning of a metaphor is the same as giving the meaning any other use of language, because to interpret an utterance as literal is equivalent to make a choice about whether a sentence is true.

(4) The textual essence and accident:

Here, Wheeler states that the contrast between the dualities of a text can no longer be maintained. Such an effect can be maintained by means of punnings, double meanings, oddities of syntax that mock contemporary philosophical style, and so forth. 'Without meanings, and without non-language like backing for language, it is difficult to see how to draw a principled line between features of the language that are relevant to interpretation and features that are not'.¹⁵

Derridean notion of dissemination is considered to parallel to Quinean indeterminacy of translation. Both of them argue that all texts are fundamentally drifting and indeterminate, given the multiple patterns of connection with other texts and within a given text. According to Derrida, writing precedes speech and that all speech is really writing and it is the least deceptive form of language as it fosters only least form of illusion.

Interpretation in such a writing takes place *via* regression to a background language and the notion of iterability provides a kind of “drift”. Derridean notion of “dissemination”, therefore has a two-phased abandonment.

Firstly, as it is in Quine, it rejects the magic concept behind the words. It states that anything behind words is also concrete material and thus word like. *Secondly*, the effect of the denial of language independent of similarity and connection are either a Quinean or a Davidsonian motif. The connection of a term to a non-linguistic casual world impinging on thought is always mediated or combined with language or language-like phenomena. Thus the connection between the term and the thing is not fixed by nature. The pattern of what is seen and what is contradictory, both of them exist across and within languages.

Quine’s indeterminacy of translation pursues very similar path to this pattern of argument. Quine used the metaphor “the myth of the museum”, to point out the common misconception of language with regard to sign and referent. Rejecting this ‘museum myth’, Quine turns toward a naturalistic view of language and a behavioral view of meaning what we give up is not just the museum of figure of speech. He wants to give up an assurance of determinacy. “For naturalism, the question of whether two expressions are alike or unlike in meaning has no determinate answer, known or unknown

except in so far as the answer is settled in principle by people's speech dispositions, known or unknown."¹⁶

Thus the Quinean argument would force us to acknowledge the presence of elements of *indeterminacy* and *relativity* in some form or degree in every use of language in situations like commonplace, ordinary and to the most sophisticated, technical or recondite. By the term 'indeterminacy', Quine points out the indeterminacy of translation in going from one language to another. In this attempt both ordinary case of translating from one language to another and the extreme case of *radical translation* explained by the field linguist in translating the language of a "hitherto untouched people" form the staple cheese of Quine's deconstructivist logic.

A comparison of the Quinean indeterminacy of translation with that of Derridean phenomenology of dissemination will make it clear that Quine's indeterminacy still depends on a *dualism* between observation and theory (observations are theory-laden). He held the view that the level of semantic content in the observation sentence is invulnerable to any change of scheme. Part of what transpires change can be purified and separated from observation language. Wheeler sets the condition as follows:

'only if the theoretical view of a theory are separable from observation or some directly present content can sense be made of the notion that alternatives are available to our present system

of organizing experience without some *present* experience that is separable from linguistic phenomena, the notion that there is the organized as opposed to what organizes cannot be made sense of’.

On Wheeler’s view, this echoes Davidson’s remark, “This second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.’¹⁷

In short without a “theory-independent” given, no natural limit can be found on what can come to be analogous to what. It is on the same basis that Derrida makes his arguments for and introduced the term ‘*dissemination*’, in this context to describe the kind of fluidity that “correct” interpretation will have, given that there is nothing semantic beyond language and thus nothing capable of freezing interpretation between languages or among discussion within one language.” Richard Rorty concurs that Quine’s notion of “the web of belief”, like Putnam’s notion of “cluster concepts” and Wittgenstein’s image of overlapping strands, helped break the hold of the idea that we have, in the back of our heads, semantical rules that should enable us to give nice definite answers to questions like “Is it the same sock after being redarned so much”?¹⁸

3.3 Davidsonian Deconstruction and (differences) (epistemic)

Derrida's deconstruction has its indissoluble link to a topic on which Davidson has done an existing work, that is, the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical interpretations. A rough classification suggests the following comparison:

Davidson	Derrida
a) dogma of scheme and content	a) no <i>logoi</i>
b) indeterminacy of radical translation	b) Differance
c) no language (i.e no magic language)	c) magic language

A line of enquiry of Derridean deconstruction therefore, becomes a version of thesis as purified by Davidson. The denial of essentialism and the objective necessities and its consequences provide the way for their enquiry. Such a denial further devices the principled line between 'rhetoric' and 'logic', the two categories of words since Plato's War with *Sophists*. The distinction between rhetoric and logic rests on cognitive meaning. The basic idea of such a distinction depends on the analytic/synthetic distinction, the fact-value dichotomy, and the cognitive/emotive dualism. All of these distinctions are working on the principle of *logoi*. It is these logical properties that provide essence or meanings behind the words and also give truth-values of sentences. Unlike regular language, the language of *logoi* cannot be misinterpreted. To be this *logos* is to mean these objects.

The rhetorical properties are the various other properties that can affect how those words function in discourse, it includes assonances, pleasant associations, the metonymic and metaphoric connections. The distinction between rhetoric and logic is that logic draws logical connections, relations that depend on logical properties while the rhetoric moves from premise to the conclusions using rhetorical connections. In other words, the rhetorical can be defined by the negation of the logical and not by any proper feature of its own. This is characteristic of binary opposition. How to think about philosophical problems and distinctions without supposing the foundation that *logoi* permit, therefore, becomes the chief motif for Wheeler for a joint study of Derrida and Davidson.

The anti-metaphysical trend found in the works of Frege and Husserl provide the starting points for Derrida and Davidson. However Wheeler finds that Derrida's logic is distinct from either Davidson/Quine in the following characteristic features.

Firstly, unlike Davidson, Derrida extends interpretation to texts. Here, there is no need of taking interpretation between languages or total theories but it may also be between fragments of languages or particular discourses.

Secondly, Derrida takes too much effort on the interpretation of our own theory in terms of parts of it. Since mere theories will not suffice and Derrida deals with other languages and discourses. Wheeler argues:

‘since Derrida observes that the possibility of alternative interpretations is essential to a sign *qua* sign, interpretations and indeterminacy of interpretation must be in principle unending. But exactly this unfilled remainder is also implicit in Davidson’s view that meaning is given by truth-definitions. Words are interpreted by mapping into words, and what is meant cannot be put into words’.¹⁹

The rejection of magic language thus rejects anything that satisfies the conditions of being semantic essence of a word. It further states that rhetorical force and logical form are epistemologically interchangeable. The indeterminacy of radical interpretations proposed by Derrida can be taken as a consequence of the rejection of the “present” unmediated items. In this attempt, rejecting the Saussurian notion of conceptual field, Derrida takes differences that lock anchors to any intrinsic contents as his guiding principle. He further combines it with the Husserlian idea that semantic properties must somehow be understood in terms of relation to utterances. According to this notion, what words mean is derived from how people have meant them. In other words, ‘meaning-is-use’, reminisces the very Quinean pattern of argument. Derridean triple characterization of linguistic signs, namely (a) the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs (b) the iterability of signs and (c) the deferral nature of signs, are explained as follows: -

(1) Arbitrary nature of linguistic signs:

The arbitrary nature denies any intrinsic properties to signs that tie them to any particular referent or use. Since linguistic signs lack self-interpreting nature, they need interpretation or supplementation to provide their meaning.

(2) Iterability of signs:

Iterability is free from convention, lasting systems and signs and further explains that the person speaking use the expression again. It contains the notion of truth definitions. The core concept of the notion of iterability according to Derrida, is the type-token distinction, every token is a token of a type.

(3) Deferral nature of signs:

The term 'deferral' explains that signs as signs defer or put off access to what they are signs of. They never make its full presence but always leaves something out. This deferral nature can be referred to as a regression to background languages as used by Quine. We acquire in the 'home' language according to Quine.

Derridean notion of indeterminacy shares similarities as well as differences among them. The basic thought common to Davidson, Derrida and Quine is that language consisting of any kind of marks, whether marks on

paper or in the soul, is no better than words'.²⁰ The marks which one something other than essence appear before us with its intentions and materiality. Every mark is subject to interpretation.

The main thrust behind the Derridean indeterminacy is taken shape from one of his famous hyperboles that writing precedes speech and that all speech is really writing. All language is subject to interpretations in exactly the way writing is and gives the impression that the interpreting language also come under further interpretations without an end in the “regress” to the background language. Wheeler fuses the motifs in the following remark:

‘The indeterminacy of radical interpretation proposed by Derrida can be presented as a consequence of rejection of “present” unmediated semantic items. The rejection of presence itself turns on some fundamental reflections on the way signs must function in order to be signs’.²¹

Derridean notion of indeterminacy of meaning states that “true cannot be a fundamental, real feature of the world. This does not mean that we cannot continue to characterize utterances “true” and “false”, instead it says that these terms cannot be theoretical tools for grasping what goes on in understanding and communication. Here “truth” with its dependence on meaning and reference which in turn depend on either “givens” or a magic language, becomes a metaphysical notion that cannot be supported after the

deconstruction of the given and of the magic language. However, Derrida can be interpreted as requiring that any coherent account of truth must make true dependent on a match between what is and what is said. In such contexts, something about what is and its relation to the things, must make true sentences true. In that sense, ‘Derrida would be a “truth-maker” theorist about truth, but a skeptical one, since he thinks nothing can meet the conditions for the truth-maker theory.’²²

Davidson anticipates Derrida in. Davidson discusses the rhetorical in terms of the concept of force (Fregean) and in terms of the distinction between truth-conditions of sentences and the uses to which sentences are put. An examination on this line will give us proofs for how Davidsonian commitments lead to an interchangeability of rhetoric and logic has verisimilitude to Derrida’s dissolution on that line. Wheeler captures the far end of the spectrum by holding that ‘Quine, Davidson and Derrida in effect work out the consequences of being realistic and physicalistic about thought and meaning.’²³

Similar to that of Quine and Derrida, Davidson argues that any representation, whether in thought or in words, must be language-like in bearing only a contingent relation to any referent. It says that there are no magical words that interpret themselves, no meanings in the sense of objects that represent but are not subject to misinterpretation. In other words,

meaning of a word is determined by what people say and in what circumstances they say it. Meaning cannot deviate from the world.

According to Davidson, what makes interpretation possible “is the structure of normative character of thought, desire, speech and actions imposes on correct attributions of attitudes to others, and hence on interpretations of their speech and explanations of their actions’. (Davidson – 1990. p 325). His purpose in this attempt is to show how it is possible to attribute meanings and other propositional attitudes when observable behaviour is only evidence. Interpretation is possible in such situations, because the interpreter is forced to interpret the behaviour of interpretees as conforming to patterns dictated by the *Principle of Charity*. If disagreement is encountered, the theory is adjusted according to the speaker’s beliefs and language use in order to make sense of this anomaly. For this purpose, as stated by Davidson introduces ‘prior theory’, as a set of assumptions about the dispositions, beliefs and language use of the speaker/writer.

The terms ‘Prior Theory’ and ‘Passing Theory’ describe the communicative interaction. In the case of the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he *does* interpret the utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he *believes* the interpreters prior theory to be, while his passing theory is the theory for he *intends* the interpreter to use

(NDE 442). Here both speaker and listener are involved in the interpretative activity and make accurate guesses about what the other knows and does not know.

In the *prior* theories, the guess made by the speaker or listener for the question of how an utterance may be interpreted never match precisely, because both the speaker and the listener does not know with certainty the hermeneutic strategy the other intends to employ in particular communicative situation. The prior theory acts as a starting place for interpretation. Although it is necessary, it is not sufficient for effective communicative interaction. In opposition to this, the *passing theory* constitutes the hermeneutic strategy that we actually employ when we communicate. Davidson states that “what must be shared for communication to succeed is the passing theory. For the passing is the one the interpreter actually uses to interpret an utterance and it is the theory the speaker intends the interpreter to use.” Both speaker and listener makes use of the prior theories when they speak or listens and the theory undergo modification as they speak and listen. The time they guess about the meaning of one another’s sentences, they together arrive at a passing theory, a unique hermeneutic strategy that will enable them to understand one another in their own situation.

Davidsonian interpretation is at bottom just self-conscious application of the rules of thumb we all use in understanding what is up. There is no

systematizable theory much more elaborate than the supposition that much of what people do is purposeful. *In Literary Theory after Davidson* (1993), Dasenbrock argues that Davidson's model of radical interpretation successfully is an effective response to Stanley Fish and other post-modern theorists who argue that the meaning of a text is relating to the conceptual schemes of individual readers.²⁴

Davidson considers truth as indispensable and primitive. In the absence of such a notion, nothing else we can think, or think can be made sense of. It is primitive in the sense that truth cannot be reduced to reference or other notions. This Davidsonian non-representationalist way of looking at truth arises from his conviction that Tarski is the only philosopher to have said anything useful about truth and that Tarski's discovery was that we have no understanding of truth that is distinct from our understanding of translation.²⁵ This is quite different to the Derridean notion of truth to which 'while the notion of truth is indeed central to our thought, we must abandon the hope of making strict sense of that notion. For Derrida, this shows that something is wrong with our whole notion of "making sense of"²⁶ In other words Deconstruction works on the failure of "making sense" in the philosophical sense.

According to Davidson, a vast number of truths are not only unknown but unknowable. There are many genuine borderline cases of vague

predicates that must be treated as having truth –values that cannot be known. If such sentences are true or false without any reason, it follows that the existence of unknowable truth-values takes shape from the non-reducibility of truth. In such a way, it gives the impression that truth is absolutely central and that we cannot make sense of these not being truths and falsehoods. In the same way, Davidson deals with his accounts of metaphor and indeterminacy.

There are commentators who view Davidson’s truth-definitions to mean “fact-reporting” discourse. Such a view confuses truth with assertion. For Davidson, radical interpretation starts with what people do and what situations they do it and transforms this verbal behaviour into speech-acts. In that sense, Davidson’s indeterminacy seems to occur only at margins because no interpretation can be made possible without an overall agreement. However, according to Wheeler, Davidson’s theory generates a kind of Derridean piece-by-piece global indeterminacy under the following ways.

- (1) The interanimation of sentences make indeterminacy creep into other areas from the original problem of areas.
- (2) The application of Davidson’s idea to the interpretation of discourse to our own cultural past makes it clear that indeterminacy of translation especially about the cultural, social and moral topics

on which literature dwells, becomes much more creeping and pervasive.

- (3) It says that unless a person's language or a theory *at a time* is a unified whole, then the areas of our own language are indeterminate and relative to other areas of our own language. This kind of indeterminacy transforms Davidson's calm and comforting picture of indeterminacy to the other minor aspects of the psychology of the other.

In brief, Davidson extended and purified the deconstructive arguments of Quine which states that a magic language that allows meaning to be fixed by the very natures of the signifiers is incoherent with the following three reasons.

- (!) That essentialism is false.
- (2) That reference is a function of intrinsic features of concept available to the user.
- (3) That necessity is linguistic. Such a magic language is required for a "foundational" theory of meaning.

Davidson extended and purified these deconstructive arguments of Quine and eliminated his residual essentialist suppositions about observation. To him, all data both for determining meaning and for determining truth-value consists in what is said and when it is said. It means that speech situations

and in concrete situations explain what terms mean and of which sentences are true.

Before concluding let us have a close observation of the thoughts of these three thinkers regarding the indeterminacy of interpretation. Derrida is more Quinean than Davidson about what to say when all possible empirical evidence leaves a question undecided. According to Davidson, since truth is primitive, he considered the ascriptions of truth-conditions to be correct or incorrect in indeterminate situations. But Derrida along with Quine holds that if all possible evidence cannot yield an answer, the question is not a question of fact. Thus it can be said that both Derrida and Quine takes indeterminate situation to be ones in which there is no truth, whereas Davidson takes them to be situations in which there is a truth but unknowable one.

3.4 Paul de Man Against Theory: A mix up of Postmodernism and Deconstruction

Davidson's conceptual framework on metaphor, meaning and truth have its influence in de Man's mode of self-deconstruction of the text. Although there are so many striking differences between the two, they share a lot of similarities. They held the view that linguistic meaning is not reducible to non-language like meaning bearers. Further, they take metaphor as a matter of force with which a sentence is uttered. 'By interpreting Paul de Man as holding a general theory of meaning, truth and reference, analogous to

Davidson's, the purpose of Wheeler is to substantiate de Man's writings in literary theory as philosophy of language.' He also finds close connection between de Man and Derrida in the sense that de Man's criticism of the romantic contrast between "signs", which are arbitrary in their relation to their reference, and "symbols", which were alleged to have a "natural" affinity with what they were symbols of, connects very clearly with Derrida's argument that everything is a sign'.²⁷

Both Davidson and de Man starts from different traditions and places. While de Man's enquiry begins from literary concerns and the problem of figuration and the rhetorical, Davidson reaches at the same issues from the tradition of analytic philosophy. Wheeler states that the main doctrinal difference between Davidson and de Man is that the former cannot have a notion of truth that sorts out the literally true from the literally false in a determinate way that systematically keeps metaphorical assertions from being true as meant. Even though Davidson's formulation of truth-conditions may be precise, his notion of truth-value is quite indeterminate except in the monolithically controlled areas. But de Man stands to benefit from Davidson as well. Davidson's pronouncement that "no rhetorical force marker" can be connective but it acts as an analytical philosophers way of describing the uncontrollable disseminating power of figuration supplements both de Man's and Derrida's metaphors in convincing way'.²⁸ Proceeding to de Man, Wheeler thinks, by means of Davidson's theory of language, it is a way of

making de Man clear to him as well as to people with roughly background training.²⁹

According to Davidson, what determines meaning and for determining truth-value consists in what is said and when it is said. The semantics of Davidson therefore has some *prima facie* difficulties with the traditional notion of metaphor as the transference of meaning. Traditionally, it has been conceived that metaphor presupposes the existence of a non-language meaning that lies behind speech. In the case of Davidson, the absence of such a meaning raises two difficulties. *Firstly*, Davidson's semantics leaves metaphor untouched. *Secondly*, the meaning of a metaphor is not encoded in the magic language of thought. Davidson finds fault with the attempt to define metaphors as condensed simile as it fails to explain the conditions of adequacy for an account of metaphor. He also criticizes the tendency to classify words into literal and the metaphorical. In comparison with de Man what is distinct for Davidson is that to him an account of metaphor must explain why metaphor cannot be paraphrased since it does not *say* anything different from its literal meaning. Because when we paraphrase, we try to say something in another way. Davidson also claims that applying a term to a new and unfamiliar case is different in kind from applying the term metaphorically. What distinguishes metaphorical from the literal is not in terms of meaning but by means of force. "Force" is (roughly) the intention with which a sentence is produced. The intended purposes for which one may

produce a sentence with given truth-conditions vary, for words are versatile and malleable tools.’³⁰

De Man’s discussions of the philosophical questions about metaphor appears in his chapter on Rousseau in *Allegories of Reading*, entitled “Metaphor (Second Discourse)”. Despite the differences in the matters of their thinking, Wheeler attempts to translate de Man’s discussions into terms that connect with analytic philosophy, and more pointedly, to Davidson’s discussions of metaphor. He finds striking similarities between these two thinkers. Both of them deny the logocentric view of the relation of thought and meaning.

According to de Man, Rousseau says two apparently incompatible things about the relation between naming and conceptualization, according to which naming is a primitive linguistic act, whereas predication is articulation, a division into categories, of the named objects. De Man’s words in *Allegories of Reading* states that since predication or conceptualization can be considered as a substitution of properties on the basis of resemblance, which in turn corresponds exactly to the classical definition of metaphor, Rousseau’s account seems to make nomination literal and to divide language into the literal and the figurative. But Rousseau in his *Essay on the Origin of Languages* takes language as an expression of passion. These two doctrines, as de Man states, are parts of a single view.

De Man criticizes Rousseau's first use of a general term which occurs when a person applies a term as "giant" to a fellow human to indicate an expression of fear, calling it metaphorical or metalinguistic. It is metaphorical in the sense that an outer item, the man, is called by a term proper to an inner item, the fear in that way the utterance meets the conditions for carrying across meaning. But de Man considers figuration as a matter of theoretical force. 'Propositional attitudes, or "passions", are to be thought of as different rhetorical forces with which propositional contents can be entertained or uttered. Rhetorical force will turn out to distinguish the literal from the metaphorical for de Man in a way precisely analogous to Davidson's account'.³¹ De man considers meaning as a feature of primarily of speech acts and therefore, turning of meaning is a turning of speech acts.

According to de Man, it is in the interiority of the person that rhetoric originates with its various attitudes toward contents of sentences. A person is in a rhetorical situation in relation to his own representations. Since the representations themselves have a dubious rhetorical standing, the special status of a person in relation to her own utterances begins to be erased. The representations themselves already have rhetorical histories, owing to their use of general terms. These contaminated histories raise the same questions about their relation to some originating intention that the utterance has to its originating intention. This argument of the de Man has very similitude to Davidson's argument in "Moods and Performances" and "Communication

and Convention”, according to which a rhetorical force marker attached to an utterance to fix its rhetorical force in virtue of being a mark at all allow being used with different rhetorical force. To quote Wheeler,

‘This permanent possibility that rhetorical force can be misunderstood relative to the “intentions of the speaker”, or can be indeterminate at a deeper level of analysts, is a main source of the instability, indeterminacy, and unreliability of language, according to de Man’.³²

De Man states that force cannot be put into words, because words by being words, are detached from any necessary connection with an intention. As soon as an intention is expressed, it must be expressed in something. De Man’s pronouncement that “meaning” being misrepresented or language being deceptive about what we really mean acts as an exposition that enables him not to commit on the point that there are intentions that are epistemologically more reliable than language. This makes Wheeler to say that

“De Man needs the old logocentric notion of “intention” to describe the indeterminacy of language, but that old notion is then abandoned and replaced by an “abyss”, the continental alternative to the metaphor of ”regress to a background language”. At ground level, there are no intentions apart from

language and no language without ulterior rhetorical force, that is undirected by intention'.³³

In that sense, it can be said that the conscious intention behind language cannot be separated out from the language but consciousness is not language. There are no such a thing as the pure intention informing the pure language.

The “falsification” in the metaphorical use of a term then, is two-fold. *Firstly*, the two inner passion is ascribed to the external world and the object is characterized by something representing the passion. *Secondly*, when being put into words, the representations loses its privileged tie to a particular rhetorical force, that of hypothesis, and is turned into what can legitimately be read as an assertion of what is the case.

De Man also calls metaphor, “metalinguistic”. If the thought taken shape by means of a rhetorical force which acts as intention of a sentence said, saying something sarcastically by or ironically presupposes a consciousness and a representation of the sentence said. In that sense, the rhetorical use of language requires that the user have a meta-language in which sentence of the object-language can be represented.

De Man further discusses the naming of objects on the basis of resemblances. Distinct objects are called by the same name “tree”, so that a transfer of meaning from one case to the next takes place. Therefore, de Man

finds that conceptualization conceived in such a way stands very similar to the classical definition of metaphor. For Rousseau, the use of predicates or conceptualization is essentially metaphorical. Although de Man come to terms with Rousseau's notion of conceptualization, he does not think that "natural resemblance" will fix the language into a system. As there are multiple "natural", bases in "resemblance", metaphors that constitute the predicate "system", will not be a system. Similar to that of Rousseau, de Man also states that denomination presupposes conceptualization and conceptualization presupposes denomination. The metaphorical utterance also introduces a rhetorical indeterminacy in the *figural* and the *rhetorical* situations and consequent on it, *language itself turns out to be intrinsically unreliable*. It can be said that 'metaphor corrupts any "direct" naming of what is the case and metaphor, calling something by some improper name, is required by any conceptualization, which in turn, is required by any language whatsoever'.³⁴

According to de Man, figural displacement in language takes place in *two* ways. *Firstly*, language is *figural* in the sense that it involves *disfiguration*. That is, it misrepresents the force of a propositional content. *Secondly*, all predication is a matter of calling of a thing by a term that is not by nature appropriate to it. Such a view labels all predication as metaphorical. De Man, therefore, introduces *two* notions of figure, the *figural* as *intending* a different rhetorical force and the *figural* as *using* a name for an

object to which it does not properly apply. The *first* represents de Man's general conception of figure and the *second* is used to describe metaphor, a special case of figure. He also considers the second notion a real case of the first. Here by means of Davidsonian method, de Man tries to assimilate the account of conceptual extension as metaphorical to the rhetorical analysis of saying something other than what is meant. According to de Man, conceptualization is calling one thing by another's name. In such a view, if the name 'Charles' is used to refer to a *frog*, all other names such as Albert and Bertha, irrespective of the "natural division", come under its extension. Hence 'Charles', is said to be a member to that set 'that is, to a frog', the remark is not strictly true and is not strictly "meant". According to Wheeler; "the rhetorical force involved in the predication is, then, exactly like the force Davidson ascribes to metaphor: the sentence is uttered not to assert a truth but to point up something."³⁵ In brief, it can be said that de Man's reading in Rousseau's narrative, therefore, is an attempt to find in Rousseau exactly the kind of rhetorical force that Davidson takes to be characteristic of metaphorical utterance. In both cases, utterances turn from direct assertion. In a way that is to be understood in rhetorical terms, that is in terms of how sentences are used rather than what they can.³⁶

The above arguments thus vindicate that the main difference between the accounts of Davidson and de Man concerns the truth-status of metaphorical utterances. In the case of Davidson, such utterances are always

false, as meant, except accidentally, whereas de Man's metaphorical remarks are as true as any predication ever is. Wheeler's reading thus states that Davidson's account of metaphor could be amended by the addition of de Man's insights to repair exactly the difficulties we found with Davidson's account. This he calls *amended* Davidsonism, elements of which we can find in Davidson's work "What Metaphors Mean". Wheeler's perspective of amended Davidsonism can be read in the following ways.

- (1) It questions the notion "properly apply to" and the existence of a "sense of metaphor" that distinguishes the *metaphors* from the *literal* assertions.
- (2) On the amended account, a sincere "literal" assertion is intended to be automatically interpreted, extending the general connection to other predications and taking all the routine evidence and consequences to be relevant to the predication. In the case of metaphorical assertion, the routines of interpretation are intended not to be followed.
- (3) Here the understanding the other as "rational" becomes the meaning of interpretation.

According to de Man, the metaphor which treats as marginal phenomenon in analytic philosophy functions as central operation of saying things and predication. It has always been treated as a *deviant* exception to

the *correct* use of language. Davidson also treats metaphor and ordinary predication in the same way. ‘The de Manian account of metaphor is thus implicit in the anti-foundationalism required by the complex of views about necessity and language that Davidson shares with Quine and Derrida’.³⁷

3.5 Conclusion: Conservative Vs Revolutionary Deconstruction

Now, for the winding up of the discussion with how Wheeler distinguishes *two* phases of deconstruction. In the *first* phase, the deconstructor attacks the standard of cognitive meaning versus “other” meaning. At this level, the deconstructive argument reveals the dichotomy to be incoherent. Derrida’s early writing and some of Quine’s and Davidson’s work correspond to this model. In the *second* phase, the deconstructor abandons the cognitive meaning/other meaning. Here the deconstructor is not governed by the pre-deconstructive standards of argument and of what counts as incoherence.

The two-phased deconstructive arguments works in *four* basic ways. *Firstly*, the philosopher can attempt to show systematically that no dichotomy drawn as a given dichotomy will work. Such an argument states that a certain kind of dichotomy is in principle defective in the sense that a theory employing one side of the dichotomy presuppose the other side. This strategy is not fully free from the foundational totalizing and conceptual edifice that is itself subject to the same kind of criticism. *Secondly*, the philosopher tries to

undercut the dichotomy by means of argument that what the theory incorporating it takes to be a natural division that is consisted of several other factors. It states that the position it occupies is an ideological one and consisted of economic interests, gender practices, and other extralogical concerns actually motivate a dichotomy. Such an argument exposes “contradiction”, in this ideology, and it counts as deconstruction. *Thirdly*, the strategy of deconstruction discusses a particular text and show how that text undermines itself by implicitly denying the division it is explicitly promoting. This is the strategy of deconstruction that we can find in Derrida. Such deconstruction denies the existence of a well-defined single “type of view” underlying a whole culture or literature. ‘By attacking only texts, one avoids proposing a theory, dividing rhetoric from logic, and positing the thesis behind the text. The most accessible example of this strategy in Derrida is his treatment of Husserl’s notion of expressive sign’.³⁸ *Fourthly*, deconstruction attempts to end the dichotomous foundational theorizing by deconstructing that the dichotomy has no basis in what we say. This method explains how the dichotomy misrepresents the “facts” about the language and also points out the lack of logical compulsion to restructure what we say. In the purest case, Wittgensteinian deconstruction follows a pattern of this argument observing *what* is actually said and *when*. Here what is deconstructed is not the equipment of thought but certain philosophical method of theorizing. This

is the basic idea on which Wittgenstein's deconstruction works. It is also the paradigm of the "conservative deconstruction".

The absence of pure cases and the lack of theory that is complete and visualisable that speaks of a totality hoped for, make deconstructors to take two characteristic positions such as revolutionary and conservative. Revolutionary deconstruction questions the platonic conception of meaning as something that stands outside language and links them across times and cultures. It discards a deconstructed dichotomy and establishes by speaking that it does not depend on that dichotomy. The incoherence involved in it disqualifies the distinction as an acceptable piece of linguistic equipment. Here the difficulties of "reform", of communication during reform, and of coherence in the context of a reform are some of the most interesting topics in deconstructive thought.

The importance of revolutionary deconstruction not lies on the mere abandonment of dichotomies, instead, it also rejects the concepts surrounding the defective dichotomy and presupposes the dichotomies that deconstruction overturns. Such a view will be inconsistent with the notions of concepts and persons and cultures that 'deconstructive' non-dichotomous thought complies. The denouncement of a conceptual scheme supposes that the linguistic is separable from the factual, that is, there is a way of changing the words yet keeping the information constant. It is like the Davidsonian argument that the

very notion of a conceptual scheme into which we can put our factual beliefs about society, justice or the correct relation among sexes is ‘incorrect’.

The main difficulty involved in the revolutionary deconstruction is that to dismantle a dichotomy one has to use language that employs other dichotomies that are defective in the same way. For example if we attack a dichotomy by means of “platonic” philosophical terms and standards, it presuppose other dichotomies. The interconnection of these presupposed dichotomies will also hinder our way of thinking about theoretical issues.

In the conservative deconstruction self-referential incoherence is avoided by rejecting the theorizing extension of a dichotomy. Incoherences do not appear unless a dichotomy is forced to pure cases uncontaminated by their opposites. But for such a notion, we have to adopt Platonic premises, otherwise we have no grounds for supposing that those incoherences are already implicit in ordinary language, waiting as it were. The true nature of our concepts already consists of the logical demand that a dichotomy be purified, extended, and turned into a theory, and the fact that deconstruction exposes the incoherence of theorized dichotomies says nothing about the nontheorized concepts. Concepts possess no “true nature” beyond what our discussions in their terms construct. So Wheeler says ‘the theorizing impulse is the villain, not the dichotomy. This is the idea behind Wittgenstein’s deconstructions.’³⁹

The pattern of deconstruction is called conservative in the sense that it tends to preserve the patterns of what is said and when it is said. That is, it attempts to preserve the language without which we do not exist. It claims for the relevance of dichotomies on the organizing part of language, and emphasizes the necessity to preserve it as well. According to conservative deconstruction, theory is inessential to the dichotomy which can be used in its normal ways without the hyperbole that constitutes philosophical theorizing. To quote Wheeler,

According to conservative deconstruction there is nothing wrong with the dichotomy itself. Rather, the difficulty is with the theorist who insists on pushing the dichotomy past the point where it makes sense. Its failure to make sense is basically the same type of “presupposition of the opposite” that other deconstructors point out.⁴⁰

The distinction between metaphorical and the literal is not necessary in conservative deconstruction. Instead, it tries to preserve the useful dichotomies (“ordinary language is in order”) by avoiding the tendency to theorize.

A close look at the deconstruction practiced by Derrida with that that of Wittgenstein makes it clear that Derrida’s method is closer to revolutionary deconstruction and Wittgenstein’s conservative. The very Derridean notion

that history of western philosophy from Plato to Husserl is deeply entangled in the logocentric illusion, his arguments revealing the failure of a text to achieve what its arguments expressly require, etc. make Derridean deconstruction revolutionary in comparison to Wittgenstein, Quine or Davidson.

Notes:

1. DAP p. 3.
2. DAP p. 3
3. DAP p. 121.
4. DAP p. 56.
5. DAP p. 25.
6. DAP p. 4.
7. DAP p. 5-6.
8. Psn – p. 5.
9. DAP p. 43.
10. Munitz p. 360.
11. DAP p. 37.
12. CAP p. 361.
13. Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
p. 103.
14. DAP p. 48.
15. DAP p. 51.
16. CAP p. 376.
17. DAP p. 29-30.
18. Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
p. 107.
19. DAP p. 32.
20. DAP p. 62.

21. DAP p. 17.
22. DAP p. 62.
23. DAP p. 62.
24. Victor. E. Taylor & Charles Winguist (ed.): Encyclopedia of Post-modernism p. 248.
25. Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress, Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 3.
26. DAP p. 7
27. DAP p. 16.
28. DAP p. 90.
29. DAP p. 90.
30. DAP p. 94.
31. DAP p. 99.
32. DAP p. 100.
33. DAP p. 100.
34. DAP p. 102
35. DAP p. 103.
36. DAP p. 103.
37. DAP p. 114.
38. DAP p. 203.
39. DAP p. 206.
40. DAP p. 206.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOGIC OF DECONSTRUCTION

4.1 The Structure of Norris' Approach

We owe to Christopher Norris for the distinction between the rigorous (philosophical) form of deconstruction and the non-rigorous (literary-wild) form of deconstruction. The reason for the animus against the *wild* variety is that they cannot provide a model for literary criticism. They are hostages to misfortune in the way postmodernists are. Both are counter-theorists. His attack on post-modernism is aimed to prove 'what is wrong with it' (Norris, 1999). The *raison d'être* of the alternative rigorous form vindicates that the logic of deconstruction is deeply embedded in the logic of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, but has its own characteristic features. While the *wild* variety presupposes no interface of philosophy and literature, or the lack of it, the Derridean variety is a candidate for such an interface, as much as the early analytic philosophy. The last two chapters were devoted respectively to understand Wittgenstein's overtures to deconstructivist mode (textual affinity thesis) and Quine and Davidson's deconstructivist logic (logic of indeterminacy). In a sense, this proposes collectively that Derrida can be approached from the side of analysis. But it does not follow that Derrida is an analytic philosopher. What on the other hand needs to be examined is

whether Derrida can saunter towards the school of analytical thought. This is the prime motif of Norris to demonstrate: deconstruction is logical and analytical enough to sustain a rigour in philosophy.


Norris's basic intention is to vindicate a view according to which there is an 'analytical divide', between deconstruction on the one hand and hermeneutics on the other. Such an analytic divide suggests a contrast which carries far-reaching implications for the interface between philosophy and literature. One chief implication is that while deconstruction can sustain such an interface, post-modernism undermines and wrecks it. This is the reason behind the critical theorists' response as seen in their leveling of the genre distinction by offering transcendental types of a meta-narrative. The thesis about the analytical divide is sustained by holding that while deconstruction has the conceptual sources to sustain an interface, post-modernist lacks them. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that deconstruction belongs to the same range of discourse which Habermas terms as the philosophical discourse of modernity, but it strains one's credulity to thing so. Thus Norris is forced to take a stand on these developments but invariably he makes a failed attempt to fit everything into his scheme.

In this context, he advances a 'mitigating' argument, but fails. The argument is stated as follows:

1. Counter-postmodernist premise: Deconstruction is not a philosophical offshoot of the wider post-modernist or counter-enlightenment *drift*; (169)
2. Protagonist Habermasian premise : Deconstruction belongs to the same genere of philosophical discourse on modernity (modernism is regarded as unfinished project); (170)
3. Conservative premise: Philosophy is still a discipline with its non-distinct mode of conceptual or analytical rigour (to which Derrida can conform);
4. The analytic premise: Kant is the basis for the 'rigour' in analytic outlook.

Norris proceeds to repair (1); catapults Derrida to the Habermasian mode of discourse. So Derrida is a minimalist Habermasian who can reflect on the myriad domains of rational discourse that includes deconstruction as well as postmodernism. He wants to push back Derrida to the analytical fold in (3) and pushes analytical philosophy also into the fold of philosophical discourse of modernity so as to draw the conclusion that Derrida is a Kantian analytical philosopher as any other; so it transpires that Derrida is a *ersatz Kantian* whereas Habermas is a *superficial* one. But he conveniently overlooks that postmodernism itself is an offshoot of analytic temper.

What transpires from the above is that all these domains of discourse are on par with each other such as the one represented in the following triangle.



Norris misses what lies enclosed within the vortices, namely, language. While the mainstream (or early) analytic philosophy takes it in the direction of language-world interface, deconstructionists take it in the direction of ‘technics’ (the interface of writing (écriture)/speaking or logocentric/phonocentric) (we take the later binary relation as the immediate consequent of the former binary relation). The former sense of analysis requires certain deep structure (logical forms) while the latter sense of ‘analysis’ requires certain ‘depth’ forms (binary proposition). As such they are to be located on the outskirts of different vortices. But then postmodernists as well as critical theorists can be said to be engaged in similar ventures of binary opposition without succumbing to any Kantian ideals of conditions of possibility of language, communication, or rule-following. If we stretch further, the game of binary opposition, we find that the conditions of possibility and conditions of impossibility provide a slot for

a binary opposition (at the 'quasi-transcendental level') and thus the underlying Kantianism goes by default. What Norris fails to notice here is that the binary opposition between normal (serious) /deviant (non serious) or rule-following and rule-violating (Kripke) is acceptable across a spectrum of devices including the architecture of human cognition.

This is equally true of the 'conflict' or 'contest' between faculties or 'phrase-regimes' (pure, practical, judgemental form of reason). Dr. A. Kanthamany has yet to earn the credit for introducing *agon* (Pace R. Bernstin) in this context, which means 'controversy'. It transpires therefore the deconstructive logic in its binary form, inevitably leads to the *agon*. As Kanthamani has shown that this is not missed by Lyotard but the same is missed by Norris both in his readings of Derrida as well as his readings of Lyotard. Thus, Derrida is undoubtedly Euro-centric, but incredibly Kantian. Now the way Norris valorizes deconstruction at the expense of the other two varieties such as post-modernism and critical theory demonstrates that a cultivated understanding of the relation between is still far-off. Given the fact that he casts the vote in favour of Kant for the ancestry he cannot reinstate Kant whose paradigm is decisively rejected by all. Nor his credentials for realism are not in doubt. But in recent times, Norris has developed a certain 'amnesia' about Kantianism but not about realism.

Anyhow now we can see deconstruction can never outweigh the other two mainly because it has the rigour. This has been amply demonstrated by Kanthamani in his critical review by looking at the many of the arguments which Norris advances. No doubt that this line of enquiry in this regard will lead us to the logic of binary oppositions, that is called the 'double gesture' calling it as the very peculiarity of deconstruction, but its logic is impeccable. This is what Norris fails to decipher. No doubt Norris is an exemplar in tracing out the rigour of deconstruction. However, it does not mean that deconstruction should not be content simply to invert certain cardinal oppositions (speech/writing, philosophy/literature) so as to leave the 'inferior' term henceforth firmly established on top. For this is nothing more than a notional gesture, a reversal that leaves the opposition still very much in place without beginning to shift the conceptual ground wherein its foundations are securely laid.¹

Let us first recount the exposition with all its nuances as Norris gives for the logic before we pass judgment on them. The effective counter to Norris is that whereas analysis and critical theory (hermeneutics) can be naturalized, deconstruction cannot aspire to this position. Derrida is as much willing to admit this and is ready to exorcise the very word deconstruction which is not clearly definable as such. But one can agree that postmodernism and deconstruction share similar platforms against enlightenment ideals so much so that we can agree with Habermas's observation in the first premise.

A powerful case against Norris can be built on his own premises. The 'late' Derrida is thoroughly Euro-centric in his approach to philosophy, sharing a similar 'public sphere' with Habermas (9/11) where he talks about the 'metaphysical hangover' of the past including the Kantian 'inheritance'. So also he counter-poses Davidson to Quine in his recent writings, especially his scepticism of translation. What Davidson probably needs according this reading is referential semantics which will ultimately bring Davidson in approximation to the ethics of literary criticism. Even here, Norris' premises can be countered by holding that Davidson's 'malapropism', that involves violation or 'circumvention' of linguistic conventions can equally serve as a prototype of linguistic creativity. So Norris is defeated on his homegrounds. So we can concede that Norris's logic is right in moving deconstruction towards the top vortex but not at the expense of the others unless he wants to endorse more the analytic rather than the post-analytic reversal. So what boils down from all this is that deconstruction is analytic both in the analytic and post-analytic mode, as shown in this dissertation.

One can reverse the priority by holding that philosophy is (postmodernism, deconstruction and critical theory) as much sensitive to the failure to distinguish between normative (pure) and deviant discourses but the way they come to grip with this may facilitate further differentiation. They all have family resemblance by virtue of their trait and can even exchange roles between them. Norris has as much to concede this in his revisionary outlook

in the *third* edition of his book on 'Deconstruction: Theory and Practice', where he confesses that he missed the *real rationale* of the debate between Austin and Derrida.

Plato condemned writing and its effects, and upholds the authority of self-present (spoken) truth. Derrida finds that this is a pattern of thought prevalent in the history of western philosophy from Plato, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and other representative thinkers like Heidegger, Marx, Ricoeur during the 'late' period. By doing this according to Derrida, philosophy refuses to acknowledge its own textual status and aspires to a pure contemplation of truth independent of mere written signs. It reduces writing to a form of mere repetition by means of dead mechanical notation devoid of the true form of knowledge. Rejecting these notions, Derrida states that all these never take us back to the origins and sources and there is no escaping from the 'logic of supplementarity'.

The attempt to fix an origin for truth and knowledge in *Phaedrus* is therefore, get entangled in the textual complication beyond its power to predict or control. Deconstruction of Plato's *Phaedrus*, therefore works on the failure of the text to *achieve* what its arguments expressly require. This failure is inscribed in a series of metaphors and figural substitutions that lacks a clear-cut logic of sense. Hence Derrida states that mere inversion of the received order of priorities will not solve the problem, instead 'writing' will

take precedence over ‘speech’ and its various associated values. Further, it involves the dismantling of all those binary distinctions by means of which Plato’s text is formed to the point where opposition itself provides the very ground of dialectical reason. ‘Derrida shows with remorseless regularity, this contrast must always undermine its own logic by opposing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ on the basis of a single term – that of writing itself – whose primary (literal) sense is undeniably that of textual inscription. So the ‘good writing, imprinted in the soul, can only be conceived as a metaphor derived from its supposedly derivative opposite term’: metaphoricity is the logic of contamination and the contaminations of logic.² He also calls the ‘trial of writing’ in the *Phaedrus* with the ‘trial of democracy’ that occupies Plato intermittently throughout the *Republic*. Derrida takes Freudian ‘kettle-logic’ as a model for the different logocentric moves. Freudian kettle-logic comes forward with the following contradictory claims that the subject may put for excuse. These are (1) I never borrowed your kettle; (2) It was in perfect condition, when I gave it back to you (3) It already had those holes in the bottom when I borrowed it. In parallel to this, Derrida finds the following logocentric moves. (1) Writing is ‘rigorously exterior and inferior’ to living speech, and cannot threaten speech (2) Writing is harmful to speech since it can put speech and reason ‘to sleep’ and (3) if anyone prefers writing, it is because not of its intrinsic value but because of the finite aspect of the living memory.

4.2 Exploring the Logic of Binary Opposition

Now let us discuss how ‘deconstruction as an event that does not avail deliberation, consciousness or organization of a subject or even of modernity,’³ takes place in some of its key terms such as *Pharmakon*, *differance*, *supplement* etc. It is through these double-edged metaphors and the oddly reversible figures of thought that Derrida has traced out the covert textual logic of his enquiry. This what is illustrated by Norris in his handling of the binary opposition in many of the instances, a specimen of which are selected for discussion in the subsequent section. Norris has admirably shown how this leads to the *aporia*.

The Greek word *Pharmakon* is not a mere ‘ambiguous’ term. The ramifications of its sense are everywhere explicit in the dialogue. One could list several meanings and appreciate its richness, subtlety or scope that it imparts to Plato’s text. Literally, *Pharmakon*, in Greek language is a *drug*, either healing or harmful; a medicine; a poison; an enchanted potion, hence a charm or spell; and also a dye or paint. In *Phaedrus*, Plato presents writing as remedial poison, a pseudo-remedy against forgetting, because it distances us from the idea of the thing itself. King Thomus criticizes it as a *Pharmakon* of forgetfulness, saying, ‘you have found a *Pharmakon* not for memory (*mnēmē*), but rather for recollection (*hypomnesis*).’ The *Pharmakon* “writing” therefore does not provide a good and real memory. The two chief

senses of the word *Pharmakon* thus becomes ‘poison’ on the one hand and ‘remedy’ or ‘cure’ on the other. Norris cites, this is an exemplar of inimitable logic of deconstruction and tells us,

‘that these two antithetical senses of the word are everywhere co-present in Plato’s text, defeating all attempts (on the part of tidy-minded scholars and translators) to choose one or other according to context. And it is not by chance, he argues that the *Pharmakon* inserts this strange double logic into Plato’s text at the point where writing is explicitly on trial, along with all its manifold associated terms. Writing is both poison *and* cure on the one hand, a threat to the living presence of authentic (spoken) language, on the other, an indispensable means for anyone who wants to record, transmit or somehow commemorate that presence.’⁴

Quite contrary to the above context, scholars interpreted the meaning of the word that gives ‘best sense in a given passage.’ They took *Pharmakon*, *an effect of analysis* that violently destroys it and reduce *Pharmakon* to one of its simple elements by means of paradoxical interpretation with the aim of some ulterior developments that itself has made possible. All these commentators, according to Derrida tries to reduce the *Pharmakon* to one or other of its violently disjunctive senses. They have not done justice to this

word. The word *Pharmakon* thus disrupts the very logic of identity, that opens up a play of semantic substitutions beyond the hope of all conceptual grasp.

There cannot be a Greek word that captures the entire range of meanings connected with the scapegoat-figure as well as a connection with the *Pharmakon* of writing. Here the Greek word in Question is *Pharmakos* for which scholars have given different meanings such as ‘magician’, ‘wizard’, ‘poisoner’ and the ‘one sacrificed in expiation for the sins of a city.’ At the same time, for the word *Pharmakon*, the meaning comes as ‘charm’, *philter*, drug, remedy, poison etc. According to Norris, Derrida would seem to have good philological warrant for his thesis that writing is in some sense a *scapegoat*, a necessary evil that society tolerates only in the hope of presenting worse ills. Both terms belong to the same paradoxical system that can take a single word (whether *Pharmakos* or *pharmakon*) and invest it with meanings so sharply opposed as to render its senses undecidable in any given context.⁵

The word ‘*Pharmakos*’, never appears in the course of Plato’s dialogue. However, according to Derrida, its effects can be traced through the logic of displacement or ‘supplementarity’ that governs the text. But the word *Pharmakon* is dealing with a word, which, ‘for all its hiddennes, for all that it might escape Plato’s notice, is nevertheless something that passes

through certain discoverable *points of presence*.⁶ Such a reading is not free from the bounds of lexical self-evidence. Although the word *Pharmakos* is absent in *Phaedrus*, it says that there is no last appeal to the ‘words on the page’ as support for one’s various conjectures. Such a view, according to Derrida, suspends those structured oppositions (inside/outside, present/absent) and serve to delimit the operations of textual commentary. In brief ‘according to Norris, the word ‘*Pharmakos*’ is demonstrably *there* among the lexical resources of the Greek language, and would moreover seem to have played a vital role in Greek thought and culture. So how can we account for its absence in a text where everything points to the *Pharmakos* as key to that the text’s most essential and intricate logic of sense’?⁷ To quote Derrida,

The bad *Pharmakon* can always parasitize the good *Pharmakon*, bad repetition can always parasitize good repetition..... Deconstruction is always attentive to this indestructible logic of parasitism. As a discourse, deconstruction is always a discourse about the parasite, itself a device parasitic on the subject of the parasite, a discourse “on parasite” and in the logic of the “Super-parasite”.⁸

(2) The second deconstructive key term is *differance*, which appears in Derrida’s essay ‘*Difference*’ in *Margins of philosophy* (1982). Derrida coins the term, exchanging “*ence*” ending for “*ance*”, with the aim of bringing

together contrary senses of the French verb '*differer*'. This "neographism", *differance* stands for the differing and differentiation as well as deferral, detour and delay. These senses are combined so as to discuss the constitution of presence, and thus all that depends on presence within the simultaneous constitution of difference and its deferral. In other words, as stated by Derrida, *differance* inhabits structures of meaning as both conditions of possibility and impossibility.

In French, the anomalous *a* of *difference* registers only in the written form of the word, since when spoken it cannot be distinguished from the common place, received spelling. And this is precisely what Derrida intends: that *differance* should function not as a concept, not as a word, whose meaning could be finally 'booked into the present', but as one set of marks in a signifying chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical economy of language and representation'.⁹ *Differance* or the trace does not present itself, this almost nothing of the unrepresentable is what philosophers always try to erase. It is this trace, however, that marks and relaunches all systems¹⁰.

Differance is the systematic play of differances, of the traces, of the *spacing* by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance*) indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition, production of the

intervals without which the “full” terms would not signify, would not function. It is also the becoming space of the spoken chain - which has been called temporal or linear; a becoming space which makes possible both writing and every correspondence between speech and writing and every passage from one to the other.¹¹

The key point to be noted in the term *differance* is that it does not merely mean the two words differ but it also points out that each word differs from itself. As Derrida says in *Positions*, “Nothing – no present and in – *different* being – thus precedes *differance* and *spacing*. The two words “cat” and “dog” are alternatively present and absent in the two sentences “the cat on the mat” and “the dog is on the mat”, but while the word “cat” is present in the first sentence and not the second (in which the word ‘dog’ is present), the “cat” nevertheless remains absent. This absence of the referent is what makes a word *differ* from itself and opens discourse to the play of consciousness, a play that deconstruction tries to understand.¹²

Freudian influence can also be traced out in the word *differance*. Derrida’s increasing interest in psychoanalysis was very explicit since his first essay on Freud in 1966 *Freud et la de l’écriture*. After that the *Glas* (1974) comes out, using certain psycho-analytic notions (such as the fetish) in its account of Genet and Hegel. The essay *La Differance* of 1968 (collected in *Margins*) and *La Dissemination* (1972), also immensely reveals. Derrida’s

reflections on the relationship between psychoanalysis and deconstruction on the basis of the rejection of values of presence, origin and ultimate meaning. Derrida treats the Freudian notion of 'trace' (*Spur*) as an inscription of 'differance', and finds a way for an analysis, the fulfilled form of which comes out a few years later in the pleasure principle and its deferral through the Reality Principle. Unlike Freud, Derrida argues that the unconscious is not a reservoir of what was once present, but rather a 'past which was never present and never will be'. Further, it is deconstruction which helps clarify Freud's notions of the trace and the unconscious, not *vice versa*. Dissemination is another concept which resists what Derrida calls, 'the effect of subjectivity..... and appropriation', as it points out the internal self-division of 'presence' and disorganizes the unity of symbolic meaning and truth.¹³

(3) The third deconstructive key term, I intend to explain is *supplement*. According to Norris, there are two senses of the word 'supplement', but only one of the senses squares with this traditional idea of the relation between speech and writing, that is speech. This situation would exist so long as writing was the kind of *mere* supplement or optional feature. In that sense, firstly, the only self-sufficient entity speech could make use of writing despite its limitations as an aid to memory or mass-communication. Secondly a 'supplement' is also required to *complete* or fill up the existing lack, the gap in the present order of things. Here writing would have to be

treated as a precondition of language in general. It becomes a necessary supplement and in its absence speech itself could scarcely be conceived. Norris thus states that ‘what Derrida calls ‘the logic of supplementarity’ is precisely this strange reversal of values whereby an apparently derivative or secondary term takes on the crucial role in determining an entire structure of assumptions.’¹⁴

Thus an enquiry into the logic of supplement together with its history bring us back to the question of genesis that marked the beginning of Derrida’s thinking in 1953. It lead us to the Rousseauian concept according to which ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are terms which exist in some fixed order of priority and conforms to the logic of identity which in turn is the classical notion of ontology. But the logic of supplement says that the outside be inside that what adds itself to something takes place of a default in the thing, that the default, as the outside of the inside, should be already within the inside etc.¹⁵ In the words of Bernard Stiegler, the ‘logic of supplement’, as a logic of pro- thesis that shows the “truth” of the “inside” to be (in) the outside in which it exteriorizes itself makes the opposition inside/outside redundant.¹⁶ Thus we get the fourth illustration, which makes its appearance once again in ‘late’ Derrida, there he explains how impossibility is lodged in possibility. Let us discuss some of them.

Firstly, the word confession: a confession does not simply involve saying what happened. Here Derrida says that if an individual committed a crime and go to the police and saying “I have committed a crime”, does not itself constitute a confession. It becomes a confession only when, beyond the act of imparting information, I confess that I am guilty. In other words, letting someone know what has happened is not simply confession. There is more to the confession than informing, more than the constative of cognitive saying of the event. It involves a transformation of the individual’s relationship to the other, there he present himself as guilty and say ‘I am guilty, and not only I am informing you of this, but I am declaring that I am guilty of this’. Hence Derrida says that in the confession, there is a saying of the event, of what happened, that produces a transformation. It produces another event and is not simply a saying of knowledge. Every time that saying *the event* exceeds this dimension of information, knowledge, and cognition, it enters the night – you spoke a great deal of night – “the night of a non-knowing”¹⁷ Therefore, *saying the event* that produces the event beyond the confines of knowledge. The possibility of such and such an event will happen appears impossible.

Secondly, we take how ‘Giving as an event’, discussed by Derrida. The very word close to giving is forgiving is also a form of giving. One cannot forgive a person who has committed immeasurable crime. Forgiving, if it is possible, can only come to be as impossible. But this impossibility is

not simply negative. This means that the impossible must be done. Therefore, it states that “giving or forgiving, if there is any, must appear impossible; they must defy all theoretical or cognitive statements, all “that is that” type of judgments, all judgments along the lines of “forgiving is”, I’ve a forgiving nature, or “the gift has been given”.¹⁸

Derrida concludes that the history of philosophy is the history of reflections on the meaning of the *possible*, on the meaning of *being* or *being possible*. The great tradition of the *dynamis* of potentiality, from Aristotle to Bergson, these reflections in transcendental philosophy on the conditions of possibility- are affected by the experience of the possible and the impossible, the opposition between the possible and the impossible. What we speak here is of im-possible event, an im-possible that is not merely impossible, that is not merely the opposite of possible, that is also the condition or chance of the possible. An im-possible that is the very experience, of the possible.

4.3 The Logic of Undecidability

Norris wants to prove that the conclusion that Derrida is not perversely collapsing or annulling the genre distinction between philosophy and literature as Searle and Habermas blamed, instead he is seeking a ‘leap beyond a certain logic within a logic which he tries to perform and which is so difficult to perform’.¹⁹ This leads him to open a counter to post-analytical logic. He says that unlike Davidson, to whom there is *a priori* possibility of

comparing or translating between different conceptual schemes, that is, ontological relativity must presuppose the very idea of conceptual scheme, *contra* Quine, Derridean deconstruction says that there is *a priori* condition of impossibility for the above according to which there is a world.

‘Deconstruction directly attacks not a thesis but only an argument for a thesis.’²⁰ This gets the support from Derrida’s own illumination of ‘logic’ that is stated as follows:

I am trying to elaborate a *logic* and I would call this a ‘*logic*’, in which the only possible x (and I mean here any *rigorous* concept of x) is ‘the impossible x’. And to do so without being caught in an absurd, honzensical discourse. For instance, the statement according to which the only possible gift is one impossible gift, is meaningful. Where I can give only what I am able to give, what it is possible for me to give, I don’t give. So, for me to give something. I have to give something I don’t have, that is to make an impossible gift.²¹

In another context, Derrida says,

For me, the concept of possibility as something which has to be saved at the moment that it may ruin what we want to save, this ‘possibility as impossibility’, is the most unavoidable argument today. I use the word ‘argument’ in the sense of something

which can be used in a logical demonstration as something convincing, I want to convince.²²

But then he is willing to concede that like Godel, Derrida also has exploited the semantic slippage or undecidability. At several points, he has made reference to Godel's undecidability proof which holds that from any logical system rich enough to generate the axioms of elementary arithmetic there will always result at least one inconsistent or contradictory theorem and moreover that any change introduced in order to remove the anomaly will render the system incapable of generating all axioms required. This is one of the most famous and deeply problematical results in twentieth century philosophy of logic and mathematics.²³ Derrida's early writings such as *Writing and Difference*, *Dissemination* and *Margins of Philosophy* constantly makes reference to this "undecidability" and sometimes directly mentions Godel's proof for its bearing on issues of truth meaning and textual interpretation.

Again in *Dissemination*, Derrida writes specifically as Godel demonstrated in 1931 that "undecidable proposition", is a proposition which, given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity; is neither an analytical nor a deductive consequence of those axioms nor in a contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms. *Tertium datur* without synthesis.²⁴

This passage acts as a guiding principle for a writer like Arkady Plotinitsky who finds it as one indicator of the manifold associative links between (1) undecidability in its Godelian (mathematical or set-theoretic) sense (2) Derrida's usage of the term in various (also highly specific) context of argument and (3) the whole range of scientific, literary and cultural phenomena which can also be described – albeit with some loss of analytical precision – as per taking of a generalized “undecidability”.²⁵ This generalized “undecidability” explained in the third sentence, Norris says, brings Derrida closer to Bohr, Godel and other prophets of post-modernity who were engaged in undoing the values (like “classical” truth/falsehood distinction) that held sway in the discourse of the western natural and human sciences.²⁶

Derrida uses the term “undecidable”, to designate what he defines as unities of simulacrum..... “false” verbal properties, nominal or semantic, which can no longer be understood in terms of (binary) philosophical opposition, and which nonetheless inhabit it, resist it, and disorganize it, but without ever constituting a third term, without ever giving rise to a solution in the form of speculative dialectics (POS. 58). ‘Undecidable’ stands for one thing and its opposite in one sense, and on the other it is neither one thing nor its opposite. Thus according to Derrida, undecidables are ‘in a rigorously Freudian sense, the unconscious of philosophical opposition’.

Derridean undecidables are not Hegelian *Aufhebung* or *Urteil* or *Meinen* or *Beispiel* which were necessary for Hegel in expressing the speculative dialectic, neither they are a matter of ‘enigmatic equivocation’ or ‘poetic mystery’, they do not stand for any lexical richness instead they stand for a syntactic practice which composes and decomposes them.

The term “undecidability” used by Derrida, is partly had its roof in the philosophy of mathematics. It does not stand for the vague idea used by some literary deconstructionist in connection with textual interpretation. As stated previously, it stands for the formal and synthetical *praxis* that composes and decomposes it. The various deconstructive key terms such as (1) *Pharmakon* in Plato, (2) *Supplement* in Rousseau, (3) *Parergon* in Kant (4) *Differance* (or differing – defferal) in Husserl etc. are worked on this principle of undecidability whose status is determined not by their ‘lexical richness’ or ‘semantic infiniteness’ nor by their open-ended textual ‘free play’. Instead it is the logical grammar of these words that makes them to function as internal points of leverage for a deconstructive reading. These revisionist proposals, according to Norris, result (like Godel’s undecidability proof) from a willingness to apply the principles of classical logic right upto the point where they encounter some obstacles to thought, some moment of textual *aporia*, which marks the limits of any such approach.²⁷ Norris sustains the rigour of logic with the resources of realism. For he says that Derrida had valid

reasons for revising the axioms of classical (two-values) logic. This is very evident when he says.

‘Taking into account the fact a name does not name the punctual simplicity of a concept, but rather a system of predicates defining a concept, a conceptual structure *centered* on a given predicate, we proceed: (1) to the extraction of a reduced predictive trait that is held in reserve, limit in a given conceptual structure (limited for motivations and the relations of force to be analyzed) named *x*; (2) to the delimitation, the grafting and regulated extension of the extracted predicate, the name *x* being maintained as a kind of lever of *intervention*. In order to maintain a grasp on the previous organization which is to be transformed effectively.’²⁸

He proceeds the canvas that we should reject Habermas’s attempt to treat deconstruction as one offshoot a ‘philosophical offshoot of the wider post-modernist or courier enlightenment drift.’ He also highlights Habermas’s failure to recognize the extent to which the so-called ‘ordinary’ language shot through with metaphors, nonce-usages, Freudian parapraxes etc. At the same time, with proven evidences, Norris recognizes the post-analytic side by quoting from Henry Staten when he describes ‘how Wittgenstein, like Derrida, develops a style that is ‘radically errant’, one which effectively ‘un-

hides all the accident concealed by “normal” uses of words in order to show how many different routes it would be possible to take from any given point in the discourse.’ There is no reason why he cannot agree with Habermas. There are examples for Norris to cite from Henry Staten from which he cannot draw the conclusion saying that Habermas has miserably failed. Norris comments:

‘Philosophy is indeed a ‘kind of writing’, but a kind which (contrary to Rorty’s understanding) cannot be collapsed into a generalized notion of rhetoric or intertextuality. It is unfortunate that Habermas takes his bearings in Post-modernism from a widespread but nonetheless fallacious idea of how deconstruction relates to other symptoms of the so-called post-modern condition. What Derrida gives us is *not* philosophy’s undoing at the hands of literature but a literature that meets the challenge of philosophy in every aspect of its argument, form and style.’²⁹

Further, Norris claims that this very argument, form and style of deconstruction is emanated from the Fregean tradition. Hence it does not reduce logic to rhetoric. It has its own logic and strong foundational proofs for its claims. It is a continuum that keeps the rigour and logic of analytic philosophy. But the context of deconstruction is “limitless”, which is also to

say interminable and indeterminable (or “indecidable”): one is left with *mise en abyme* (abyss), or hall of mirrors of contexts. Derrida has claimed that a trait of “deconstruction would be the effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization.”³⁰

4.4 Deconstruction as the Wider Practice in Analytic Philosophy

The rigour of logic found in deconstruction is very similar to the rigour found in analytic philosophy. It does not mean that deconstruction is analytic philosophy, instead, it can be said that the method of analysis of language found in deconstruction has close proximity to the method of analysis of language found both in analytic philosophy as well as in post-analytic philosophy. Thus a wider conclusion can be drawn in the event of identifying Derrida as an analytic philosopher of language. But Derrida makes it increasingly clear that he disowns it however much he is willing to concede that he is a sort of analyst.

According to Frege, referents can only be identified if language and logic between them provide the salient criteria for picking out the object referred to. There is no direct relationship between word, concept and referent. However, naming depends upon a structure of predicative assumptions which point out the object in question with all its details. A similar argument can also be found in Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’ and in

Wittgenstein's pronouncement of 'the limits of my language', although with a different end in view.

These perspectives of the logico-linguistic traditions also squares with the structuralist emphasis on language as the omnipresent mediating element in all existing orders of knowledge and representation. According to Saussure, it is the linguistic structures that determines our grasp of the world and that the 'reality' can only be construed as a product of deep-laid linguistic conventions. The arbitrary nature of the sign, the Saussurean distinction between "signifier" and "signified" and "*langue*" and "*parole*" are some of the important structuralist notions that become important at this moment.

There are many common points at which structuralism and logico-linguistics converge and differ. Both Saussure and Frege agree that 'meaning determines reference' in the sense that outside language there exists no self-sufficient act of naming. When Fregean logical semantics speaks of a clear-cut referential implication, Saussure had no such objective in view. The linguistic 'science' that he had discussed consisted of different linguistic terms that have no absolute grounding in epistemological truth. According to Norris,

'It follows from the structuralist argument that thought is necessarily constrained by certain regularities of language which semiological theory seeks to explain. To this extent,

perhaps, the Saussurain science of signs implies its own status as a meta-language equipped to interpret and ‘scientifically’ grasp all other forms of discourse. But this is quite distinct from the Fregean claim that semantics as ‘first philosophy’ is uniquely fitted to analyse the very terms of epistemological truth.’³¹

The point can be made explicit taking example from Frege. To him, it is the proper names like ‘Aristotle’, which create all manner of philosophic problem when the conditions that apply to their use as uniquely referring terms is asked. Frege’s answer is:

‘Opinions as regards their sense may diverge. As such may, e.g., be suggested ‘Plato’s disciple’ and ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’. Whoever accepts this will interpret the meaning of the statement ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’, differently from one who interpreted the sense of ‘Aristotle as the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great. As soon as the nominatum remains the same, these fluctuations in sense are tolerable. But they should be avoided in the system of a demonstrative science and should not appear in a perfect language.’³²

Here Frege points out the difficulty of assigning definitive attribute to names like 'Aristotle' based on the priorities. It also raises the logical kind of problems in deciding the status of factual propositions. Thus a 'Fregean analysis is called for to prevent the collapse into logical undecidability which threatens as soon as one makes any statement *about Aristotle*'.³³

In comparison to logico-semantics, structuralism takes a different path to the referential function of language. Its focus of attention mainly rests on the theories or philosophies of language bound up with linguistic convention. It is in this background, the emergence of deconstruction has to be viewed. Derrida sets out to deconstruct the 'metaphysics of presence' prevailed in the western philosophy. 'What Derrida provides – most strikingly in his texts on Plato, Nietzsche and Saussure – is a discourse which combines an extreme sceptical rigour with a wayward, unsettling figurative play its aberrant (or self-deconstructing) moments.'³⁴ By doing this, Derrida shows an unscrupulous fidelity to the letter of the texts to undo the 'logocentric' assumptions. The last and most acutely contradictory form of this play between blindness and insight, metaphysics and the textual 'unconscious' are expressed in structuralism. According to Derrida, the very idea of 'structure' is a metaphor that is handed over as concept and exist as the disseminating power of language. 'Structuralism', Derrida believes, 'lives on the difference between its promise and its practice'. Quite contrary to this, deconstruction

sets out to demonstrate ‘the principled, essential and structural impossibility of closing a structural phenomenology,’³⁵ on the following points.

- (1) that writing is systematically degraded in Saussurean linguistics;
- (2) that this strategy runs up against suppressed but visible contradictions;
- (3) that by following these contradictions through, one is led *beyond* linguistics to a ‘grammatology’ or science of writing and textuality in general.

From the above, Norris attempts to derive a conclusion about the differences between Frege and Saussure in a vain effort to align Frege with Derrida. He says that the Derridean critique of meaning and method was thus totally different from the Fregean attempt to search for epistemological clarity. However, it has a logic of its own.

The notion of ‘meaning determines reference’, acts as a large and potentially unlimited concession which in Derridean terminology is the ‘disseminating’ power of language. Such a perspective within the realm of epistemological reason necessitates a logical semantics which can clearly distinguish between necessary (analytic) structures of meaning and the senses which cannot or need not be thus construed. This is a trend that we can find in recent philosophy. For example, pragmatist Quine, discovered no grounds for preserving the notion of *a priori* logical necessity. He considered the total field of knowledge at any given time as ‘a man-made fabric which impinges

on experience only along the edges.’ The conflict with experience finally make ‘readjustments in the interior of the field’. Here *a priori* thus are themselves so linked to the total structure of knowledge that they may at any time be subject to revision, the field as a whole being ‘undetermined by its boundary conditions’.³⁶ This is the main cause behind the collapse between synthetic and analytic judgements.

Structuralism, therefore, states that it is through language that we get access to the world of objects and experience. The ‘arbitrary’ nature of the sign, the absence of a bond between signifier and signified indicates the existence of a meaning dependent reference and that meaning itself is further bound with structured economy of signifying relationships and differences. Hence there is the general notion that ‘reality’ came into being by means of ‘discourse’ or by signifying practices that are used to explain it.

These activities cannot be considered as a textual free play. Instead deconstruction is the outcome of not mere structuralist thinking but analytic philosophy also has its role for basing its methods on the principle that ‘meaning [sense] determines [or precedes] reference.’ According to Norris, Derrida’s procedure’s are not the less compelling for the fact that they work to question or confound all normative concepts of logic and meaning. His conclusion that his arguments are the outcome of a Nietzschean principled

scepticism, allied to the means of linguistic analysis provided by Saussure,³⁷ needs a corrective, along the lines indicated in the above.

It is by means of ignoring, suppressing the disruptive effects of language that philosophers have been able to impose their various systems of thought. The purpose of Derrida therefore is to draw out these effects by a critical reading to pick out the elements of metaphor and other figurative devices at work in the texts of philosophy. Here the role of deconstruction in its most rigorous form is to act as a constant remainder of the ways in which language deflects or complicates the philosophers' project. Further, it works to undo the idea that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or method, the prevailing illusion of western metaphysics. In other words, it is on the radical incommensurability of rhetoric and logic, meaning and structure, 'naïve' and critical interpretation deconstruction has taken shape. One wonders whether Norris can draw sustenance from such arguments to build up a narrow view of analysis. It does not, because it is the main plank on which it rests.

4.5 Deconstruction: Architectonics and Spectres

Next he must see how Norris exploits the Kantian motif to further his conclusion. Commentators on deconstruction fall into two groups. Firstly, writers like Rudolphe Gasche who reads Derrida's work as a radical continuation of certain Kantian thesis. Secondly, thinkers like Richard Rorty

praises Derrida for having put such ‘deluded enlightenment’ notions behind him and arrived at a post-modern pragmatist stance relieved of all metaphysical baggage. These writers are of the opinion that we can’t make sense of Derrida without some knowledge of the relevant intellectual prehistory.

Rortian reading explains how the thinkers from Descartes to Kant on down to have misconceived the philosophical enterprise under the guise that they were giving solutions to the real philosophical problems. On the contrary, Gasche finds Derrida as a philosopher who not only had a critical perception on the previous thinkers especially with Kant, Hegel and Husserl but is centrally concerned with the issues in the realm of truth, knowledge and representation. However, it can be said that Derrida’s thinking is poised against the categorical basis of Kantian argument and also tries to demonstrate what Gasche calls ‘the conditions of impossibility’, which marks the limits of all philosophical enquiry. A close look at the arguments raised by these philosophers will make us understand that these philosophers (Rorty and Gasche) take Kant as cardinal point where their histories diverge. On the one side, there is the line that leads from Kant, *via* Hegel to the various other speculative systems and projects that make up the ‘continental side’. On the other, there is the Kantian base which inaugurates an era about the debates about language, logic and truth mainly found in the analytical school of

thought. Deconstruction belongs to the latter, or else it can be said that deconstruction is a form of Kantianism. To quote Derrida,

Deconstruction is not simply the decomposition of an architectural structure. It is also a question about the foundation, about the relation between foundation and what is founded; it is also a question about the closure of the structure, about a whole architecture of philosophy. Not only as concerns this or that construction, but on the architectonic motif of the system. Architectonic: here I refer to Kant's definition, which does not exhaust all the senses of "architectonic", but Kant's definition interests me particularly.³⁸

In this context, Norris discusses how Derridean affinity to Kant have taken shape in two of his major texts namely the chapter "The Parergon", in *'The Truth in Painting'* and the essay, *'Economimesis'*. Both of these texts treat the analytic of aesthetic judgement as set out in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. Such an understanding though warranted does not go beyond a limit. In fact one can hold that any anti-Kantian reading will also be compatible with it.

Kant thought to liberate philosophy from the abysmal shares of sceptical doubt raised by empiricists and idealists by declaring that the proper concern of philosophy was not to prove that the mind could 'know' the

reality. Its purpose according to Kant is to show how experience was always and inevitably *structured* by the innate constitution of human intelligence.

Kant's categories of understanding thus becomes a proof against this sceptical attack signally something inevitably epistemic in its core. Thus what Kant bequeathed to later philosophers was a new and more refined set of problems such that Moore's attempted 'solution' could only seem willfully comprehending. This, says Norris, is some of the background history that needs to be borne in mind, when interpreting Derrida's own various statements on the question of referentiality.³⁹

In the chapter on the parergon in *The Truth In Painting*, Derrida explains how the domain of aesthetic enquiry emerges in Kant's philosophy. According to Kant, *Parerga* include all those things "attached" to the work of art get they are not part of its intrinsic form or meaning, the frame of a pointing, the colonnades of palaces, or drapery on statues. *Parera* becomes an ornament, an adjunct or supplement to the intrinsic beauty of the artwork. To be more precise, to quote Kant, as he has stated in *Transcendental Aesthetic* of the first critique – 'art concealed in the depths of the soul', a synthesizing power that alone can accomplish the required link between intuitions and concepts, yet whose nature inherently eludes conceptual definition. Passages like these, for Heidegger, Foucault and Lyotard stand as promissory notes whose value can be redeemed only through Kant's treatment

of the aesthetic (in his third *critique*) as a *sui generis* modality or judgement .

⁴⁰ But the paradox is that Kant's analysis to the specificity of aesthetic judgement *creates* the dilemma it was designed to resolve 'the insistence on enframing – defining on the one name, the self-identity of art and, on the other, the specificity of aesthetic judgements – is what in fact *produces* the divisions between object and subject, inside and outside, mind and nature, that the third *critique* claims to resolve in completing Kant's transcendental system.⁴¹ The purpose of the third *critique*, according to Derrida, is to identify art as a middle term bridging an opposition between mind and nature, internal and external phenomena, the inside and the outside, and so on. Instead, Kant introduced two separate worlds that are absolutely divided through the concepts such as object/subject, nature/mind, external/internal, outside/inside, sensible/supersensible etc. These divisions cannot be bridged by pure reason as this would render aesthetic and scientific judgements as equivalent. Instead, the aesthetic judgement should be able to bridge these discontinuous worlds through the discursive structure of the example and throw a logic of semblance without identity originating in analogies referring to the model speech. In short, the parergon is a metaphysical logic of "controlled indeterminacy" or of a ceaseless vibration between inside and outside, the intrinsic and extrinsic, subject and object, the reflective and the determinant, the singular and the universal, the conceptual and the non-

conceptual, mind and nature.⁴² This indeterminacy is the ontological uncertainty of the very idea of the aesthetic.

Derrida coined the term *economimesis* while discussing the value of analytic judgements. It stands for the value produced in the self-identity of art as formulated by the logic of the Parergon, and in the hierarchies that adjudicate the relative value of different media and practices in relation to an identification of freedom and reason with speech. Economimesis secures the figure of Genius as the example of a divine agency in art where the artist creates without concepts as a pure and free productivity of the imagination – in a fashion analogous to the way God produces works in nature.⁴³ So Derrida argues that Kantian aesthetic which deals with the interrelated questions of *mimesis*, of artistic disinterest and the ‘framing’ of aesthetic experience are involved in a play of figural substitutions which resists any form of *de jure* conceptual closure.⁴⁴ So Norris, says, representation in general – which includes that most of classical of ‘*philosophemes*’, the notion of linguistic reference – becomes caught up in this functioning of a text that must perforce remain strategically bind to its own most crucial turns of argument.⁴⁵ What transpires from the above is that the analytic motif of deconstruction can be subjected to varying readings. It must however be pointed out that it is an open question whether this makes Derrida to become a Kantian philosopher of analysis. This is no better shown in his account of spectrality of Marx to which we now turn.

Now let us turn our discussion to one of Derrida's another major work, *Spectres of Marx* published in French in the year 1993. This book deals with the thoughts of Marxism and its future. The very title of the book is an allusion to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel's statement at the beginning of the Communist Manifesto that a "spectre [is] haunting Europe". For Derrida the spirit of Marx is even more relevant now since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the demise of communism. With its death the spectre of communism begins to make visits on the earth. Derrida seeks to do the work of inheriting from Marx, that is, not communism but of the philosophy of responsibility, and of Marx's spirit of radical critique.

Derrida discusses Marxism of today and of the past with multiple meditations of various aspects of Marx and considers that Marxism is specifically inspired by the religion of messianism – a messianic politics it is. The most fundamental element of experience which has aligned to the coming of the Other, as stated by Derrida in *Spectres* is not the present moment but the future for which communication always hurries for, but missing it. He forewarns the coming of the bad from the future, 'the bad Other, and also the bad from the past, for it is possible and essential to choose, not by conservatism and nationalism, or by approaching stasis and death, but by understanding the unforeseen quality of the future, and the spectral feature of events, because if we are not careful, they haunt us, and return. In the same way, one must avoid certain things from the past and cultivate others.'⁴⁶ How

can the coming of the worst can be avoided without recourse to conservatism, asks Derrida. 'We always have to choose what to accept from time, and what to reject. We have to have courage and responsibility to do this. "The democracy to come' means always renew your promise to democracy and justice, your belief in the better future, so as to remain changeable events.'⁴⁷ In other words, the absent presence of the spectre features the self-identity of the present, installs, an anachronic, differential temporality, which is not divorced from, but renders both possible and impossible, the unfolding of time understood as a succession of self-present moments. Any modality of temporal presence is disadjusted, out of joint.⁴⁸

Examining Marx's book *German Ideology*, in the second half of *Spectres*, Derrida dealing with the question of whether Marx believed the communist event would arise and become present and whether we were justified in ever believing incomplete social revolution. It creates a economy of hauntology in which expectations of the present and future are remained unfilled. 'However if Marx was unaware of this, his text becomes subtly but dangerously involved in the lack of presence, a lack which also hides a power of ghostliness which Marx sought to erase. The lack and the ghost now come forth: 'hauntology' is possible because the spirit, or mind, continually calls the past in its aid, without alternative, and cannot settle and become steady, grounding.'⁴⁹

The final chapter of *Spectres* witness the presence of Marx reading a christian and ghostly writer, St. Max or Max Stirner who in turn makes the world into a ghost or insubstantial thing with 'Jesus' ghostly body at its centre. Here Derrida finds parallelism between Marx's own life with Max Stirner's crime against life and politics according to which the material fact of the world has been reduced to a mere insubstantial and unreal ghost. Marx's own life was also directed with the intention of reducing the dialectic of Hegel to materialism. However, Derrida points out that Marx is obsessed by 'St. Max' because he is his double, his other, a ghost of himself whom he would like to oppose.⁵⁰ To quote Jason Powell, it is sufficient to point out that the text *spectres of Marx*, was not only to discussion of Marxism, but an experiment in whether a working hypothesis of Marxism and religion could be formulated, a problem which Derrida, in his texts of broken questions and answers, of various voices solved his own satisfaction to some extent, although he kept searching. That is, such a deconstruction has never been Marxist, no more than it has ever been non-Marxist, although it has remained faithful to certain spirit of Marxism, to at least one of its spirits for, and this can never be repeated too often, there is *more than one of them* and they are heterogeneous. Having revealed the hope for a just revolution deconstructing it, Derrida says that this hope is the aspect of Marx's writing which he has always thought to be valuable.⁵¹ According to Derrida, unlike any other philosophical tradition, the Marxism dialectic makes an allowances for

restructuring and reinventing the view of the unpredictability of knowledge and the ever-changing politics of globalization. Thus reading and re-reading, revisions and re-revisions of Marx always becomes indispensable.

There are people who believe that Derrida can be reconciled to Marx *pace* his spectres of Marx. There are also Derrideans who believe that deconstruction is at one with Marxism. A mixture of both of these readings are traced out by Dr. Kanthamani in his critical essay on 'On Spectres of Marx' ('Man' is printers devil), where he response to the writings of the Indian neo-Marxist Aijaz Ahamad and states that 'there is indeed a Benjaminite warrant for the above engagement of the text, but it may not be true at all. Thus Aijaz claims that the spectres include a spectre of Benjamin, which warrants a messianic affirmation (376) with its kind of emancipation and in order to achieve a 'religious surrender'. (392).⁵² The purpose of Kanthamani is to contest the argument whether Derrida's text of spectres of Marx is much more a text of filiation than a text of affiliation. It is this which in turn throws light to a Marxist descent and heritage, a very idea that inspired Aijaz from Fukuyama's which Derrida utilized for a deconstructive reading of end of history/ideology. The very idea of warrant a revanant by a spectre is counterintuitive to Kanthamani. Because 'Derrida can never agree that a de-totalized horizon can ever sponsor a totalizing vision. Aijaz's reading collapses therefore on its own homeground, as there is not a shred of evidence.'⁵³

The very idea of Aijaz that there is a certain affinity between the spirit of deconstruction and the spirit of Marxism is repudiated by Kanthamani since it lacks textual evidence and taken it as the failure of Aijaz to understand the spirit of deconstruction. He explains the context where Derrida discusses this, as follows. Firstly, Derrida contrasts the type of critique Fukuyama advances with the spirit of Marxist critique with all its loose Hegelian core. It is only a façade. Further, he contrasts it with the deconstruction as the practices it. This is very contrary to Marxism as an ideology. From this, it is deduced that both Fukuyama and Derrida share a certain motif. Fukuyama can also be credited with the use of the canons of Marxist critique to criticize Marxism. In that sense, Kanthamani states that ‘no conclusion could ever follow from the above steps about the compatibility of the spirit of deconstruction and the spirit of Marxism. Unless the two steps are said to collapse into each other since there is no textual evidence for this, the two contrasting gestures will not collapse into each other. In fact, they are opposed to each other.’⁵⁴ It also proclaims that deconstruction is a possible exercise on the text, but an impossible one. If its impossibility is excluded by fiat, it will be reduced to a meta-narrative like others. But the spectrality of Marxism does not exclude its impossibility as it speaks of many disparate spectres in place of the single spectre in the *Manifesto*. Kanthamani states that ‘we can deconstruct what cannot be object of deconstruction. If so, deconstruction becomes both the conditions of possibility as well as the

condition of impossibility,'⁵⁵ 'what distinguishes Derrida's text is however it has a strong deconstructionist motif. That is, it refuses to valorise any dogmatics either neoliberalism or neomarxism.'⁵⁶ This is what is largely attested to in 'late' Derrida, to we move.

4.6 Deconstruction: Postmodernism and Critical Theory

The earliest use of the term postmodernism dates back to the 1930's by defining it as a "conservative reflux within modernism", by the Spanish literary critic, Federico de Onis then agreeing with the unfinished project of Habermas. Despite the differences among these usage of 'post-modern', there is an underlying pattern of agreement in some areas of post-modernism. These are: (1) recognition of pluralism and indeterminacy in the world that modernist thought had evidently sought to disavow. It caused for a renunciation of intellectual hopes for simplicity, completeness and certainty (2) A new focus on representation of images of cultural signs as occupying a dominant position in social life. This has resulted in the acceptance of play and fictionalization in cultural fields that had earlier sought a serious, realist truth. Although the very idea of a summary may be antithetical to post-modernism, the points of agreements may be discussed as follows.

Firstly, it has often been said that postmodernists are concerned only with signs and never with things or objectivity or truth. Completeness and consistency of a system of phenomena are impossible to postmodernists. To

them analysis never ends. If anything is fundamental for the postmodernist, it could only be *difference* or *differance* in Derridean terminology.

Secondly, the denial of presence, is a characteristic feature of postmodernism. Traditionally, philosophers have often distinguished perception or sense-data, as immediate conduits for reality, thought, interpretation and hence symbolization. Postmodernism rejects any such distinction. *Presentation presupposes representation*. It makes Derrida even to say that there is no such a thing as “perception”. This denial throws light into the arguments about interpretation. Thus the saying ‘Every author is a dead author, denies that the meaning of a text can be authoritatively revealed through reference to authorial intentions’.⁵⁷ Instead it states that author’s intentions are not immediately available, nor are relevant for the understanding of the text. They are not the origin of the text and have no *privilege* over other factors. In that sense, post-modernists are more radically *antifoundationalist* than others. They are also sceptic of God, Nature and Reason.

Thirdly, postmodernist are *constructivists* about knowledge. They state that *meaning is repression*. The denial of the myth of self-presence and the acceptance of constructivism occasionally leads them to substitute the analysis of *representation* of a thing for discussion of the *thing*. Derridean claim of “There is nothing outside the text”, is a best global expression of this

approach. By the famous statement Derrida does not mean that there is no real world, instead he states that we only encounter real referents through texts, representations, mediation. The *world we know* is constructed by representation.

Fourthly, the denial of dualism both metaphysical and methodological is another characteristic feature of post-modernism. They denied the traditional notion of *norms*, including reason itself. It has been considered that norms we use to judge processes are *themselves products of the processes* they judge. In other words, when most philosophers use an idea of justice independently derived from a philosophical argument to judge a social order, in post-modernism, the idea itself as the product of social relations that serves to judge.

The last and that which is equally applicable to all those four themes of post-modernism is the analytic strategy of post-modernism. It has been considered that a phenomenon maintains its identity in semiotic systems only if other units are represented as foreign or “other” by means of a hierarchical dualism in which first is *privileged* and the other *deprivileged*. Quite contrary to this, post-modernist concentrates on the *marginalized* elements of any system or text since it is here lies the key to its structure. From such a position, they will take linguistic tropes, such as metaphors, to the meaning of the text. To them, metaphors are crucial to the constitution of the texts theme.

“Pulling on these threads *deconstructs* the text, in Derrida’s famous term. Such deconstruction is the making explicit of the way the text undermines its own meaning”.⁵⁸

What all this indicates that deconstruction can be seen as is one offshoot – a ‘philosophical’ offshoot – of this wider post-modernist or counter-enlightenment drift as claimed by Habermas. Norris gives us in the service in which it was argued for in the light of consideration of post-analytical angle in the two chapters above what can now be examined.

Habermas ‘attacked post-modernism as a new form of conservatism, which has prematurely abandoned the uncompleted project of the Enlightenment’.⁵⁹ Habermas also held the view that deconstruction is a matter of collapsing all genre – distinctions, especially those between philosophy and literature, reason and rhetoric, language in its constative and performative aspects.

Norris states that Habermas’ has misread Derrida’s work, and done so moreover in a way that fits in too readily with commonplace ideas about deconstruction as a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism, one that rejects the whole legacy of post-Kantian enlightened thought.⁶⁰ Norris agrees that deconstruction properly understood, belongs within the same philosophical discourse of modernity. However, there are certain blind-spots in Habermas’s critique which Norris tries to explore. According to Norris, the

major thrust of Habermas's criticism is not emanated from what Derrida has written, but it springs up from what has been written about him by various (mostly American) commentators.

Norris states that one major premise in *The Margins of Philosophy* that often makes commentators especially Habermas confuse to classify Derrida in the post-modernist camp is this:

Philosophy is indeed a certain 'kind of writing', a discourse which nonetheless strives to cover its own rhetorical tracks by aspiring to an order of pure, unmediated self-present truth. Thus a deconstructive reading will typically fasten upon those moments in the philosophic text where some cardinal concept turns out to rest on a latent or sublimated metaphor, or where the logic of an argument is subtly undone by its reliance on covert rhetorical devices or again it will show how some seemingly marginal detail of the text some aspect ignored (not without reason) by the mainstream exponents – in fact - plays a crucial but problematic role in the entire structure of argument.⁶¹

According to Norris, what Derrida has achieved – on this view at least – is a striking reversal of age-old prejudice that elevates philosophy over rhetoric, or right reason over the dissimulating arts of language.⁶² But Habermas says that by doing this, Derrida marks a full scale programme of

ignoring those different kinds of language – use that have separated out the modern (post-Kantian) discourse of enlightened reason and overgeneralized poetic (rhetorical) aspect of language to a point where it commands the whole field of communicative action.

It has been the object of Derrida's text to show how philosophers from Plato to Husserl, have striven and failed to suppress the signs of rhetorical disruption in the discourse of philosophical reason. But it does not issue the passport of reducing it to "all concepts are metaphors" or that philosophic truth claims are really metaphorical through and through: as literary critics do. These critics ignore a very crucial problem raised by Derrida in "White Mythology", that all our working definitions of metaphor – from Aristotle down – have been couched in terms that ultimately derive from the language and conceptual resources of philosophy. Thus Norris says that, 'it is impossible to break with that tradition simply by reversing one's priorities, declaring the omnipresence of metaphor and hence the bankruptcy of philosophic reason. Such moves represent only the first stage in a deconstructive strategy which must then go on to re-think the whole structure of opposing valuations attached to the ideas of 'metaphor' and 'concept'.⁶³ So according to Norris, 'we err more grievously in assimilating Derrida to a strain of post-modern irrationalism whose effects he has done nothing to endorse.'⁶⁴ When Derrida says that 'philosophy is indeed a 'kind of writing', it does not mean philosophy's undoing at the hands of literature but a

literature that meets the challenge of philosophy in every aspect of its argument, form and style'.⁶⁵

Now let us have a brief account of the term 'critical theory' in relation to deconstruction. The first meaning of the term '*critical theory*' was defined by *Max Horkheimer* of the Frankfurt School of Social Sciences in his essay on '*Traditional and Critical Theory*'. Since then, critical theory is often thought as referring to Frankfurt School that begins with Horkheimer and Adorno and stretches to Marcuse and Habermas. Nowadays any philosophical approach with similar practical aims could be called a "critical theory", including feminism, critical race theory and some forms of post-colonial criticism. This theory is originated in contrast to the traditional theory with the aim of critiquing and changing the society as a whole. These theorists believed that a "critical theory" may be distinguished from a "traditional theory" according to a specific practical purpose – that is the theory is critical to the extent as it seeks human emancipation, 'to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.' (Horkheimer 1982, 244). Its distinctive as a philosophical approach extends to ethics, political philosophy and to the philosophy of history. These philosophers not only try to preserve the values of enlightened critique but also attempts to diagnose the specific *distortions* of that principle brought about by modern (repressive or instrumental) reason. In this context, the relevance of deconstruction to that of critical theory may be asked.

Norris also asks the relevance of deconstruction in the context of critical theory especially in the reasoned debate of nuclear issue. A fitting answer – one answer – says Norris, ‘I would cite Derrida’s statement that ‘if there are wars, and a nuclear threat, it is because “deterrence” has neither “original meaning” nor measure. Its “logic” is the logic of deviation and transgression, it is rhetorical-strategic escalation or it is nothing at all’ (‘No Apocalypse’, p. 29). Although this Derridean statement may be taken as a ‘continental’ way of making the familiar point in the sense that deterrence is founded upon premises and principles that won’t stand up to logical analysis, here ‘Derrida wants to argue a much closer, more vital and productive link between ‘nuclear criticism’ and the strategies of deconstruction.’⁶⁶ If deconstruction has any special competence in the form of analysis developed to a unique degree – ‘then this has to do with precisely that absence of ‘original meaning’, the ‘logic’ of alogical transgression and the effects of ‘rhetorical escalation’ as against the ‘measure’ of enlightened reason.’⁶⁷

Norris states that these Derridean pronouncements cannot be negligible describing it as Derrida’s well-known solipsistic tendencies, instead it has to be viewed not only in the context of Derrida’s statements but also the entire post-Kantian history of epistemological critique has to be considered. Never before Derrida has more insistently engaged with that history than his reflections on the nuclear issue. “Nuclear Criticism”, like Kantian criticism, is thought about the limits of experience as a thought of finitude As for

the history of humanity, that example of finite rationality, it presupposes the possibility of an infinite progress governed according to an Idea of Reason, In Kant's sense, and through a treatise on Perpetual Peace ('No Apocalypse' p. 30). This Derridean statement according to Norris, 'pronounces the necessity of re-thinking those Kantian ideas with the utmost rigour, since nowadays crucial decisions are being made *as if* in compliance with the principle of reason, but actually in accordance with an escalating logic of rhetorical overskill which possesses neither 'measure' nor reason'.⁶⁸ It also states the necessity of doing more than confrontation on these issues with a passionate moral conviction and a rhetoric as powerful as that brought to bear by the advocates of peace through nuclear strength. Hence the Derridean statement that 'deterrence is a notion whose 'logic', as Derrida writes, is 'either rhetorical –strategic escalation or nothing at all', involves not only a patient and detailed rebuttal of opposing claims but also an appeal to critical reason by way of bringing out the contradictions and *aporias* present in the discourse of nuclear power-politics.⁶⁹

4.7 Conclusion

From the above sections it is explicit that deconstruction has a logic of its own and the rigour of this logic is very similar to the rigour of logic in analytic philosophy. It does not mean deconstruction is analytic philosophy. Instead as described by Norris, deconstruction can be seen in the wider practice of analytic philosophy. This moves us forward to conclude the perspective with an exposition of 'late' Derrida, which forms the final chapter.

Notes

1. Dda. p. 23-24.
2. Dda. p. 39.
3. LTRG p. 287.
4. Dda. p. 37-38.
5. Dda. p. 42.
6. Dsmn. p. 129
7. Dda. p. 43.
8. Pts. p. 234.
9. Dda. p. 15.
10. Pts. p. 83.
11. Psn. p. 24.
12. Michael Kell (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, O.U.P.1998. p. 306.
(E.A hereafter)
13. Christina Howells, *Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics*, Polity Press, 1999. p. 28.
14. Dda. p. 67.
15. Dda. p. 12.
16. Bernard Stiegler, *Fidelity at the limits of deconstruction*, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader. Tom Cohen (ed.) Cambridge University Press. 2001, p. 249.
17. Jacques Derrida, *A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event*, trans. By Gila Walker, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007, vol. 33, Number 2, p. 448.

18. Ibid. p. 450.
19. AD. P. 56.
20. DAP p. 37.
21. AD. p. 55.
22. Psn. p. xxiii.
23. Dsmn. p. 229.
24. Christopher Norris, *Against Relativism*. Blackwell, p. 115.
25. Ibid. p. 115.
26. Psn. p. xxi.
27. Psn. p. 60.
28. Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction, Postmodernism and Philosophy*, in *Derrida a Critical Reader*, David Wood, Blackwell 1998, p. 191. (DCR hereafter).
29. John Coker, Jacques Derrida, in *Black well Guide to continental philosophy*, Robert. C. Solomon and David Sherwom (ed.) – Black well. 2003, p. 265.
30. Christopher Norris, *Deconstructive Turn*. Methuen 1984, p. 145-146.
31. Frege, 'On Sense and Reference' in *Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege*, (ed.) and trans. P. Geach and M. Black.. Oxford. Blackwell 1960, P. 56-78, p. 58.
32. D.T. P. p. 146.
33. D.T. P. p. 147.
34. W & D p. 60.
35. D.T. P. p. 149.

36. O G. p. 43-44.
37. D.T. P. p. 157
38. D.T.P. p. 148.
39. D.T.P. p. 148.
40. A.R. p. 104.
41. Michael Kelly (ed.) Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 2, O.U.P, p. 14.
42. Ibid. p. 16.
43. Ibid. p. 14.
44. Ibid. p. 148.
45. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Harvester Press. 1982. p, 117. (MP hereafter)
46. JDB p. 194
47. Ibid. p. 194.
48. John Brannigan, Ruth Robbins and Julian Wolfreys (ed.) Applying to Derrida, Macmillian 1996, p. 250.
49. JDB. p. 194.
50. Ibid. p. 195-96.
51. Ibid. p. 196.
52. A. Kanthamani, 'On Spectres of Man', in Calicut University Research Journal Vol. 3. Issue.2. Feb. 2003, p. 28.
53. Ibid. p.29.
54. Ibid. p.31.
55. Ibid. p.34.

56. Ibid. p.35.
57. Lawrence and Cahoon (ed.), *From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology*. Blackwell. 2003, p. 3.
58. Ibid. p. 12.
59. Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, (trans.) Fredrick Lawrence, Polity Press. 1987, p. 152.
60. DCR. p. 167.
61. MP p. 117.
62. Dda. p. 167.
63. Dda. p. 170.
64. Dda. p. 169.
65. DCR. P. 191.
66. Dda. p. 167.
67. Dda. p. 167.
68. Dda. p. 168.
69. Dda. p. 168.

CHAPTER V

‘LATE’ DERRIDA: THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

5.1 From the Deconstructive Turn to the Pictorial Turn

The classification of the voluminous writings of Derrida into different periods is a topic of discussion among his commentators. According to Richard Rorty, “Derrida’s work divides into an earlier, more professorial period and a later period in which his writings become more eccentric, personal and original”. Rorty sees Derrida more involved in public project during the earlier period but in the later period, he seemed to have turned away from philosophy and toward literature, as having written as a writer rather than as a philosopher. This Rortian approach as Gasche’ observes, sees the early Derrida as in search of “the mysterious transcendental “conditions of possibility” dreamed up by Kant” and getting entangled in “the thoroughly deceptive question” of such transcendental notions.¹ This is proved to be false, even according to Norris.

Labelling of Derrida’s early work as an example of professional philosophy, according to Francis Ferguson, is the outcome of recognizing it with Rorty’s own earlier work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Ferguson is not certain that whether he can divide up Derrida’s career and

speak authoritatively of its different eras. For Ferguson, the continuity of Derrida is the continuity of philosophical analysis in which ‘writing’ and ‘reading’ receives a place of genuine philosophical analysis. It is here Derrida practiced a ‘noncannonizing’ approach to the text. He makes *two* points:

1. Nothing divides the text and the world. Both text and the world are similarly touched by the distribution of emphasis.
2. No complete interpretation: Reading distributes emphases; it redistributes emphases, and it alters relative weight. Texts are continuously open to re-marking.

W.J.T Mitchell, on the other hand distinguished *three* major periods in the philosophical career of Derrida. These are:

1. The early ‘radical’ phase was deconstruction of Western metaphysics from Plato onwards and it was oriented towards questions of language, writing and literature and technical discussions of center/margin etc.
2. The middle defensive period connected with the de Man affair and,
3. The late Derrida period with the moment of moving to the ‘borders’ of deconstruction.

These three periods convey an inherent appeal in which deconstruction was first *discovered*, *defended* in the second and *deconstructed* in the *third* period.

The 'lateness' is the lastness, finality, finitude, and of course, death itself-leads to the problematic of the *post- deconstruction*, that marked the final decade of Derrida's life. If limit is characterized by death, the question whether deconstruction is dying is significant. Mitchell quotes Derrida as saying that deconstruction is clearly *dying*. Unlike death of person, deconstruction has been clearly dying for quite awhile it continues dying for sometime to come. In the US (as against France), 'deconstruction still seems to be dying quite a bit.'

It looks as if there is nothing that waits to be deconstructed. It does not have a definite limit. Even if nothing is there, there is something that cannot be deconstructed. It is here Derrida remarks that deconstruction as moving towards its borders, to the edges of the conditional, to the realm of the limit or the limitless, the unconditional and unconditioned, the pure, the absolute, and ideal – in short, the undeconstructable to which he sometimes gave the name of justice'.² So not everything is meant to be deconstructed; there is something which is not deconstructable. This is justice. 'Deconstruction is justice'.

This is also the period in which Derrida comes to the public sphere with topics other than philosophy such as politics, ethics, religion and even in the urgent issues of the day, he also responded to events and contemporary issues at the invitation of others and speak out with surprising unpredictable

results. This is also the period in which a 'pictorial' turn takes place in modern studies of culture and media. If, in the world of ideas, the closing of the case is the equivalent of death, nailing the coffin shut, Derrida's effect on thought was precisely one of continual resurrection, the insistence on opening ourselves to what is to come, or (in more anxious modes) what threatens to come back..³

This continual resurrection is obtained by means of analysis. It is an analysis that began in terms of binary oppositions and which has exercised in larger socio-political context in the later period, which can be called 'a parallax view', as termed by Slavoj Žižek, an intervention that changes the angle of vision ever so slightly, with momentous consequences.⁴ Such momentous consequences are more felt in the 'late' rather than the 'early' Derrida.

During the late period, Derrida is also responsible for moving beyond the "linguistic turn" (as Rorty described) in the human sciences toward a 'pictorial' turn, thus marking a swerve from language to images where he invokes spectrality, imagination, fantasy as 'graphemes', echoing the 'philosophemes' or 'phonemes'. The various figures that are evoked *are image, morphe, eidos* and especially phantasm. He is also said to have renewed the traditional disciplines such as aesthetics, iconology and art history, and the emergence of new formations such as visual culture, and the

study of media, as well as its equally important *immateriality* – that renders all things or objects – all “beings” in other words – un-canny”.⁵

Among the very large number of topics that Derrida had discussed during this period, some of them are as follows:

(1) Political sovereignty, democracy and rogue states (2) law and justice (3) animal rights (4) the university (5) the idea of Europe (6) television (7) the ‘return’ of the “Abrahamic” religions of the book (8) secularism (9) religion (10) hospitality (11) violence (12) terrorism and the war on terror (13) Capital punishment etc.,

Let us take some of the above topics as specimen for discussion. *Firstly*, the deconstruction of sovereignty. It appears in his work *Voyous*, at the outset of which Derrida put the concept of sovereignty into question after that in several other texts, it occurs and vindicates that sovereignty is not just the modern system of states and its international components but it is also ethics, law and human relations.

Speaking about the ‘rogue’ state, D state that the rogue state “does not respect the state duties before the law of the world community..... it scoff at the law..... it betrays law, always as an exception..... looking at times this angle, and citing Chomsky’s *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs* and Robert Litwak’s *Rogue States and U.S Foreign Policy*, Derrida confirms that “the most perverse, violent and destructive of *Rogue*

States would thus be, first the United States and occasionally its allies' (V, p 139).

The meaning of sovereignty as supreme authority within a territory associated with historical sequence of sovereigns (God, King, people, nation, will) dates from the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) when interference with other states governing prerogatives became unacceptable. Following upon the ontotheological right of a sovereign, by Carl Schmitt, Derrida states that "a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception [and he has] the right to suspend the law". In the U.S it is manifested itself in the right of the President. In such contexts, the meaning of sovereignty is linked with the use of force and the principle of might is right.

Derrida's deconstruction also tries to demonstrate the non-democratical features of sovereignty. Here "the idea of a sovereign is contradictory (one over many), the concept of exception (being above the law), the notion of the death penalty (contravening the right to life of the citizen), and the fact that "only small states ever see their sovereignty contested and disputed by powerful states..... Powerful states never allow their own sovereignty to be challenged."⁶ Besides, there is the non-democratic role of the U.S in "playing a virtually sovereign role among sovereign states, it also dominates the inner circle of United Nations. The

non-democratic Security Council is therefore exercising a sovereign unilateralism and it makes Derrida to say that

‘As always, these two principles, democracy and sovereignty, are at once and by turns indissociable and in contradiction with each other. For Democracy to be real, in order to grant space to a right to assert its idea, and to become actual, it requires the *cratie* [power] of the *demos* [people] – in this case of the global *demos*. Thus it requires a sovereignty, namely a force stronger than all others in the world. But if the constitution of this force is indeed destined in principle to represent and protect this global democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it at the outset.’⁷

Despite the aporias of sovereignty found in modern democratic forms, Derrida tries to preserve it in its limited and shared forms. Derrida’s own political prophetic words in the context on the ‘War on Terror’ is expressed as follows:

‘The idea and even the practice of shared sovereignty, that is, of a limitation of sovereignty, has been accepted for a long time now. And yet such a divisible or shared sovereignty already contradicts the pure concept of sovereignty..... The

deconstruction of sovereignty has thus already began and it will have no end.’⁸

Here Derrida asks, how are we to reconcile unconditional *auto-homy* (the foundation of any pure ethics, the sovereignty of the subject, of the ideal of emancipation and of freedom) and the hetero-nomy that imposes itself upon all unconditional hospitality worthy of this name?

In its very foundation, sovereignty therefore functions with autonomy, freedom and force “Human rights post and presuppose the human being as sovereign (equal, free, self determined)” (V, p. 128). Again, “All the fundamental axiomatics of responsibility of decision (ethical, juridical, political) are grounded on the sovereignty of the subject, that is, the intentional auto-determination of the conscious self (which is free, autonomous, active etc.)” (WA, p. xix). Derrida’s conclusion is that one cannot simply ignore the sovereign self, its liberty, equality, responsibility and power any more than the sovereign nations state”. In his late texts, Derrida extends the meaning of sovereignty to God, ruler, reason, nation-state, people, subject, the asylum city, university and domicile.⁹

The political pragmatism of Derrida also operates under the name of negotiation. It adopts a well-known double strategy/gesture signaled by the deconstructive formula. For example, in connection with the matter of nation-state sovereignty, Derrida vehemently declared that “according to the

situation, I am antisovereignist or sovereignist – and I claim the right to be antisovereignist here and sovereignist there” (D & D p. 153). But being an unconditional sovereignist, Derrida put the sovereignty again into question. In either case, sovereignist and anti-sovereignist are not two separate, dissociated positions, instead they haunt one another like that of other Derridean quasi-transcendental concepts. What is working here is the key pragmatic feature of Derridean deconstruction which is the conditionality of the unconditional. This is hereby supports Derrida’s gesture to Gasche’s condition of impossibility on Norris’s condition of possibility, but given both, it embodies a double-gesture. What I want to draw from this, this binary equivalent offers no support to Gasche or Norris, but to Derrida. There is no reason to think of them as Kantian categories.

Derrida’s usage for rewriting of the university and of the authority appears in his famous work *‘The University Without Condition’*, such a rewriting is essential since Derrida is inclined to turn the question of some mutation in the essence of the university back toward the university’s permanent non-conformity with its most fundamental claims. Taking university’s own permanent non-conformity with its own fundamental claims, Derrida remarks the university of excellence turns out to be the sheer fact of administration. In different to knowledge – and to our own careers, the fact of our professionalism is the ongoing institutions of this indifference. It could be done within the terms of its dailiness ie its classrooms and curricula, the

teams thrown which use recognize one another work, the means of our governance. It is a process of university within the infinite ruin. To do this might be to discover a process of university in the infinite ruin of the university. It is the ruin what he calls university in deconstruction. Because there were no university apart from its reinvention at every moment in each of its parts or as if the responsibility for what one might call *la chose universitaire*. Here University is the origin of the absolute if we take this as a name for or imagination of *la chose universitaire*.

According to Stephen Melville, this proposition resembles Hegel's own propositions, as for example in the Phenomenology's exposition of the speculative proposition. A repetition of this can also be found in Heidegger. Heidegger makes out clear that what Hegel means in such phrasings of absolute knowledge, according to which the meaning is "knowledge self-moving and in its own shape." Here the absolute knowledge is first of all not relative and thus that it is not knowledge of anything external to it in any sense. It says that

"For knowledge to be qualitatively other than relative knowledge, for it to be other than a knowledge which is carried over to what is known and is bound there, it must remain bound but must liberate and absolve itself from what it knows and yet as so absolved, as absolute, still be a knowledge. To be ab-

solved from what is known does not mean “abandoning” it, but “preserving it by elevating it”. [HP, p. 15].¹⁰

Now let us turn our attention to how Derrida deals with the notion of ‘justice’. Derrida places deconstruction on the side of justice. Deconstruction is the undeconstructive demand, desire, and need for some notion of a justice to come. He says

Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself. If such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice. It is perhaps became law..... is constructible, in a sense that goes beyond the opposition between convention and nature, it is perhaps insofar as it goes beyond this, opposition that it is constructible and so deconstructable.¹¹

Both justice and deconstruction are Kantian regulative ideals, neither they are teleological horizons for which we might plan in some projected futurity. They are what arrives or simple what happens. The above understanding conflates with the understanding one normally comes across in the west. It is this symptomatic understanding that led Norris to valorize Derridianism as a species of Kantianism throughout his writings. It is this understanding that prompts writers to call the ‘Algerian Jew’ and the ‘Palestinian Christian’, (Said,) bracketing the Continental Habermas, with

whom Derrida shared the response to 9/11. Not only that Derrida comes closer to Habermas but it was said that Habermas was keen that Derrida respond to this in this way and he only signed it.

Deconstruction acts like a earthquake, a violent disruption in the system of structure of checks and balances. It has no specific method. The role of deconstructor is like that of seismologist who traces the disturbances, locate their origins, describe their qualities. Following Walter Benjamin this can be called the nature violence of deconstruction.

Here if Derrida expresses that there is no method of deconstruction, for the question of Freddy Tellez that to deconstruct really is to battle, Derrida's reply comes as follows:

Indeed, if you take deconstruction as a method, with its own logic, its tradition, its modalities of application, and so on, it can become something like that. And it is becoming that. Thus, when it is received, it becomes that..... that deconstruction is talked about as if it were some kind of grand method, a new logic, a kind of logistics then, too, in the military sense..... So I think that if deconstruction involves war, I find it much more interesting as a war in you sense, as a nomadic war, if you will, a war consisting of small clandestine operations rather than a big war and battle in which the lines need to be brown.¹²

5.2 Kantian or not? Gasche/Norris

One major reason for Kantianising Derrida is seen in the way Derrida subscribes to enlightenment ideals of reason; another reason is that Derrida uses the phrase ‘condition of possibility’ and ‘conditions of impossibility’ in more or less similar version to convey a Kantian-like image. Both are not favoured in the writings of late Derrida, where it becomes almost evident he is not subscribing to those ideals, nor is he using these terms except to make a double-gesture which leads to ‘heterogeneity’ and thenceforward to deconstruction. What makes late Derrida interesting beyond mere superficial reality is that he hones up the analytical skills to such an extent that he both deconstructs in overcoming limits, and at the same time returns to analysis in a more succinct sense in which he is both a filtered reader and of both *texts* and *images*.

Derrida has often been criticized for collapsing the genre-distinction between philosophy and literature and deconstruction has been described as one offshoot – ‘a philosophical offshoot of wider post-modernist or counter – enlightenment drift. Rortian reading of deconstruction in ‘philosophy as a kind of writing’, states that ‘we should take Derrida with a large pinch of ironic postmodernist salt when he goes on about *diffe’rance* – with – an *a*, logocentrism, the western ‘metaphysics of presence’, and such like deconstructive variants on the old idea of philosophy as a quest for ultimate

(albeit, in this case ineffable) truths (Rorty 1982; also 1989 and 1991)'. According to Rudolph Gasche, 'Derrida is in the business of providing philosophical *arguments*, or that he has somehow 'radicalized' the project of philosophy by showing that it generates conceptual problems beyond its own power to contain or comprehend (Gasche 1986, 1994). Rorty finds that Derrida himself once was subject to this same unfortunate delusion. This can be traced out in his early work on Husserl and his *echt*-deconstructionist yet minutely analytic and distinctly philosophical body of writing on Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and others.

Commentators like Gasche find in these texts the deployment of a 'quasi-transcendental' modes of reasoning and arguments emanated from the spirit of Kantian project of enlightened critique and at the same time questions that project with regard to its own values, presupposition and unthought axiomatics. This aspect of Derrida's work, according to Rorty, we should ignore, rather we should view him as playing 'bad cousin Derrida' to 'honest old uncle Kant' and as making the point-in his later texts – that philosophy is indeed a 'kind of writing' in order to shake off its self-image as a privileged discourse of reason and truth. 'So if we want to carry on reading 'early' Derrida then we had much better to do so in the spirit of postmodern ironists who have picked up a lesson or two from 'late' Derrida, instead of supposing (like Gasche' and Norris) that the late texts only make any kind of sense if one treats them as performative elaborations of themes first broached – to

more convincing effect – in the work of Derrida’s early period.¹³ The well-known Derridean critique of traditional binary concepts and the eccentric focus on margins remain today powerful tools of analysis.¹⁴ This stands in full support of the perspective we have developed here in the thesis.

No doubt the readings of Kant scattered across the late works incisive and productive, but they are to be gathered under such political headings as cosmopolitans in responsibility, decision, justice, forgiveness, force, reason (that is reason of state), where he is in mood to above or return to a Kantian standpoint.

Mitchell raises with an inquisitive blend of truth and horror:

Derrida invoking the Enlightenment? This will only surprise those who forget that it was the enlightenment and the Goddess of Reason that presided over the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. Reason is on the side of both terror *and counterterror*. This insight is crucial to the understanding of deconstruction as a rational operations, one that traces the fault lines in any system or structure¹⁵

It can be said that Derrida’s commitment to democracy, justice and internationalism shows that he is a political optimist, while his ubiquitous nuances and qualifications displayed a seasoned scepticism alert to conscious and unconscious deceptions. As a gifted writer, Derrida was always capable

of finding motifs previously, in retrospect surprisingly unnoticed. Further, similar to that of Kant's account of the profession of the book in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Derrida construes that texts have often been used to guide practice (to serve as the method for choices that one would otherwise not know how to make). In Kant's account, doctors, lawyers, divines need not have experience but can always point to their guiding rules, to this texts and these techniques for generating experience when one fails to be able to point to experience that one already has.

With reference to Norris's book in the *Contest of Faculties*, Kant contests, whereas Norris deconstructs, thus both miss the 'real' conflict, which forms the staple of Habermas's philosophical discourse. Here let us see how Dr. Kanthamani defends Habermas against Norris's unsympathetic reading.

"What gives us the initial shock is the question as to how these two incompatible motifs become the simultaneous targets of Norris's critique. To begin with, deconstruction is poised to contest or deconstruct the Kantian presumption of autonomy of faculties of pure reason, as reflected in the tripartite distinction between the cognitive, ethical and the aesthetic on the one hand, and again it targets the valorizing of the one as a model over the others, especially the aesthetics over the others. On the other hand, it also finds their commensurability in the way it makes aesthetics as playing a

mediating role in the way Kant has done in his *Conflict of Faculties*, which remains just an extension of the first or second *Critique*. Thus the alleged *modus vivendi* is more a movement from the first to the second *Critique* and more natural at that, even while granting that the first is a sort of mirror image of the third, rather than the less natural movement from the third to the second, with all the fractal imago, and this is what that is posed to celebrate the above interface with that alleged idea of *sensus communis*. That is, no doubt, post-modernism also wants to differ from it by privileging the aesthetic, but at the same time, it ends up with creating a rift between different phrase regimes. As Norris tells us, there are two sides to the post-modernist stance against metanarratives. On the one side, they set their hearts against any conflation between them, by proscribing any extrapolation between one regime (the cognitive) to the other (the aesthetic), and running the risk of ultra-nominalism, and secondly, they are also equally against accepting a revisionist reading of this as privileging, aesthetics, which is supposed to provide a model for political practice. The aesthetizing of political on the other hand, emerges as the inimitable source and model for all forms of aesthetic ideology, but it is only too weak since it ends up with the consequent potential for an ‘inverted Platonism’. Such an inverted Platonism inaugurates a dangerous vision of society with its anti-realism or scepticism or irrationalism and it is thought that deconstruction has the true potency for realistic counter and it is, therefore, the best candidate for sponsoring an

ideologiekritik. Calling the above as yet another transcendental illusion, Norris suggests that the most appropriate tool in this contest is provided by deconstruction: we must deconstruct the aesthetic ideology, as it was demonstrated in the theorization and practice by Paul de Man within the precincts of literary criticism. This tantamounts to showing that the functions of literary criticism still depends on textual close-reading. In brief, whereas deconstruction mediates theory and practice, post-modernism divides their unity. One can safely attribute the analytical motif to the former, but not to the later. That is, deconstruction extends the Kantian theme of the condition of possibility of each of the above three faculties in the direction of marking out the conditions of impossibility as the further, much less understood, limits of the Kantianized critique, here being the critique of literal or aesthetic discourse, and thus it is well motivated to follow a close Kantian reading of Kant. So, there is a specific need to push the argument in one direction. The Kantian beginnings of deconstruction are amply attested to by holding that deconstruction starts off where Kant leaves off. This bespeaks of a contrast to his later thesis which characteristically abandons it in favour of a quasi-differentiation between ethics and aesthetics where his motto seems to be: ethicize aesthetics before aestheticizing politics. It seems to be clear that by virtue of the acceptance of the above analytical divide, Norris cannot relish the thesis, which shows that the stuff that makes deconstruction as well as post-modernism are both offshoots of the analytical traditions in philosophy.

Norris has no patience for any such argumentation that could possibly show that they are rooted in analytic traditions. If so, he can hardly convince any analytic philosopher about the soundness of his enterprise by simply showing that deconstruction is tolerably arguable and hence it can fall within the analytical mode of discourse while post-modernism falls without. Conversely, the above interface can be sustained to stay, Norris things, only when it becomes fine-grained enough to withstand the onslaughts both from post-modernists as well as from contra-post-modernists (hermeneuticists) like Habermas. The deconstructive contesting can, therefore, be defended for its analytical rigour against the attacks leveled against both by post-modernists and hermeneuticists alike. Norris's analogy between epistemic and evaluative concerns (a similar analogy is warranted in the context of Foucault's pre-revisionary reading of Kantian individualist ethic, where Norris's difficulties about ascetic-aesthetic interface become much more apparent) in lieu of the contest, may not work after all by simply granting the analogy between taste for the beautiful and the desire for justice. In what follows, I shall directly defend Lyotard's version of the aesthetic-aesthete interface for providing a far more superior analytical paradigm, depending on materials which Norris hardly utilizes for arriving at the so-called truth about post-modernism, and thereby indirectly defend the Habermasian completion of the project as providing a more coherent convergence between analytical and post-modernist ethos."

5.3 The Post-Deconstructionist Tools of Analysis

A best example of the role of Derrida as a philosopher on the public sphere can be drawn elaborately in the context of Derrida's own response at the 9/11 incident. Here Giovanna Borradori's attempt to gather the responses of the two leading philosophers of our time, Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, is quite remarkable. The philosophers in the rival paradigms replied differently. When Habermas defended it registering no quarrel with modernism, Derrida rejected it. The matter becomes a *querelle* between modernism and post-modernism. What is to be noted in this context is that both look at the holocaust as an event of the past that move them to reflect. In general, it was mixed with issues on secularism, globalization, constitutional history, the role of UN for the peace of the world etc. But in the case of Derrida it is something more than that for which we focus our attention. Here the role of Derrida as 'philosopher deconstructor' is expressed as follows.

A 'philosopher' (actually I would prefer to say 'philosopher-deconstructor') would be some one who analyses and then draws the practical and effective consequences of the relationship between our philosophical heritage and the structure of the still dominant juridico-political system, that is so clearly undergoing mutation. A 'philosopher' would be

someone who seeks a new criteriology to distinguish between ‘comprehending and justification’.¹⁶

This new method of ‘comprehension and justification, is exercised in his response to 9/11 discussions organized by Giovanna Borradori. It is remarkable for its almost clinical and analytical tone and for its emphasis on the *fantasmatic*, speculation, and mediated character of terrorism. Derrida argues that “the real terror consisted of and, in fact, began by exposing and exploiting..... the image of this terror by the target itself”.¹⁷ Derrida viewed terrorism and the so-called war on terror in terms of a cold war that becomes the major global image of conflict. The attack of September 11 therefore acts as a cold in the head, a global head cold that had now mutated in an “*auto-immunitary* process..... that strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-*suicidal* fashion, ‘itself’ works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself *against* its ‘own’ immunity”.¹⁸ (PTT p. 92-94)

By selecting the image autoimmunity as a tool for analyzing modern terrorism, it becomes an image with considerable surplus value, whose immediate applicability is startling and continues to resonate well beyond the use he makes of it. As stated by Donna Haraway “the immune system is both an iconic mythic object in high-technology culture and a subject of research and clinical practice of the first importance.¹⁹ Here the metaphor plays a double role, its status as “iconic” on the one hand and as an indispensable

research tool on the other. In that sense, it exceeds the meaning of a mere metaphor, a loose analogy to haunt us in the biological figures that are part of the ordinary language for describing terrorism and in the language of biomedical research. By using this image, Derrida tries to bring out the ancient figure of the body politic. The image also directs us to see the collective, society, the nation, mankind, even all things as one body, is *reversible*. It also states the necessity of our speaking irrespective of our interest in the political body or body politic. In that sense, the very notion of immunity as such is originally based in a socio-political discourse not a biological one.

The words *heilig*, *holy*, and *sacrificial* connect Derrida's concept of the autoimmunitary in his earlier thinking about religion and about sacrifice as an essential feature of the three "religions of the Book". The Latin words *immunitas* and *immunis* have their origin in the legal concept of exemption, "a sense that returns in the notion of diplomatic immunity". In the broader sense, the whole theory of the immune system and the discipline of immunology is riddled with images drawn from the sociopolitical sphere of invaders and defenders, hosts and parasites, natives and aliens and of borders and identities that must be maintained. By taking terror as autoimmunity, Derrida is bringing the metaphor home and at the same time he sends it abroad extending it to the limits of the world.

The bipolar image thus creates a situation in which there is *no literal* meaning but it resonates between two images such as the bio-medical and the political. The absence of literal meaning thus caught us in the circuit two realms of discourse. For Derrida, this admission of ignorance is crucial because the real politics of the autoimmunity metaphor, beyond its power to deconstruct all the easy, Manichean binary oppositions that have structured the war on terror; is the restaging of terrorism as a condition that needs to be thought through analytically, systematically, and without moral tub-thumbing, exactly as we would approach the diagnosis of a medical condition.²⁰ It also says in order to address terrorism with any hopes of an effective cure “a mutation *will have* to take place in our entire way of thinking on topics like democracy. Sovereignty, globalization, military power etc. What is to learn in this context is that it says that pre-established certainties are exactly the wrong medicine.

A clue that is to be derived from the metaphor (and the literal operations) is that there are two systems in the human body that are capable of learning. One is the nerve system and the other is the immune system. It learns by clonal selection, the production of anti-bodies that mirror the invading antigens and bond them, killing them. The implications of Derrida’s intentions to use the image is here more explicit. It means that the appropriate strategy for international terrorism is not war, but rational, open, public institutions of international justice.

Adapting Marshall MacLuhan's term the "central nervous system" of the social body, Derrida calls the "techno-economic power of the media", which has been traumatized by an image – the spectacle, the word, above all the *number as enigmatic name 9/11*. This image, the spectacle of destruction of the Twin Towers, has been cloned repeatedly in the collective global system. In other words, the attack was not immediately on the immune system but on the nerve system. When the nerve system is in a state of panic, anxiety, depression etc., the immune system has a tendency to respond in appropriately as well. Here Derrida gives a proper reply for those who calls him as an obscurantist or nihilist.

It is once again a question of the Enlightenment, that is, of access to Reason in a certain public space, though this time in conditions that techno science and economic or telemedia globalization have thoroughly transformed..... if intellectuals, writers, scholars, professors, writers and journalists do not, before all else, stand up together against such violence, their abdication will be at once irresponsible and suicidal.²¹

In the context of the above para, Derrida is reminding us the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. It says it was the Enlightenment and the Goddess of Reason that presided over the Reign of Terror. This insight according to W.J.T Mitchell is crucial to the understanding of deconstruction

as a rational operation, one that traces the fault lines in any system or structure. Finally Mitchell asks, is deconstruction itself a species of auto immunity? The answer is that Derrida places deconstruction on the side of justice, of the undeconstructable demand, desire, and need for some notion of a justice to come.

5.4 Euro-centric/Indo-centric

Whether deconstruction is Euro-centric or Indo-centric is also a matter that needs discussion. There are Indian writers like Gurbhagat Singh etc., who finds parallels of deconstruction in the very many eastern philosophies such as Tao, Zen, Sunyavada, the philosophy of Nagarjuna etc. Before coming to that discussion I wish to focus my attention on the European context in which deconstruction has taken place.

According to Derrida *to be* means to inherit. This concept of inheritance in general, Derrida has been pointed out in his brief remarks devoted in *Specters of Marx*. It says that one is an heir even before one explicitly assumes or rejects a particular inheritance. According to Derrida “that we *are* heirs does not mean that we *have* or that we receive this or that, some inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that, but that the *being* of what we are *is* first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not”. Derrida, further states that “inheritance is never a *given*, it is always a task”; it is something still before us, to which we have to bear witness as that which

“we are insofar as we *inherit*”.²² This task is above all in *being* for Europeans by means of which they assume the memory of Europe. This does not give any nostalgia or traditionalist fervor, for them. At the same time, being understood as a task, the affirmation of this inheritance becomes a call for a radical transformation of what has been handed down. The prime duty of the European therefore is to take responsibility for this heritage, that is the modern tradition of reflecting on European identity.

This European identity is always established in relation to alterity to the other, the non-European. Responsibility toward this heritage therefore also becomes the responsibility to the other. It consists in the double injunction of being faithful to “an idea of Europe, [to] a difference of Europe, but [to] a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in “its own identity” (O.H. p. 29). In other words, the responsibility Europeans bear for all of the traditional discourses on European identity, of which “old Europe seems to have exhausted all the possibilities” is thus a responsibility toward responsibility, indeed, toward the concept of responsibility itself (O H p 26).²³ What is more specific in these lines is that for Derrida, the prime responsibility of the European is one toward the tradition of the discourses and counter-discourses concerning his own identification. This has been made more pointedly clear in *‘For What Tomorrow..... A Dialogue*, in which Derrida remarks that “the concept of responsibility has no sense at all outside of an experience of inheritance”.²⁴

It is this perspective in the first two chapters of *The Gift of Death* that Derrida engages Jan Patočka's views on the genealogy of European responsibility as it is presented in *Heretical Essays In the Philosophy of History*. Not only Patočka's views, in *The Gift of Death*, also engages the views of Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas and Søren Kierkegaard etc.,. The main tenets of the European responsibility can be stated as follows. It is the responsibility that require the invention of a new way in which to renew, revive, or replay the figure, concept or idea of Europe. European responsibility is first of all, this openness to both traditions of responsibility, namely Platonism and Christianity. Above all it is the responsibility of uncompromising willingness to assume the challenge posed by the aporetic nature of inheritance itself- that is, it shows its capacity to negotiate contradiction in the absence of handed down rules or norms. Apart from the historical and cultural intra-European cultural differences for which it is being hospitable, the name of Europe stands for the demand of unconditional receptiveness of the tradition of the non-European other. It means that Europe is the idea of an identity predicated on aporetic demands hence it becomes a mode of being that has a infinitely open structurality rather than a closure. The conclusion is that 'Europe, neither a figure nor a concept, neither an idea nor even an idea in the Kantian sense – all of which presuppose a formal unity of what they represent or name – is something that can be realized only by way of approximation, something whose very

conception remains open, still, perhaps forever – unfinished, name, something to come.²⁵

Derrida's reference to heritage does not imply that he would dismiss the notion of tradition. But in contrast to Gadamer, Derrida does not hold that tradition to be homogenous. Even though repeatedly he notes that "it is no longer possible to *use* seriously the words of tradition and that in the end all concepts of tradition have to be put aside", he also "reaffirms the necessity of making recourse to them, at least, in a crossed-out fashion. Responsibility to the tradition and its deconstruction go hand in hand".

Seen in this light Derrida may not agree to the Indo-centric reading. He is Euro-centric. Derrida remained resolutely and self-consciously Euro-centric in philosophy and politics, sovereignty pertains to the domicile.

However we shall consider a down-to-right pedestrian reading of deconstruction (Gurbhagat Singh). Many thinkers argue that deconstruction is much closer to the many so-called ethnophilosophies such as Tao, Zen, Sunyavada, the philosophy of Nagarjuna, varieties of Sufism and the like, but no one has established this is so. Gurbhagat Singh in his 'Western Poetics and Eastern Thought', says that the absolutist dynamics of the deconstruction are fashioned out of our acute dualism or Dvaita, as the Upanishadic text would say. When the Upanishad defines Brahman or the Totality of what is by technique of negation as *Neti-Neti* or Not-Not, it is pointing up the danger

of what Derrida has called “the presence”. The Upanishadic text tells us of the identity of the self or *Atma* with the totality-of-what-is, in terms of nothing or not which means in the Derridean sense “the absence”. The relation that the Upanishad sets up is not with an absolute that is separated from the world or creation, but with the totality-of what is.²⁶ Singh takes the Upanishadic *Atma* as close to being the Derridean signifier *minus* the problematic of Derrida as it cannot liberates itself from its meaning-centered or transcendental semiology. He registers no comparison. Derrida’s play of the language differential is a-worldic and for that reason a-historical, a-environmental and alienistic, which would not be the case if we follow the Upanishadic ‘relation’ of the self with the Totality-of-What is.²⁷

Gurbhagat Singh also reads Nagarjuna, the second century A.D. Buddhist philosopher with that of Derrida. According to Nagarjuna, it is not possible to intuit or to attain in the faculty of *prajna* unless the absolute is understood as the unconditioned form of the conditioned world. In his famous work *Vgrahvyavartani*, Nagarjuna, suggests a middle path according to which “there is not the slightest difference between *samsara* and *nirvana*. By doing this, in other sense, Nagarjuna was attacking the absolute concept that bypass the world, because it is not possible to absolutize rationally since everything is co-dependent. The co-dependence has also been called emptiness or *Sunyata*, we cannot equate this *sunyata* to Derridean differance. If *sunyata* is an expressional luminosity of balance realized by the seeker in

an experience of cosmic equilibrium, Derridean differance is theoretically non-expressive. Although both Buddhist and Derridean frameworks speak of text that is empty, the very idea of emptiness is different. In the former if the sense of emptiness is a balance a relativity experienced by the seeker or reader if we apply the theory to the enterprise of critical reading, the totality of the text would be constituted by a non-schizophrenia or dialogistic energy, whereas in the latter, the emptiness would come out the *differance*, the play of the signifier that has obliterated the signified and has become an intuition.

If we consider Derrida's views on religious secularism, mysticism (mysterious tremendous) etc., it is clear that nothing warrants a comparison. But Robert Magliola, another scholar, also finds parallelism. between Nagarjuna and Derrida. To him, Derrida is Nagarjuna in a modern western garb. Such a comparison, according to Harold Coward, is not compatible with the very essence of the idea of these philosophers because for Sankara and Nagarjuna, language must be cancelled for the real to be experienced, for Derrida the real is most directly experienced in the very centre of language (there is nothing outside of the text).²⁸ This is no direct comparison.

Compared to the above, it is comforting to know that Coward also finds so many parallelisms and contrasts between Sankara and Derrida somewhat precisely on the following points. (1) The relation of language to the real (2) Sankara *versus* Derrida on the nature of the real and (3) The end

goal: language as a call for action *versus* a revelation of intuitive knowledge.²⁹

There must be a direct comparison between the non-directly and the binary code but no one has taken it very seriously.

Coward's study begins with the often quoted and much discussed Derridean phrase, 'There is nothing outside the text'. This Derridean phrase as has been discussed by many, Coward says, does not indicate a denial of God on reality that led to a new form of nihilism, instead, it reflects the Derridean notion of the real which is presented in the very dynamic of language itself. Bhartrhari's description of language as beginninglessly intertwined with all consciousness and identified with the real in the fore of the *sabdatattva*, Coward says can be found almost very near to this Derridean phrase. But at the time we come to Sankara this situation seems changed. Sankara disagrees with the grammarians identification of language with Brahman and in that sense the Derridean phrase 'there is nothing outside of the text' does not come under Sankar's percept. For Sankara Brahman, the real, exists as separate from language in that when language is cancelled out (as in the final direct perception prompted by *tat tvam asi*) Brahman alone remains. Language as part of *maya* is ultimately unreal.³⁰ However, only by means of language as Veda, the Brahman, the real can be realized. For such a realization even the language of Sruthi, has to be cancelled out or transcended. This is because the essential characteristic of language is difference which is antithetical to identity or monism explained by Sankara's

Advaita theory. The difference of all language is part of *maya* which conceals Brahman from our vision.

Now let us discuss the points Derridean departure from Sankara. If difference is part of *avidya* which has to be overcome in the case of Sankara, it is difference as manifested in the dynamic tension of language that is the real for Derrida, says Coward. Similar is that of Saussure, Derrida says, all language finds its source in *différance*. The movement of '*différance*' is the arche-trace in which contains the possibility for all speech and writing. The real is the dynamic expressive difference of language. All thought, speech and writing exists at the moment of difference and makes possible the opposition between signifier and signified. The term *avidya* which in Sankara stands for the obstruction of the knowledge of the real, a functional parallel of which can be found in Derrida in the form of one of the opposites of language over other and thereby destroying the dynamic tension between the opposites. Thus according to Coward, it is the tension between the opposites which is for Derrida the hallmark of the real. Since these opposites are not maintained in dynamic tension, but placed in a hierarchical order of first priority, many of traditional philosophy has engaged in a privileging of identity over difference.³¹

This Derridean notion of *différance* can be considered as a critique of Sankara's emphasis on identity. In the words of Coward, on closer analysis,

the two are seen to be engaged in a similar philosophical tactic. Just as Sankara would use the conceptual term 'identity' as simply a hint or pointer as to the nature of the real, so also Derrida admits that his use of 'difference' to indicate the nature of the real must be constantly deconstructed. Both Sankara and Derrida agree that the conceptual oppositions that make up language are the obstacles that get in our way of the experience of the real. Identifying oneself with either of the terms that make up these oppositions (e.g., 'identity' for Sankara, 'difference' for Derrida) is the trap of language that must be overcome.³² If Sankara's philosophy speaks of transcending the language altogether, Derrida's enquiry rests within the language taking a middle position between the pair of opposites. Hence, Coward says that both Sankara and Derrida have a practical goal in mind in their philosophy of language. This is the goal of spiritual self-realization.³³

The many parallels that Coward finds between Sankara and Derrida are far away from the term deconstruction as meant by Derrida. The practical goal of spiritual self realization as attributed by Coward in the case of Derrida may be due to the Derridean quest for the other. It is this quest of Derrida, makes Norris to define, Derrida as a transcendental philosopher for which the latter restricted his reply with a simile.

In Sankara's method of realizing the self by means of negation, at the end of it, language itself is denounced to a formless, qualityless, timeless state

in which the other in the form of supreme is found. Compared to this, the Derridean notion of the 'other' is inextricably linked with the language and the concept of difference. The existence of the 'other' between the tensions of oppositions of language and beyond the limits of language in many respects varies and the latter outweighs the former. Because as Wittgenstein said, the limits of our language is the limit of our world, and the *differance* and the play of words cannot go beyond the very realm that language restricts. In that sense, the comparison of Derridean deconstruction with that of Sankara's philosophy is not quite compatible with. Hence it can be said that ethnophilosophies like *Sunyavada*, the philosophy of Nagarjuna, varieties of Suifsm etc. show affinities with parts of deconstruction, in so far as they transcendentalize extrasubjective authority, they are not quite "the same thing" as deconstruction. But in so far as they locate agency in the radically other (commonly called "fatalism"), the exorbitancy of the sphere of work in the ethical as figured by Derrida has something like a relationship with them.³⁴

5.5 Research Findings and Scope for

1. The Proposed interface between analysis and deconstruction is deemed to work at two levels.
 - (a) To bring Derrida with all the evidences one could muster to the fold of the major as well as other analytical tradition.

- (b) To defend the interpretation against narrow reading of Derrida as an analytical philosopher (cf. Norris) by suitably widening the tradition.
2. Such a widening was duly supported by theses (genetic affiliation and its consequent continuum hypothesis) from Føllesdal.
 3. A major shake-up of this idea is from the recently held symposium ‘Arguing with Derrida’, which christens Derrida as doing what is characterized as conceptual philosophy. Derrida’s reply in this context is very enlightening and it offers a boost to the thesis.
 4. It was found to be methodologically worthwhile to cut the whole thesis into a half-a-dozen major theses, which were liberally thrown into three motifs.
 5. Although it cannot be claimed that the understanding of Quine and Davidson cultivated by Wheeler is exactly to the point, it is enlightening to know that the broad comparison has a general pay off.
 6. This is not so in the case of Staten whose book opens up a new way of understanding Derrida’s encounter with Husserl.
 7. Many deconstructive notions such as *Pharmakon*, *differance*, *supplement* etc., have been elaborately worked out taking such consideration to the ‘logic’ behind them – a unique logic which feeds into the *aporia*.

8. Motif 3 handles Norris but not as it is received, but a serious attempt is made to look at his interpretation from a critical point of view. *Pace* Kanthamani who has criticized Kantianism on very specific grounds, we have toned up in the light of other theses.

9. Incidentally it has become necessary to look at the Austin – Derrida debate within the answer of speech – act philosophy of language. It is agreed on all hands (Simon Glendinning, A.W Moore including Norris) that the debate convey something extremely important. That is, they talk past to one another. This means that they meet at certain points. What exactly the point at which they meet. A hint is thrown at the way normative/parasitical/deviant expressions pose a binary challenge for a deconstructionist.

It is found that deconstruction throws up this idea but it is not fully worked out.

10. All these six theses and three motifs are better seen in the backdrop of analytic philosophy from Frege up to Searle. A succinct account distinguishing the different modes of philosophical analysis have been presented in the original form so as to enable to draw subtle points of comparison.

5.6 Scope for Research

The above theses of interface is not complete with a fresh look into normative deviant expression which has come to the fore in recent discussions of Derrida especially by Norris. This is likely to yield a more full-blooded interface which has not so far seen the light of they day. It also bears comparison, some interesting line of discussion that is taking place within cognitive science.

Notes

1. Rudolph Gasche, *Inventions of Difference*, p.4, quoted by Francis Ferguson in *Derrida and the Geometrical mode: The Line and the Point*, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007, vol. 33 Number 2. p. 315.
2. W.J.T. Mitchell, *Dead Again*, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007 vol. 33, Number 22. p. 222.
3. *Ibid.* p. 224.
4. *Ibid.* p. 223.
5. W.J.T Mitchell, *Picturing Terror: Derrida's Autoimmunity*, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007, vol. 33, Number 2, p. 279.
6. Derrida, *Negotiations : Inventions and Interviews, 1971-2001*. trans. And ed. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford, California 2002. p. 385.
7. Vincent. B. Leitch, *Politics of Sovereignty*, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007 vol. 33, Number 2, p. 234.
8. *Ibid.* p. 235.
9. Stephen Melville, "Allo? Allo?", *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007, vol. 33. Number 2, p. 341.
10. W.J.T Mitchell, *Picturing Terror: Derrida's Autoimmunity*, Winter 2007, vol. 33, Number 2, p. 286.
11. *Ibid.* p. 286.

12. Freddy Tellez and Bruno Mazzoldi, The Pocket-Size Interview with Jacques Derrida – *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007. vol.33. Number 2, p. 286.
13. D.T.P p.161.
14. Vincent B. Leitch, Politics of Sovereignty, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter, 2007. Number 2, p. 245.
15. W.J.T Mitchell, Picturing Terror: Derrida’s Autoimmunity, p. 286
16. J D B. p. 223.
17. W.J.T Mitchell, Picturing Terror: Derrida’s Autoimmunity, Winter 2007. vol. 33. Number 2, p. 279.
18. Ibid. p. 280.
19. Ibid. p. 281.
20. Ibid. p. 283.
21. Ibid. p. 285-286.
22. E. Rudolph Gashe’, European Memories: Jan Patočka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility, *Critical Inquiry*, Winter 2007, vol. 33, Number 2, p. 292.
23. Ibid. p. 292-93.
24. Ibid. p. 293.
25. Ibid. p. 311.
26. Gurbhagat Singh, *Western Poetics and Eastern Thought*, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1984. p. 49.

27. Ibid. p. 49.
28. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research vol. VI. Number 3
May-August 1987, p. 20.
29. Ibid. p. 13.
30. Ibid. p. 14.
31. Ibid. p. 15.
32. Ibid. p. 15.
33. Ibid. p. 16.
34. Michael Kell (ed). Encyclopedia of Aesthetics vol. 2, OUP 1978, p. 9.

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